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SUMMARY 
This master's thesis is a study of the intersection of naturalistic epistemology and 
transcendental phenomenology. The aim of the thesis is to assess wh ether or not, and 
to what extent, it is possible to bridge these frameworks. The thesis is divided into two 
chapters. The first chapter examines this issue of rapprochement from the point of view 
oftranscendental phenomenology. The chapter attempts to define a form ofnaturalism 
that is compatible with Husserl's transcendental phenomenological framework. After 
discussing varieties of naturalism and the projects the naturalize phenomenology, the 
first chapter examines the philosophical commitments of Husserl 's project and draws 
the partial conclusion that Husserl rejected almost every form of naturalism. The first 
chapter then tries to show that a minimalist variety of naturalism, what I call weak 
methodological naturalism, is in fact complementary to Husserl ' s framework. Drawing 
on Husserl ' s proposai of a science of the mind and lived body called somatology, I 
close the first chapter with the suggestion that a set of sciences, which I call sciences 
of constitution, might be apt to study the real structures that act as conditions of 
possibility for the experience of this or that kind of meaningful unity in lived 
experience. The second chapter addresses the question from the perspective of 
naturalistic epistemology and explores the issue of psychologism, or the relevance of 
psychology for epistemology. I first provide a brief history of psychologism in the 191h 
and 201h centuries. I then turn to the notion of psychologism and examine sorne of its 
varieties, in tine with my discussion of naturalism in the previous chapter. After 
reviewing a central change in the contemporary conception of epistemology, which I 
argue is interested (among other things) in the epistemic capacities of concrete agents, 
I present an argument for weak psychologism. I conclude the thesis with a constat 
d 'échec: the domains studied cannot be bridged for lack of basic agreement on main 
prem1ses. 
KEYWORDS: transcendental phenomenology, naturalistic epistemology, cognitive 
science, naturalism, psychologism, naturalization. 
RÉSUMÉ 
Ce mémoire de maitrise est une étude de l' intersection de l'épistémologie naturaliste 
et de la phénoménologie transcendantale. L' objectif de ce mémoire est de déterminer 
si et dans quelle mesure il est possible de rapprocher ces cadres théoriques. Le mémoire 
est divisé en deux chapitres. Le premier chapitre examine ce rapprochement à partir du 
point de vue de la phénoménologie transcendantale. Ce chapitre tente de définir une 
forme de naturalisme compatible avec le projet de Husserl. Après avoir discuté des 
variétés du naturalisme et après avoir passé en revue les projets de naturalisation de la 
phénoménologie, ce chapitre examine les engagements philosophiques principaux du 
projet de Husserl et en tire la conclusion partielle que le père de la phénoménologie 
transcendantale rejetait quasiment toutes les variétés du naturalisme. Le premier 
chapitre tente ensuite de montrer qu'une variété minimaliste du naturalisme, que 
j'appelle le naturalisme méthodologique faible, est complémentaire au cadre posé par 
Husserl. M'inspirant de la proposition que fait Husserl d'une science de l'esprit et du 
corps vécu, qu' il appelle somatologie, je clos le premier chapitre avec la proposition 
qu'un ensemble de sciences, que j 'appelle sciences de la constitution, seraient aptes à 
rendre compte des conditions empiriques dans lesquelles certaines unités de sens se 
constituent dans l'expérience vécue. Le second chapitre examine la question du 
rapprochement du point de vue inverse, à savoir celui de l'épistémologie naturalisée. Il 
étudie la question du psychologisme, c'est-à-dire de la pertinence de la psychologie 
pour l'épistémologie. Je procède d'abord à un bref examen de la situation historique 
entourant le psychologisme aux 19e et 20e siècles. Je me penche ensuite sur les variétés 
du psychologisme, reprenant les réflexions sur le naturalisme du chapitre précédent. 
Après avoir examiné un changement central dans l' épistémologie contemporaine et 
avoir défendu l' idée que cette épistémologie s'intéresse aux capacités épistémiques 
d'agents concrets (parmi d'autres objets d'études) , je présente un argument pour un 
psychologisme faible. Je conclus le mémoire avec un constat d'échec : les domaines 
étudiés ne peuvent pas être rapprochés puisqu' ils partent de prémisses contradictoires. 
MOTS-CLÉS : phénoménologie transcendantale, épistémologie naturaliste, science 
cognitive, naturalisme, psychologisme, naturalisation. 
INTRODUCTION 
1. General description of the thesis 
This master' s thesis explores research questions at the intersection of two do mains of 
research: naturalistic epistemology and transcendental phenomenology. "Naturalistic" 
approaches to epistemology are a kind of research programme in philosophy, the aim 
of which is to inform traditional epistemology, concerned with questions about the 
nature of knowledge and the relation of justification between our evidence and our 
beliefs and knowledge claims, using the methods of the experimental natural sciences. 
After disappearing (rather, being banished) from the philosophical landscape for most 
of the 201h century, naturalistic approaches to epistemology were reintroduced by Quine 
in his famous 1969 "Epistemology naturalized," which programmatically laid out the 
main desiderata of the approach. Naturalistic approaches to epistemology aim either to 
outright replace, or to complement, epistemology with the methods of the natural 
sciences, especially with those of experimental psychology. In the latter case, the view 
is known as psychologism: the view that the natural science called experimental 
psychology can either entirely replace or, on Jess radical readings, supplement 
epistemology. Faced with the blatant failure offoundational projects aiming to deduce 
good science from observation, Quine asked the question, the now infamous question: 
in matters epistemological, "Why not settle for psychology?" 
"Transcendental phenomenology" is of an entirely different, almost opposite nature: a 
philosophical research programme aiming to provide apodictic (intuitively self-
evident, indubitable) foundations for ali knowledge claims, a priori foundations 
grounded in the invariant, essential properties of immediate lived experience. Such 
foundations would be an apt epistemological ground for the justification of ail 
knowledge claims and scientific disciplines, providing science with a firm basis from 
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which to proceed. But the birth ofphenomenology was also a declaration ofwar against 
naturalism. Husserl, the father oftranscendental phenomenology, viewed his research 
programme from the first as a radical critique of naturalism and naturalistic 
epistemology. Philosophy, argued Husserl, is for principled reasons irreducible to the 
natural sciences, and ought to expect no clarifications from them, especially not in 
epistemological matters. Philosophy, he argued, is both autonomous and 
methodologically distinct from the experimental, natural sciences: phenomenologists 
reach their foundations through a change of attitude towards, and a ri go rous description 
of, first-person experience, rather than through experimentation, and are concemed 
with those factors that make knowledge possible. The project of a transcendental 
phenomenology thus conflicts with naturalistic epistemology at a fundamental leve!. 
The two projects, at a glanee, seem incompatible. 
This apparent incompatibility has not stopped cross-talk entirely. Naturalism and 
phenomenology are often mentioned in the same breath, and many studies have been 
devoted to examining whether there could a rapprochement between them. Since the 
early 1990s, a body of literature has attempted to build a bridge between 
phenomenology and the natural sciences, specifically with cognitive science. Sorne 
have gone so far as to claim that phenomenology can be naturalized, that is, brought 
into the fold of the natural sciences. On sorne accounts, we can even, as it were, bracket 
the interpretation provided by Husserl of his own philosophical project and only retain 
its specifie, "scientific" content: that is, we can retain his descriptions of lived 
experience, and abandon his foundationalphilosophical project and his anti-naturalism. 
Of course, this attempt to naturalize transcendental phenomenology raises a number of 
thomy questions. Is it possible to advocate sorne variety of naturalism from within the 
framework of transcendental phenomenology without ipso facto jettisoning this 
framework entirely? Are Husserl ' s arguments against naturalism, and especially 
against psychologism, still probative? Can his critique be met with an adequate 
response toda y? Can there be a rapprochement of transcendental phenomenology and 
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the natural, experimental sciences ( especially cognitive science) that does justice to 
each party? 
My general aim in this thesis to examine if, and how, naturalistic epistemology and 
transcendental phenomenology can inform one another in such a way that the exchange 
is mutually enlightening. 1 have chosen to examine two points of contact to asses this 
rapprochement. The first ofthese, which is examined in the first chapter, concerns the 
issue of naturalism in transcendental phenomenology, that is, the relevance of the 
natural sciences for the transcendental phenomenological project. The aim of this first 
chapter is to evaluate whether a variety ofnaturalism is amenable to Husserl's project 
as he understood it. The second point of contact, explored in the second chapter, 
concerns the central, contentious epistemological issue of psychologism. The aim of 
the second chapter is to step outside of Husserl ' s framework and examine an 
independent argument for psychologism, or a psycho-epistemological argument. My 
hope is that this research will, if not elucidate how a rapprochement of transcendental 
phenomenology and naturalistic epistemology is possible, at !east show where the main 
points of contention and tension lie. 
2. Naturalizing what? Varieties ofnaturalism and transcendental phenomenology 
The first chapter was published in the journal Phenomenology and the Cognitive 
Sciences in 2014 (Ramstead 2014 ). It situates itself squarely within the confines of the 
programme laid out by Husserl, and attempts to identify at !east one fonn of naturalism 
that is compatible with Husserl ' s project. The main purpose of the first chapter is to 
determine the extent to which one can endorse naturalism without losing sight of the 
specifie contribution oftranscendental phenomenology to philosophy. The chapter thus 
takes for granted that Husserl's arguments against naturalism are probative. I argue that 
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there is room for naturalism, albeit of a restricted kind, within Husserl ' s transcendental 
framework. More specifically, 1 argue that the view 1 label "weak methodological 
naturalism," is not only compatible with, but also complementary to, even the most 
idealistic expression ofHusserl ' s project. 
Now, as 1 have indicated, one of the principal factors that makes a rapprochement of 
transcendental phenomenology and naturalistic epistemology difficult is that the kind 
ofphenomenology that Husserl inaugurates, of the transcendental variety, is resolutely 
anti-naturalist. Husserl , in effect, designed his phenomenological foundational project 
as a radical critique of the naturalistic project in philosophy. Husserl claimed that 
naturalism was a viciously circular and nonsensical doctrine and that naturalistic 
philosophy was hopelessly powerless to provide the kind of foundations sought by the 
phenomenologist. Husserl resisted the new, scientific philosophies that had emerged 
after the faU of German ldealism with the death of Hegel in 1831 , and his arguments 
against naturalism quickly became philosophical canon. Husserl devoted much effort 
to systematically arguing that naturalistic philosophy, insofar as it aimed to provide a 
foundation for the sciences, was doomed to fail. Philosophy, in its epistemological 
duties, was for Husserl irreducible to, and autonomous from, the natural sciences. But 
is this the last word? Are all forms ofnaturalism inimical to Husserl ' s project? 
The first chapter, which addresses this question, is comprised offive sections. The first 
section of the chapter devotes itself to a conceptual analysis of naturalism. The term 
"naturalism" has different meanings depending on its context of use, and as such, 
different senses of the term can be distinguished, not all of which, l argue, are 
necessarily positions to which Husserl would have objected. The first section attempts 
to untangle these meanings, and distinguishes three varieties of naturalism that pertain 
to three different fields of questions. The first of these is ontological naturalism, the 
view that all things and properties are, or supervene on, natural things and properties. 
The second is naturalism understood as a methodological position, which admits oftwo 
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variants: strong methodological naturalism is the meta-philosophical v1ew that 
philosophy ought to be continuous and homogenous with the methods of the natural 
sciences, whereas weak methodological naturalism demands only that philosophy be 
coherent with the natural sciences. Naturalism, finally, is also an epistemological 
position, to the effect that knowledge claims only count as bonajide knowledge claims 
insofar as they pertain to natural things, regularities, and properties (this is the strong 
variant), orto those and also to formai things, regularities, and properties such as those 
of logic and mathematics (this is the weak variant) . 
Having distinguished these varieties of naturalism, I move in the second section to 
contemporary attempts to naturalize phenomenology and attempt to determine what 
varieties ofnaturalism motivate this project. I first examine "neurophenomenology," a 
research programme aiming to integrate two kinds of scientific data into "ontologically 
neutral" mathematical models: these are neurophysiological and behavioral data, 
obtained by experimental techniques such as measurements ofresponse latency, fMRI , 
and MEG, on the one hand, and "phenomenal data," that is, first-person, or qualitative 
data obtained through introspection and verbal report, on the other hand. I then examine 
"front-loaded" phenomenology, which directly builds the results of phenomenological 
descriptions into experimental protocol to inform experimental design. I end the second 
section with an examination of formalized approaches to phenomenology, which 
attempt to formalize the invariant or essential structures of lived experience using 
contemporary formai tools such as morphodynamics, dynamical systems theory, and 
mereotopology. This brief study of the main forms of the projects to naturalize 
phenomenology concludes that their advocates end orse all three varieties of naturalism 
discussed in the first section. 
The third section eiamines Husserl ' s position on the three varieties of naturalism 
distinguished above. 1 ·first argue that Husserl rejected epistemological naturalism. The 
father of transcendental phenomenology held that there exists a domain of universally 
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valid statements, the validity and universal scope of which pertained neither to the 
natural nomological kind of necessity associated with empirical regularities, things, 
and properties, nor to the formai necessity that is characteristic of mathematics and 
logic. This domain is that of the "material essences" or "eidë" and the "material a 
priori" laws that pertain to them. The truth value ofthese material a priori laws depends 
neither on the real causal relations, nor on the formai relations, between the terms that 
figure in them, but refer instead to the content of the terms, or essential properties, 
presented therein. 1 then move to the methodological variety of naturalism, the strong 
version of which Husserl rejected as weil. Husserl rejected this form of naturalism 
because he viewed philosophy as an autonomous and rigorous science, armed with its 
own irreducible set of methodological princip! es: the various "reductions" (the epochë 
and the Wesensschau). Both reductions consist in a change of attitude towards our lived 
experience. The use of these reductions is the specifie methodological contribution of 
phenomenology, which distinguishes it from the natural sciences, and also comprises 
one of its unique contribution to the history of philosophical thought. The project to 
naturalize phenomenology, from a transcendental phenomenological point ofview, errs 
because it instrumentalizes phenomenology, by subordinating the rigorous descriptive 
work of phenomenology to the imperatives of naturalistic research and formalization. 
The specifie task oftranscendental phenomenology is to elaborate a descriptive account 
of material essences and material a priori laws. Husserl thus rejected epistemological 
naturalism as well, in both its weak and strong variants, because the domain open to 
phenomenology is irreducible to the empirical or the formai. The very possibility of 
Husserl ' s transcendental phenomenological project depends on the autonomy and 
irreducibility of this domain. 
1 conclude the third section by discussing Husserl ' s rejection of ontological naturalism. 
As we have just seen, according to Husserl, there exist a kind of non-spatial, non-
temporal entity, grasped on the mode of the "how" (sein Was) , what he called 
"essences." An essence consists in the unity of certain kinds of invariants of lived 
i' 
1 
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experience, irreducible to the particulars that instantiate them. The domain of interest 
for phenomenology is that of material (rather than formai) essences, essences related 
to the content of what is present to conscious experience. These essences, argued 
Husserl, are directly accessible in intuition through the Wesensschau , the seeing of 
essences. For instance, while it is true that inner time consciousness exist as "this 
consciousness here," that is, as the actual consciousness of this particular person, for 
phenomenological eidetic analysis, consciousness is grasped and described, first and 
foremost, as a material essence or invariant unity, which has a different ontological 
status than the concrete individual consciousness-that is, it exists as a universal and 
invariant structure of any possible experience. Because he argued that there exist non-
natural things, Husserl rejected ontological naturalism as well. 
There seems, then, to be an unbridgeable gap between Husserl 's transcendental 
phenomenology and the three varieties of naturalism examined above. Prospects for a 
rapprochement seem difficult. To remedy this situation, the fourth section examines 
the weaker, minimalist version of methodological naturalism. This is a conditional 
version of the position, to the effect that, if an entity X is a natural entity, then the best 
methods for the study of X are those provided by the natural sciences. The first part of 
the fourth section aims to clarify the status of the antecedent of this formulation, and 
attempts to show that Husserl regarded as legitimate to treat what he called the lived 
body (Leib) and the mind (Seele) as part of the ontological region called "nature," and 
th us as falling un der the extension of X. As such, Husserl recognizes that it is legitimate, 
at !east within certain limits, to treat of the Leib and Seele as part of nature, as natural 
things with natural properties, subject to natural nomological regularities, without 
lapsing into ontological naturalism. 
The second part of the fourth section aims to show that Husserl thought it was 
legitimate to study these specifie natural things, the lived body and the mind, with the 
methodologies specifie to the natural sciences. Husserl even proposed a specifie natural 
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science, called "somatology," the object of which was the corporeity (Leiblichkeit) of 
the lived body, that is, the openness or "sensitiveness" (Empfindsamkeit) to the world 
that makes it a lived body perse. The aim of somatology is to elucidate the functional 
rapports between changes in the states of certain parts of the living physical body 
(Leibkorper) and the correlative changes in certain parts of the sensory field (what he 
called "physical somatology"), as well as to study the correlated changes between the 
different aspects of the sensory field themselves (what Husserl called "aesthesiological 
somatology"), using the methods of the experimental natural sciences, especially 
experimental psychology. Husserl was th us a naturalist in this very restricted sense of 
the term: he endorsed weak methodological naturalism. 
Having shown that at least one form ofnaturalism is compatible with Husserl ' s project, 
the last, fifth section of the chapter attempts to show that the registers of transcendental 
phenomenology and of the natural sciences do not stand in contradiction to one another, 
but are rather complementary. I first study the epistemological function that Husserl 
ascribed to transcendental phenomenology with regard to the natural sciences. lts role, 
he argued, was to provide the latter with a principled epistemological justification of 
their knowledge claims and to clarify the material a priori laws of the ontological 
regions ( e.g., nature) investigated by the sciences. I then suggest that it is possible to 
view sorne of the natural sciences, within Husserl ' s framework, as what I caU "sciences 
of constitution," that is, as sciences whose aim it is to study the specifie functional role 
of certain parts of the real world, notably parts of the lived physical body, in the 
"constitution" or disclosure of meaningful uni ti es in lived experience. I suggest that the 
function of these sciences of constitution can be understood, within the strict limits of 
Husserl ' s framework, as that of elucidating the empirical conditions for the occurrence 
of certain kinds of meaningful uni ti es ( e.g., a visual datum, or a sound experience) in 
the conscious experience of given psychophysical embodied agents. 
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The first chapter went through three very extensive rewrites in response to commentary 
from reviewers at Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences. 1 have decided against 
modifying it further: the chapter appears in essentially as it was published in 
Phenomenology and . the Cognitive Sciences, albeit with slightly a different citation 
format. 1 shall now respond to useful remarks that were made with respect to this 
chapter, and indicate how responding to these comments helped to shape the second 
chapter. One of my evaluators remarked that my distinction between the weak and 
strong variants of methodological naturalism was almost trivial. lndeed, he suggested, 
on the account provided, everyone is a weak methodological naturalist. The point of 
making the distinction was to show that, in effect, Husserl did consider the Leib and 
Seele as part of nature. This claim is not trivial, insofar as one of its consequence is that 
both the lived body and the mind can be studied by the natural sciences within the 
transcendental phenomenological framework, which is the kind of concession the 
chapter was seeking. Husserl regarded an entire domain of things, the domain of 
material essences and material a priori laws, as essentially non-natural , and he 
described many central objects of transcendental phenomenological inquiry as such 
things: the invariant structure of consciousness, or "transcendental consciousness," was 
one such thing. Husserl, again and again, made it clear that such things are not 
amenable to experimental in quiry. lt is th us not a trivial remark to claim that, for 
Husserl, the lived body and the mind are part of nature and subject to naturalistic 
methodologies. (Note that 1 decided to drop the distinction between strong and weak 
variants of methodological naturalism in the second chapter, because such a fine-
grained distinction would not have been helpful.) 
Another evaluator made a number of remarks that would greatly inflect the writing of 
my second chapter. The first was that 1 ought to justify the period of texts covered in 
Husserl. Why did 1 not choose to focus on Husserl ' s early works, or again on the later 
works, where questions epistemological are more clearly brought to the fore , and where 
Husserl softens his apprehensions with regard to psychology? Simply put, 1 wanted to 
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see if Husserl' s proj ect was compatible with naturalism wh en it was expressed in its 
most radically idealistic and anti-naturalistic form. To me, this corresponds to his 
writings in the early 1910s, especially the Ideen series. However, it may indeed have 
provided more points of contact to address Husserl ' s later writings, especially the 
Krisis. This is one of the many limitations ofthis thesis. This evaluator also suggested 
that I stick to contemporary issues in naturalistic epistemology, and that I focus my 
propos on the problems related to psychologism, which are really le nerf de la guerre 
when discussing the link between phenomenology and naturalism. I think he is exactly 
right. I have devoted the second chapter to addressing this question in the context of 
today' s naturalistic approaches to epistemology. 
3. Buried alive? A study of psychologism and the epistemic capacities of concrete 
agents 
The second chapter of the thesis, in contradistinction to the first, departs significantly 
from Husserl ' s framework. The chapter investigates the renewed form of psychologism 
that has been operative in contemporary epistemology at least since Quine' s 1969 paper 
"Epistemology naturalized." The aim of the chapter is to evaluate this resurgence and 
to propose an argument for a weak, "collaborative" form of psychologism. This form 
of psychologism would supplement epistemology with the methods of experimental 
psychology, instead ofreplacing it entirely. In order to make this argument, the second 
chapter explores a central transformation in contemporary epistemology, which is 
today interested (among other things, of course) in the epistemic capacities of concrete 
epistemic agents such as ourselves, as opposed to the essence (the definition in terms 
of necessary and sufficient conditions) of knowledge. The chapt er argues that if as we 
accept this transformation, then a weak form of psychologism is entai led. 
1 1 
The second chapter is divided into two main parts. The first part consists of three 
sections. The first section deals with the history of psychologism in the 19111 and 20111 
centuries. Although psychologism, as the historian of philosophy will note, was for 
most of the discipline' s history the de facto position of most epistemological thinkers, 
it was buried at the beginning of the 20111 century, to the point where, by the 1920s, it 
was mostly taken for granted that it had been refuted as a serious philosophical 
doctrine. The first section thus examines the rise of psychologism after the death of 
Hegel in 1831 , its fall at the tum of the century at the hands of Husserl, and its 
resurgence with the work of Quine and others starting in the Iate 1960s. 
But just what is psychologism? Much like naturalism, psychologism admits of different 
definitions. At the tum of the 20111 century, wh en the great dispute over psychologism 
(Psychologismus-Streit) was tearing a rift in German philosophical circles, the term 
was being used ambiguously: many different positions, arising in quite heterogeneous 
domains, were labelled "psychologistic": positions arising in metaphysics, ontology, 
epistemology, and logic, of course, but also ethics, aesthetics, sociology, religion, and 
pedagogy, to name just a few, were given the label. To speak of psychologism 
simpliciter would make the discussion on offer simply intractable, given the wealth of 
positions described in this ·way. As such, the chapter attempts to situate psychologism 
with respect to the varieties of naturalism that were presented in the first chapter. These 
varieties are taken up and expanded upon in the first second. In the sense relevant to 
debates over naturalistic epistemology, psychologism is a form of naturalism. 
Psychologism, generally speaking, is the view that experimental psychology ought to 
either replace or inform epistemology. It is th us a species of naturalism whose source 
and target have been specified: psychologism is a form of naturalism having as source 
a specifie discipline, namely experimental psychology, from which it draws 
methodological insight, and having as specifie target discipline epistemology. 
Moreover, one can be more specifie and claim that psychologism today is a form of 
epistemological and methodological naturalism. From my earlier typology of 
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naturalism, I argue that we can define a strong, or "replacement" variant of 
psychologism, as a combination of strong epistemological naturalism and 
methodological naturalism, as well as a weaker, "collaborative" form ofpsychologism, 
as a combination of weak epistemological naturalism and methodological naturalism. 
(Note that the definition ofweak epistemological naturalism was changed slightly from 
one chapter to the next to better suit the argument of the second chapter.) 
The third section, which closes the first part of the chapter, discusses a maJor 
transformation in contemporary epistemology, which marks the divide between the 
epistemology of Husserl's time and ours today. Contemporary epistemology, I argue, 
is no longer sol ely interested only in the justification of knowledge in the abstract, but 
also in the specifie epistemic capacities ofwhat 1 shall cali "concrete epistemic agents," 
that is, flesh and blood, embodied, historically and culturally determined epistemic 
agents. This shift in the conception of epistemology has a number of consequences for 
epistemological research, the most prominent of which is to focus its descriptions (at 
!east occasionally) on how it is that concrete agents such as ourselves manage to acquire 
information about and know the world around us. Contemporary epistemology thus 
leaves behind the abstract, "pure" or "transcendental" subject of knowledge, in favor 
of an embodied and historical approach to the epistemic agent that takes the finite 
nature of the agent as point of departure. I conclude this section with a brief review of 
Husserl 's arguments against psychologism, which were addressed at length in the first 
chapter. The aim of this overview is only to show that Husserl 's arguments, although 
they became canonical in the history of philosophy, were not unopposed, and were 
subject to vociferous debate and critique even at the time he was writing them. 
The chapter then moves, in its second part, to a discussion of an argument for weak 
psychologism. The argument moves to a conditional conclusion: if we accept the 
premise that there exist world-disclosing capacities, things done by concrete epistemic 
agents, which are relevant to epistemology (among the many other things that interest 
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epistemology ), th en it follows that epistemology ought to be informed by the set of 
sciences that provide explanations for those capacities. This is arguably the central 
issue of contention in the dialogue with transcendental phenomenologists. A 
disagreement is bound to emerge here between naturalists and transcendentalists: for, 
what is at stake is ultimately two different conceptions of what the epistemological 
agent consists in. Naturalists and transcendental phenomenologists might thus part 
ways at this point in the argument (the very first premise), which might spell doom for 
a potential rapprochement of the kind I had been aiming at. As indicated, however, if 
we can precisely . situate the disagreement, at the very least, sorne progress will have 
been made: we shall understand why the abyss yawns between both research 
programmes. The entire argument explicitly rests on accepting this first premise, and 
recognizing the paradigm shift operative in recent epistemology. 
The argument itself is as follows: 
(1) An epistemic world-disclosing capacity C*, which is characteristic of 
concrete epistemic agents, is epistemically relevant to epistemology 
( among other things) 
(2) There exists sorne cognitive science N, such that N can provide an 
explanation of the relevant epistemic world-disclosing capacity C*, by 
functional analysis/decomposition of C* into organized operations fE: F c•, 
and/or by mechanistic analysis of C* into cognitive mechanisms m E: MC* 
( among other things ), or both 
(3) For any two disciplines D, and D2 (e.g. , epistemology and cognitive 
science) and a given capacity C (e.g. , C*): if C is epistemically relevant to 
D, and C is explained by D2, then D, ought ~o be informed by D2 
(4) If C* is epistemically relevant to epistemology, then epistemology 
ought to be informed by N. 
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The chapter then justifies ali the mam prem1ses and sorne ramifications of the 
conclusion for epistemology. In order to address the reproach of committing the 
naturalistic fallacy, that is, to claim that the argument drives normative statements (with 
the normative modality "ought to") from statements offact (with the factual modalities 
"is," "exists"), I first discuss claim (3). 
The purported naturalistic fallacy is avoided by appealing to a design or engineering 
perspective on epistemic normativity, that is, the idea that it is possible to engineer or 
otherwise design ( e.g., through natural selection) a process to make it "better" if we 
can provide a terminal parameter for that process. A terminal parameter, in this sense~ 
is what the relevant system does, that is, what it achieves, under normal conditions. 
The terminal parameter of, say, visual processing is a representation of the visual scene. 
Once this is specified, we can consider how the process might be carried out 
adequately, that is, we can consider the process through the lens ofnormativity. 1 argue 
that to specify such a terminal parameter opens onto normative considerations, in two 
different senses. First, one can think of the terminal parameter in terms of rational 
epistemic action. The general principle of rational action we can appeal to is: if, in a 
set of conditions X, an agent S aims to achieve an objective 0 , and if, in those same 
conditions X, a given action A allows S to achieve 0, then S ought to do O. In the case 
of epistemic capacities, the claim is about rational epistemic action. The principle that 
we can appeal to is: that if, in a set of conditions X, an epistemic agent S aims to account 
for sorne epistemic capacity C*, and if, in those same conditions X, to be informed by 
a cognitive science N allows S to provide an explanatory account of C*, then S ought 
to be informed by N. Second, I suggest that we can also provide a normative account 
of the in terms of Millikan' s proper functions. Proper functions can fail to be carried 
out, which means that, if we assume a terminal parameter, their being carried out can 
be construed as normative. Proper functions also have "normal conditions" of 
operation, which add another dimension of normativity to the account: these functions 
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can fail to be carried out if certain conditions are not satisfied. In either account of 
normativity, the naturalistic fallacy is avoided by appealing to design considerations. 
Having addressed the naturalistic fallacy, the argument is unfolded in a stepwise 
manner for the remainder of the claims. Claim (1), which was justified in the third 
section, is the claim that today, epistemology is interested, e.g. , will find it 
explanatorily relevant to cite, world-disclosing capacities of concrete agents (among 
other things). Of course, as we have seen, this is the claim that will meet the most 
resistance among traditional epistemologists such as Husserl. We can also note that 
claim (1) leads only to weak psychologism, because it does not claim that epistemology 
ought to be replaced by a study of epistemic capacities, but rather that it is interested 
in such capacities among other things. I consider the candidate capacity of being in an 
intentional, interpretive relation with the world as an illustration of such a world-
disclosing capacity. 
So far, then, we have argued that if a gJVen cognitive science can provide an 
explanation of a given capacity, and if epistemology is interested in this capacity, then 
epistemology ought to be informed by cognitive science. The chapter turns to claim 
(3), and examines whether such an explanation can be provided in principle. This part 
of the chapter presents functionalist analysis and decomposition, as well as mechanistic 
analysis, as two candidate forms of explanation for epistemic capacities. What is called 
a functional explanation of a capacity is an explanation that decomposes the capacity 
into its constituent operations and their organization. Meohanistic analysis couples this 
functional description of the capacity with an analysis of the physical parts that carry 
out the operations. Both kinds of explanation can be appealed to independently, but 
each illustrates that a given epistemic capacity can be explained by at !east one kind of 
cognitive science. 
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Having justified all the prem1ses of the argument, the chapter proceeds to the 
conclusion and its ramifications. After discussing sorne of the ways psychology might 
clarify epistemological questions, I sketch a response to Husserl ' s arguments against 
psychologism. Husserl argued, as we have seen in the first chapter, that psychologism 
leads to vicious circularity and relativism. I respond to the accusation of vicious 
circularity by appealing to design-normative considerations and to the fall of 
foundationalism in philosophy. I then sketch a response to the accusation ofrelativism 
by pointing out that most cognitive architectures suppose that at sorne level, the system 
is in direct causal connection with states of affairs in the world, which are non-relative. 
Thus, although knowledge about the world may be relative, the state of affairs is not, 
and can be more or less reliably drawn upon by the organism in trying to make sense 
of the world. This allows us to counter the accusation. 
In summary, the present thesis represents an attempt to bridge naturalistic epistemology 
and the transcendental kind of phenomenology inaugurated by Husserl. In the final 
analysis, I believe that the end result is less a rapprochement, as I had initially intended, 
and more a depiction of why the conversation between both research programmes is 
difficult. I have shown that transcendental phenomenology is open to a form of 
naturalism, but this form is much weaker than what partisans of the naturalization 
project, both in epistemology and in phenomenology, typically endorse. As such, my 
account may prove unsatisfactory to the latter. Conversely, naturalistic epistemology 
significantly seems to rely on a new conception of the epistemic agent, one that is 
directly at odds with Husserl's conception of the epistemic subject as absolute or 
transcendental consciousness. Although I do not believe that I have managed to bridge 
the abyss between transcendental phenomenology and naturalism, we can at !east see 
where it yawns. 
CHAPTERI 
NATURALIZING WHAT? V ARIETIES OF NATURALISM AND 
TRANSCENDENTALPHENOMENOLOGY 
Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to reappraise the attempt to bridge phenomenology and the 
natural or empirical sciences (particularly cognitive science). Specifically, 1 wish to 
address the relevance of the natural sciences for transcendental phenomenology, that 
is, the issue of naturalism. 1 suggest that to evaluate this relevance, we must directly 
address the transcendental dimension of Husserl ' s phenomenology. The chapter itself 
is divided into five sections. Because the concept of naturalism simpliciter is too blunt 
an instrument to conduct this investigation, in the first section, I distinguish three 
varieties of naturalism and corresponding kinds of naturalization: an epistemological 
form (with strong and weak variants), a methodological one (also with strong and weak 
variants), and an ontological one. Having clarified the concept of naturalism, 1 turn in 
the second section to the projects that aim to "naturalize phenomenology." There, I 
examine neurophenomenology, front-loaded phenomenology, and formalized 
approaches to phenomenology in light of their commitments to these varieties of 
naturalism. This overview leads me to consider in the third section the fundamental 
commitments of Husserl ' s transcendental phenomenology, and to evaluate the 
coherence of his project with the previously discussed varieties of naturalism. 1 argue 
that Husserl rejects strong and weak forms of epistemological naturalism, strong 
methodological naturalism, and ontological naturalism. 
At this point in my argument, the prospects for a rapprochement between naturalism 
and transcendental phenomenology seem rather bleak. The fourth section attempts to 
remedy this situation; it presents the argument that Husserl endorsed a weak, 
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conditional form of methodological naturalism with regard to the lived body and the 
mind. 1 illustrate my point with Husserl's proposai of a science apt to study the 
corporeality (Leiblichkeit) of the lived body (Leib ), which he called "somatology." 
Having established that at least one variety of naturalism is coherent with Husserl ' s 
transcendental phenomenological project, the issue arises of determining the relation 
between naturalistic investigations and transcendental phenomenological ones. In light 
of this issue, the fifth and final section addresses the possible complementarity and 
respective limits of the transcendental phenomenological and the natural scientific 
frameworks. I argue that, on Husserl 's account, transcendental phenomenology is a 
foundational epistemological framework; its function with respect to the natural 
sciences is to provide them with a foundation for their claims to knowledge and to 
clarify their ontologies. I suggest that certain natural sciences can be viewed, within 
Husserl's transcendental phenomenological framework, as "sciences of constitution," 
that is, as natural sciences investigating the real structures that act as conditions of 
possibility for the occurrence of comprehensive unities in the experience of embodied 
subjects. The upshot of my discussion is that the natural sciences can make a specifie 
contribution to the transcendental phenomenological edifice without usurping the 
function of transcendental phenomenology. 
1. Naturalism and transcendental phenomenology 
Recent! y much attention has been devoted to the possibility of a meaningful encounter 
of phenomenology and the natural sciences, and specifically with cognitive science. 1 It 
1 Of late, this has been an active field of study and has generated a substantial literature. Recent book-
length illustrations of the attempt to bridge phenomenology and cognitive science include: Kiverstein & 
Wheeler (2012); Edelman, Fekete, & Zach (2012); Rowlands (2010); Gallagher & Schmicking (2010); 
Berthoz & Petit (2008); Thompson (2007); Gallagher & Zahavi (2007); Wheeler (2005); Petitot et al. 
(1999b ). This is not an exhaustive list. I shall use the singular "cognitive science" (rather th an the plural 
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has even been suggested by sorne that phenomenology could be naturalized. Others, 
however, take phenomenology to be opposed to naturalism and natural scientific 
explanations as a matter of principle, and regard "naturalized phenomenology" as a 
contradiction in terms. This makes the proposed rapprochement a thorny issue. Is 
naturalism relevant to transcendental phenomenology? Are they compatible, or IS 
naturalism fundamentally incoherent with the transcendental perspective?2 
What is "naturalism"? The term has various meanings depending on the context in 
which it is used, and my attempt to define it can only be partial. Naturalism, as I shall 
be using the term, can be understood as a position arising in three domains: the 
methodological, the ontological, and the epistemologica1.3 The term "naturalization" is 
similarly polysemous. I propose to read it generally as referring to a project undertaken 
by members of a research community, having as its target a particular domain of 
inquiry or domain of objects. Broadly speaking, naturalization is the attempt to make 
these domains of inquiry and/or objects continuous with the natural sciences. The 
specifie way this is brought about depends on the kind of naturalism considered. 
Naturalism, as an ontological position, is a form of monism. According to ontological 
naturalism, there is only one kind of "stuff' that makes up all things, nam ely "natural" 
form "the cognitive sciences") throughout to refer to the cluster of disciplines working on cognition, 
including cognitive psychology, cognitive neuroscience, etc. 
2 A prima facie objection to my account might consist in arguing that the story presented here is of 
strictly hi storical or exegetical interest. The claim that contemporary naturalist epistemology might have 
any interest in transcendental phenomenology is something that itself needs to be justified. An 
independent argument ought to be made to establish thi s significance. 1 agree. That task, however, 
exceeds the scope of this chapter. My aim he re is only to evaluate the relevance of the natural sciences 
for Husserl ' s transcendental phenomenological project. 1 go on the assumption that the contributions of 
phenomenology are relevant to contemporary naturalist positions. 
3 This distinction is reminiscent of Ayala' s distinction between three domains in which questions of 
reductionism arise (see Ayala 1974). 1 am also indebted to Zahavi's (2010) discussion ofmetaphysical 
and methodological naturalism. The varieties of naturalism 1 describe in what follows are not mutually 
exclusive, and they can be combined in various ways. 
,- - - - - - - - ---- - -
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stuff. Natural stuff is the kind of stuff postulated by the ontologies of the natural 
sciences, typically (but not al ways) the ontologies of the physical sciences ( e.g. , electric 
charge, mass, energy, etc.). We can define this variety ofnaturalism as follows: 
Ontological naturalism: the position that all things and their properties are 
natural things and properties, or supervene on natural things and properties. 
This bas strong ontological implications, because it entails that no other (non-natural) 
kinds of things or properties exist. Ontologically, the naturalization of a discipline 
amounts to, e.g., an explication, in Carnap's (1947) sense, ofthe things and properties 
postulated by the ontology ofthat discipline (numbers, persons, values, consciousness, 
etc.) in terms of natural things arid properties. An ontologically naturalized discipline 
accounts for all the phenomena of interest pertaining to it on the basis of these entities 
and properties alone. We should note that "to naturalize a thing" or "to naturalize a 
property" are shorthand expressions. They are elliptical; they refer to a systematic 
change in the conceptual or semantic network mobilized to account for a given class of 
phenomena, and not to a change in the ontological properties of the object considered 
perse. That is, to naturalize a thing entails that one mobilizes only those concepts that 
pertain to the ontologies of the natural sciences to explain a given phenomenon, and to 
abandon those concepts that were previously used to account for it which are not part 
of the lexicon of the natural sciences. If an entity or a property is non-natural as a matter 
offact, then no effort on our part can change this fact aboutit. We can, however, change 
the way we think and talk about these entities and properties. I propose, then, to read 
the expression "to naturalize a thing or property" throughout as meaning "to give an 
explanatory account of a thing that is coherent with the ontologies of the natural 
sciences." lt is thus a manner of speaking about a change in our conceptual apparatus 
or semantic network with regard to a thing or property that was heretofore not 
conceptualized as a natural one. 
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When it arises in the methodological domain, naturalism is the meta-philosophical 
view that philosophical fields of inquiry (e.g. epistemology, ethics, metaphysics) 
should employ, or at least be coherent with, the methods of the natural sciences (such 
as the use of empirical experiments, the operationalizing of concepts, and so forth) and 
their criteria for justification (e.g., parsimony, simplicity, predictive power, 
reproducibility of results, etc.). We can define a strong and a weak variant of this 
position. The strong variant can be stated as follows: 
Strong methodological naturalism: the position that philosophy and the 
natural sciences ought to be in methodological continuity; i.e. , that the 
former should all adopt the methods and criteria for justification employed 
in the latter. 
The implication of strong methodological naturalism for philosophy is that it has no 
methodological autonomy. This is quite a strong claim. A weaker reading of the 
methodological naturalist position, one that will become important later in my 
argument, would take the form of a conditional constraint. This weaker reading of 
methodological naturalism restricts the scope of the proposition; it does not apply to 
all discourses and objects in philosophy, and pertains only to the study ofthose entities 
and properties which are construed as natural entities or properties. We can define it as 
follows: 
Weak methodological naturalism: the position that if X is a natural entity 
or property, then the most adequate method for its study is one coherent or 
continuous with those ofthe natural sciences. 
We should note, however, that such a position is only available if one rejects 
ontological naturalism. After all, if all things and properties are natural things and 
properties, then by implication one must espouse the stronger version of the thesis, 
because every thing and property trivially fall under the extension of the antecedent. 
--- -------~--------- - - - - - - - -
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When naturalism is read this methodological way, the naturalization of a discipline 
amounts to making the methods and criteria for justification of that discipline either 
coherent with (weak methodological naturalism), or continuous with (strong 
methodological naturalism), those of the natural sciences. 
The third, epistemological form of naturalism is the view that the only valid and 
justified form of knowledge is empirical knowledge, knowledge pertaining to natural 
things and properties, and natural nomological regularities. Here, we can again define 
two variants. A strong reading of this position requires that all legitimate forms of 
knowledge be explicable strictly in terms of empirical knowledge. We can state this 
precisely: 
Strong epistemological naturalism: the position that for any field of study 
to qualify as a bonafide scientific enterprise providing a legitimate form of 
knowledge, that field must provide empirical knowledge about natural 
nomological regularities and particulars. 
The partisans of strong epistemological naturalism thus attempt to show that ali 
legitimate knowledge daims can be explicated ü1 terms of empirical ones. This is a 
very strong position, perhaps too strong for most readers. A slightly weaker reading of 
epistemological naturalism might also acknowledge the legitimacy of formai 
knowledge, knowledge pertaining to formai entities such as those found in mathematics 
and logic. This weaker position can be defined as follows: 
Weak epistemological naturalism: the position that for any field of study to 
qualify as a bona fi de scientific enterprise pro vi ding a legitimate form of 
knowledge, that field must provide either empirical knowledge about 
natural nomological regularities and particulars, or formai knowledge 
about logical and mathematical entities, structures, andrelations. 
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Epistemologically, the naturalization of a discipline would be an attempt to explicate 
the daims made by a target discipline, e.g. the normative daims made by epistemology, 
either exdusively in empirical terms (strong epistemological naturalism) or with a 
combination of empirical and formai claims (weak epistemological naturalism). The 
projects for a "naturalized epistemology" are the logical outcomes of such a position.4 
Having examined these three varieties of naturalism and naturalization, we can now 
turn to the various attempts to bring them into contact with phenomenology. 
2. The naturalization of phenomenology 
This section addresses the daim that phenomenology can be naturalized. Recent 
projects aiming to connect phenomenology and the natural sciences have taken the 
form of attempts to "naturalize phenomenology." The main figures in this project are 
Varela, Thompson, and Lutz's proposai of a "neurophenomenology," Gallagher' s 
"front-loaded phenomenology," and the vanous formalized approaches to 
phenomenology.5 What the naturalization of phenomenology amounts to should be 
darified. Much hangs on the questions of what we are attempting to naturalize, and 
how such a naturalization is carried out. As such, the aim of this section is to examine 
4 A few examples of epistemological naturalism include P. M. Churchland ( 1989; 2007), P. S. 
Churchland (1986), Giere (1990; 1999; 2010), and Giere et al. (2005) . These projects are intellectually 
indebted to the pioneering work of Quine, who first proposed a naturali zed epistemology in the 
contemporary setting. ln "Epistemology naturalized" (1969), Quine first argued that the proper construal 
of contemporary epistemology is "as a chapter of psychology and hence of natural science" (1969, 82). 
Given the failure of logical empiricism, notably of Carnap ' s project of rational reconstruction 
exemplified by his Der Logische Aujbau der Welt (1928), to ground and ultimately justifY the doctrinal 
(i.e. truth- and justification-related) aspects of scientific investigation, the best course of action for 
philosophy, if it is still to attempt to ground knowledge cl ai ms at ali , is according to Quine to "settle for 
psychology" (ibid., 75). This sets the tone for contemporary naturalization projects . 
5 Note that these three approaches are not mutually exclusive. See Gallagher (20 12) for a review and 
discussion ofthese approaches. 
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the project of naturalizing phenomenology in light of the varieties of naturalism 
discussed above. 
2.1. The epistemological and methodological naturalization of phenomenology 
Transcendental phenomenology, as we shall see in section 3, is a foundationalist 
epistemological project, aiming to ground ali possible knowledge claims. It has 
recently been argued that the unilateral foundationalism of the transcendentalist 
position is no longer tenable in contemporary epistemology. Calls for putting aside 
foundationalism, abandoning "pure phenomenology," have become numerous, as weil 
as those hoping to develop "a new understanding of phenomenology" (Gallagher & 
S0rensen 2006, 120), one that can "separate itself from the idea that it can be free 
standing" (Noë 2007, 234), autonomous and foundational. Murray (2002) has even 
suggested that philosophy in general and transcendental phenomenology in particular 
suffer from an "anteriority complex," from the delusion that somehow epistemology 
· could be carried out before, and separately from, the natural sciences. According to this 
line of reasoning, foundationalism is a historical residue in Husserl ' s thought, a kind 
of hangover from a passé foundationalism, to be overcome by contemporary thought. 
A popular way to overcome this 'anteriority complex ' is to propose a redefinition of 
phenomenology, not as a foundationalist enterprise but rather as an equal partner in a 
mutually constraining relationship with cognitive science. 
I shall examine the three naturalized approaches to phenomenology just mentioned in 
light oftheir epistemological and methodological commitments. Neurophenomenology 
is a research program in cognitive neuroscience. Its most prominent protagonists are 
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Varela (1996) and Thompson (2007). The approach has gamered much support.6 
Neurophenomenology employs two kinds of data in mathematical models that are 
ontologically neutra!: "phenomenological data," usually obtained through the use of 
first-person data collection methods (usually from subject reports), and 
neurophysiological data, obtained from, e.g., EEG or fMRI experiments. 7 These kinds 
of data are 'mutually constrained' by being integrated into an overarching 
mathematical model, usually formalized with dynamical systems the01·y (DST), such 
that this model could be used to correlate phenomenological experience with patterns 
of neuronal activity. As Lutz and Thompson summarize, 
neurophenomenology is based on the synergistic use of three fields of 
knowledge: 
1. (NPhl) First-person data from the careful examination of experience 
with specifie first-person methods. 
2. (NPh2) Formai models and analytical tools from dynamical systems 
theory, grounded on an embodied-enactive approach to cognition. 
3. (NPh3) Neurophysiological data from measurements of large-scale, 
integrative processes in the brain. (Lutz & Thompson 2003 , 34) 
6 A host of authors have joined Thompson and Varela 's cali for a neurophenomenology. See Thompson, 
Lutz, & Cosmelli (2004) for an accessible introduction to neurophenomenology. Neurophenomenology 
was a research topic in Frontiers in Human Neuroscience (Hasenkamp and Thompson 2013, 17 articles). 
7 Neurophenomenology is one of the recent attempts to address the need for a syste matic integration of 
"ftrst-person" data into the study of the neurological basis of conscious experience. " Phenomenological 
data" is another term for first-person introspective data. As Lutz and Thompson write, 
"Neurophenomenology stresses the importance of gathering first-person data from phenomenologically 
trained subjects as a heuristic strategy for describing and quantifying the physiological processes 
relevant to consciousness. The general approach, at a methodological leve! , is (i) to obtain richer first-
person data through disciplined phenomenological explorations of experience, and (ii) to use these 
original ftrst-person data to uncover new third-person data about the physiological processes crucial for 
consciousness. Th us one central aim of neurophenomenology is to generate new data by incorporating 
reftned and rigorous phenomenological explorations of experience into the experimental protocols of 
cognitive neuroscientific research on consciousness." (Lutz & Thompson 2003, 32). Phenomenological 
data are thus epistemic objects of a new kind, obtained through the self-observation of a subject' s 
experience and subsequent verbal report on that self-observation. These data are then correlated with 
"third-person" data, such as behavioral or neurophysiological data, into an overall mathematic model. 
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The claim is that mathematical models drawn from DST enable us to bridge the 
"explanatory gap" between physical and phenomenal properties by showing that both 
are explained by the kinds of mathematical relations described in the models. 
One of the clearest formulations of how phenomenology is supposed to relate to 
cognitive science in the project ofneurophenomenology is found in Borrett, Kelly, and 
K wan' s (2000) proposai, according to which the proper relationship of phenomenology 
to cognitive science would be that of data to model. In the wake of V are la, they argue 
that 
the right relation between phenomenology and brain science is that of data 
to model: brain science is ultimately concerned with explaining the way the 
physical processes of the brain conspire to produce the phenomena of 
human experience; insofar as phenomenology devotes itselfto the accurate 
description ofthese phenomena, it provides the most complete and accurate 
presentation of the data that ultimately must be accounted for by models of 
brain function. (Borrett, Kelly, & Kwan 2000, 214) 
On both Lutz and Thompson' s and Borrett, Kelly, and Kwan' s accounts of 
neurophenomenology, phenomenology can be most easily integrated with the cognitive 
sciences when instrumentalized: for both groups ·of authors, it serves as a method to 
generate phenomenological data. What differs in their accounts is the ki nd of model 
employed in tandem with the data generated by phenomenological analysis, but the 
role of phenomenology remains the same. 
That said, the question arises asto how such use of phenomenological data differs from 
more traditional uses of first-person qualitative data. What differentiates the two, 
according to Lutz and Thompson (2003), is that the subjects are trained to become 
familiar with a certain class of experiences, and that the subjects help define the 
categories employed in analysis. This is meant to capture the idea that phenomenology 
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proceeds through intersubjective validation of experiential structures. The latter are 
taken to be "essences" in the Husserlian sense (which we shall examine in detail in the 
next section), given that they describe invariant structures of experience that seem 
relatively stable across subjects (because validated intersubjectively). 
Front-loaded phenomenology, advocated by Gallagher (2003; 2010), on the other hand, 
attempts to build phenomenological insights directly into experimental design, 
avoiding the need to train specialist subjects. For the front-loaded phenomenologist, 
the mutual constraints play out main1y at the level of inter-theoretic discourse. On the 
one hand, phenomenology allows cognitive science to refine its descriptions of the 
abjects it tries to explain and to propose more adequate experimental designs. As 
Gallagher and S0rensen say, 
DJust as experimental designs can be informed by specifie theories, 
experiments can also be informed by phenomenological insights-that is, 
insights developed in independently conducted phenomenological 
analyses, or in previous neurophenomenological experiments. In such 
cases phenomenology is "front-Ioaded" into the experimental design, and 
there may or may not be any phenomenological method, or even 
introspection in the strong sense, explicitly used in the experiment itself. 
(Gallagher & S0rensen 2006, 125) 
When they are "front-loaded," the insights obtained through phenomenological 
descriptions, even if they are not directly involved in scientific experimentation, 
nevertheless inform and guide the latter, much the way any other theory could be 
appealed to in designing an experiment. Reciprocally, cognitive science can allow 
phenomenology to re fine its analyses of lived experience. Gallagher ( 1997) has argued 
that a sufficiently discriminating cognitive scientific model might prompt our revision 
of a previous phenomenological description by distinguishing different cognitive 
mechanisms for what was described in phenomenological analysis as a homogenous 
process. For instance, if a mental phenomenon that had a homogenous 
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phenomenological description is revealed, through experimental investigations and 
madel-building, to be realized by two different cognitive mechanisms working in 
concert, this may motivate us to revisit our description and to ascertain whether our 
appraisal of it as unitary was warranted (although this has been contested by, e.g., 
Overgaard 2004, 370-371). 
A third approach to naturalized phenomenology is provided by those who wager that 
the descriptions of classical phenomenology could be made rigorously mathematical 
by formalizing the structures of lived experience uncovered by phenomenological 
analysis using various contemporary formai and mathematical tools such as DST, 
differentiai geometry, and morphodynamics. Gallagher (2012) usefully refers to this 
cluster of approaches as the "CREA proposai," because its main protagonists (Petitot, 
Roy, Pachoud, and Varela) are based at the Centre de Recherche en Épistémologie 
Appliquée (CREA) in Paris-though we should bear in mind that many others also 
work in this formalized style (e.g. , Edelman, Fekete, & Zach 2012; Fekete & Edelman 
2011; and Marbach 2010.) These thinkers would have it that Husserl ' s motives in 
opposing naturalism reflected the limits of the state of the art in the science and 
mathematics of his time. His position on naturalism would thus only be of historical 
interest. As the editors of Naturalizing Phenomenology argue, it is ali right to bracket 
Husserl's philosophical interpretation of his project and only retain phenomenology' s 
"scientific content" (1999a, 52). 
Now, the "science of salience" proposed by Petitot and Smith (1997) illustrates the 
kind of formalized analysis made possible through the direct mathematization of 
phenomenological descriptions. Its aim is to account for the invariant descriptive 
structures of lived experience (what Husserl called "essences") through formalization, 
providing a descriptive geometry of macroscopic phenomena, a "morphological 
eidetics" of the disclosure of objects in conscious experience (in Husserl' s words, the 
"constitution" of objects). Petitot employs differentiai geometry and morphodynamics 
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to model phenomenal expenence, and Smith uses formai structures from 
mereotopology (the theory of parts, wholes, and their boundaries) to a similar effect. 
Petitot and Smith construct a naturalist account of how macro-level phenomena, with 
their qualitative structure and salience, emerge from micro-leve! neurological 
phenomena, interpreting what Husserl called the unity of the object in morphological 
terms. Their key insight is that of qualitative discontinuity: objects in everyday 
phenomenal experience, they argue, appear as salient figures on a ground because their 
boundaries emerge as qualitative discontinuities, rather than appearing as smooth 
gradients. Petitot and Smith have formalized severa} such structures that account for 
macro-phenomenal appearances in our everyday commonsense experience with the 
world.8 
To sum up, neurophenomenology, front-loaded phenomenology, and fonnalized forms 
of phenomenology are, in different ways, attempts to bring together cognitive science 
and phenomenology through an instrumentalization of the descriptive methods of the 
latter. Neurophenomenologists use descriptive analysis to generate first-person data 
that is correlated with cognitive and neurophysiological data using the tools of DST 
(among others). Front-loaded phenomenology uses the insights of Husserlian 
phenomenology to guide the kind of investigations to be carried out in cognitive 
science. Finally, formalized approaches . start from rigorous phenomenological 
8 It is not obvious that Husserl would have been open to formalizing the structures of lived experience 
with mathematical modelling. Husserl described phenomenology as the rigorous study of " inexact 
essences," rather than the ideal "exact essences" of mathematics and logic, and he believed that the 
essences specifie to phenomenology admitted of no mathematization. See !deen zu einer reinen 
Phanomenologie und phdnomenologischen Philosophie, §§71 - 75 (hereafter cited as !deen !; second and 
third volumes as Jdeen il and Jdeen ill respectively). Any attempt to mathematize the inexact essences 
of lived experience, he argued , would in volve importing mathematical regularities or en titi es , and as if 
forcing them on "the things themselves." However, those who approach phenomenology from a formai 
point ofview wager that Husserl ' s sharp distinction between types of essences was due to the limitations 
of the scieiltific state of the art in his ti me. Indeed, Petitot argues that one must bett·ay the Husserlian 
text if one is to revive his spirit: "Nous sommes conscient du fait que cela 'trahit ' la lettre de Husserl. 
Mais c'est la condition sine qua non pour faire revivre son esprit" (Petitot 1993, Introduction, §3). 
Ail page references to Husserl's works refer to the German edition of Husserliana, unless otherwise 
noted. 
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descriptions of experience, and proceed from there to mathematically formalizing the 
eidetic macrostructures uncovered therein. 9 Phenomenology is formalized insofar as it 
is used to generate descriptions of the natural mental phenomena that cognitive science 
is trying to explain. 
The approaches reviewed here can be seen as combining aspects of epistemological 
and methodological naturalism. That all three approaches endorse a variant of 
epistemological naturalism is evident in their attempt to explicate the descriptions of 
the invariant structures oflived experience provided by phenomenology either in terms 
of natural nomological regularities and particulars, discovered by "mutually 
constraining" phenomenal and neurophysiological data with fom1al rilodels (in neuro-
and front-loaded phenomenology), or again directly in terms of formai structures (in 
formalized approaches to phenomenology). All three kinds of "naturalized 
phenomenology" can be described as endorsing either weak or strong epistemological 
naturalism, depending on whether or not equal legitimacy is attributed to formai kinds 
of knowledge. Most approaches toda y would endorse the weaker thesis. 
All three positions also converge on sorne form of methodological naturalism. In 
neurophenomenology and formalized approaches to phenomenology, 
phenomenological descriptions are employed only to the extent that they are putto use 
in the more encompassing methodological framework, provided by cognitive 
neuroscience or by the attempt at fom1alization. Front-loaded phenomenology, as 
indicated, need not even employ the specifie methods of phenomenology at all. As 
such, all these positions endorse the view that the methods of the natural sciences are 
most apt to deal with the phenomena described by phenomenology, either directly at 
9 Petitot's (2004) use of phenomenology illustrates this strategy. He starts from the phenomenological 
descriptions of III. Logische Untersuchung and of Ding und Raum, and proceeds to their 
mathematization. Other kinds ofphenomenological description, e.g. , the theory of pure hyletics, might 
also be used as the descriptive basis from which to carry out such formalizations . For other instances of 
this mathematical approach to phenomenology, also see Petitot (1993 ; 1994; 1995; 1999). 
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the level of description, or indirect! y, by subordinating the methods of phenomenology 
to tho se of natural science or forrnalization. As indicated, the question of whether the se 
positions amount to strong or weak methodological naturalism rests on whether or not 
they endorse ontological naturalism. To accept the latter ipso facto commits one to the 
strong version of that thesis. 
2.2. Ontological naturalization 
Contemporary attempts to naturalize phenomenology also seem committed to 
ontological naturalism. This may in fact be the central claim of the "naturalized 
phenomenologies." The editors of the volume Naturalizing Phenomenology (1999) 
argue in their introduction to that work that phenomenology holds the promise of 
closing the "explanatory gap" between physical and phenomenal data, and as such, its 
use in cognitive science could provide cognitive science with a phenomenologically 
informed, naturalized account of consciousness (Petitot et al. , 2-9). They propose to 
understand the naturalization of phenomenology as a process that starts from 
phenomenological descriptions of Iived experience, moving from there to naturalized 
accounts of consciousness, most notably through mathematization (Petitot et al. 1999a, 
48ff). To provide a "naturalized phenomenology" on this reading is to put 
phenomenological descriptions of conscious experience to use in naturalistic 
approaches, and explain consciousness as a natural thing with natural properties. 
Their wager is that this will provide the natural sciences with a framework for a 
naturalistic explanation of consciousness, as it is described in Husserlian 
phenomenological analyses, as well as a way to close the explanatory gap between 
physical and phenomenal properties. Just as the old, Aristotelian ontological distinction 
between the "sublunar" and the "supralunar" was made obsolete through the 
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advancement of scientific theory and practice, the naturalization of consciousness as it 
is described in the analyses of phenomenology will on the ir account show that there is 
no ontological divide between the physical and the phenomenal (see Petitot et al. 
1999a, 46-49). They argue that the revolution brought about by Galileo and Newton 
with the emergence of classical mechanics "can be said to result from the neutralization 
of a conflict between the 'sublunar' and the 'supralunar' worlds through the 
establishment of a new division of scientific objectivity" (Petitot et al. 1999a, 46); and 
the naturalization of phenomenology similarly promises to neutralize the conflict 
between phenomenal and physical properties. 
Perhaps the clearest examples of attempts to ontologically naturalize phenomenology 
are those providing naturalistic explanatory models for the phenomenological 
experience of the flow of inner time. Philosophers, cognitive scientists, and 
neuroscientists have proposed neuro- and cognitive scientific models to account for 
time consciousness ( e.g., van Gel der 1999; Varela 1999a; 1999b; Lloyd 2002; 
Gallagher & V are la 2003 ; Grush 2006). Grush' s proposai , for instance, makes use of a 
"trajectory estimation model" to formalize the kind of information processing required 
for a cognitive system to have a representation of itself and its environment with the 
temporal "thickness" described in Husserl' s analyses of time consciousness. 10 Rather 
than accept that consciousness and its "essences" cannot, as a matter of principle, be 
accounted for with naturalistic explanatory models-as Husserl had held, and as we 
shall see in greater detail presently-these proposais attempt to provide just such an 
account. Indeed, research projects such as the neurophenomenology of inner time 
consciousness "direct! y challenge" the claim that "no analogue of the synthetic unity 
-proper to consciousness is to be found in physical nature" (Thompson 2007, 356). To 
10 Grush ' s trajectory estimation mode! builds on his work in the emu lation theory of representation 
(Grush 2004a, 2004b). It is a kind of internai modelling approach to cognition , formalizing a system ' s 
capacity to estimate forthcoming states using an internai mode! of the perceived object or situation. See 
Grush (2005a; 2005b; 2006). 
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the extent that they endorse ontological naturalism, the naturalized phenomenologies 
also endorse the strong version of methodological naturalism. A weaker reading of 
methodological naturalism is possible if ontological naturalism is rejected. 
3. Husserl' s transcendental phenomenological critique of naturalism 
Now that we have defined naturalism and examined the attempts to naturalize 
phenomenology, we can turn to the heart of the matter: Is transcendental 
phenomenology compatible with naturalism? If not, wh y not? Any attempt at a 
rapprochement between Husserl ' s transcendental phenomenology and the natural 
sciences should demonstrate that it can adequately address the epistemological, 
methodological , and ontological commitments of his transcendentalism. This section 
examines Husserl' s position with respect to the varieties of naturalism defined above. 
1 argue that Husserl rejects epistemological naturalism (both strong and weak variants), 
strong methodological naturalism, and ontological naturalism. 1 concern myself first 
with the epistemological variety. 
3.1. Naturalism, epistemology, and eidetics 
Husserl ' s transcendental phenomenological framework is at odds with epistemological 
naturalism for two main raisons. First, Husserl rejected epistemological naturalism 
because his transcendental project IS a foundational epistemological 
( erkenntnistheoretisch) endeavor, concerning itself with the transcendental conditions 
of possibility of knowledge of objects "out there" in the world. 11 Transcendental 
11 As can be clearly seen from his 1907 lectures Die Idee der Phanomenologie (henceforth Die Idee), 
Husserl ' s "transcendental tum" is motivated by his desire to avoid the "epistemological 
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phenomenology attempts to clarify how it is that evidence can be attained in principle. 
Its aim is to provide an indubitable foundation for the ali the sciences. As such, it cannot 
be a natural science, for otherwise it would find itself in a vicious circle of justification. 
If epistemological naturalism is defined as above, as the view that the only valid from 
of knowledge is empirical (and perhaps also formai) knowledge, and that by 
implication epistemology should concem itseif with matters of fact and empirical 
knowledge (and possibly also with formai knowiedge), then Husseri 's transcendental 
phenomenology is incompatible with that view. This is because transcendentalism, on 
his account, is committed to the view that the very possibility of empirical knowledge, 
of knowledge about states of affairs in the world, requires a specifie kind of 
justification, of a transcendental kind. Husserl argued that naturalist epistemologies 
cannot justify themselves using their own methods and specifie form of knowledge 
without falling into a vicious circularity. Second, directly related to the first point, 
transcendentai phenomenology conflicts with epistemoiogical naturalism because it 
posits the validity of a non-empirical and non-formai domain ofknowiedge, knowledge 
of what Husserl called "material essences" or "eidë." He defined transcendental 
phenomenology as an eidetic descriptive science, a science interested in the "eidetic" 
or "essential" laws that pertain to the experience of various kinds of objects in virtue 
oftheir being specifically ofthat kind. lts function, with regard to the natural sciences, 
is to provide a clarification of the essential structures at work in their investigations. 
Let us unpack this. 
Conceming the accusation of circularity, a cluster oftheoretical perspectives Husserl 
called "positivism," "extreme empiricism," "psychologism," and "anthropologism" are 
variations on the position 1 have defined as epistemological naturalism. Husserl was 
(erkenntnistheoretisch) confusion" (Die Idee, 22) caused by naturalism with regard to the 
epistemological status and validity of knowledge, and to the ontological status of the ki nd of entities 
studied by the natural sciences. Husserl criticizes naturalist empiricism for similar reasons in Jdeen ! , 
§§ 18- 26. 
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heavily involved in the Psychologismusstreit, the great debate over psychologism at 
the tum of the 201h century. Psychologism, the primary guise of epistemological 
' 
naturalism when Husserl was writing Logische Untersuchungen circa 1900, is the view 
that epistemological justification-notably the laws of logic-depends on facts about 
the makeup ofhuman psyches. Anthropologism, also prominent, was the related view 
that truth reduces to facts about human nature. A few illustrious proponents of 
psychologism and anthropologism were Lipps (1893), Wundt (188011883), and 
Sigwart (1904 ). Science, for a proponent of psychologism, is understood as a natural 
process, as something human psyches do. As indicated, this position has 
epistemological ramifications. As far as epistemology is concemed, for the proponent 
of psychologism, psychology as a natural science seems best suited to establish 
epistemological criteria, because scientific reasoning is a natural process that ought to 
be studied empirically. If the legitimacy and possibility of ali forms of knowledge is 
ultimately grounded on psychological processes such as reasoning, remembering, and 
perceiving, then finding out how these processes function is necessary and sufficient 
to account for proper scientific methodology and justification. The same reasoning 
applies, mutatis mutandis, for anthropologism and facts about human nature. 
Husserl was convinced that such enterprises were radically deficient bases from which 
to start a theory of knowledge, bound to fail because they were "naïve" and "self-
contradictory" (widersinnig). Radical empiricism, as he argued in his Logos article 
"Philosophie als strenge Wissenschaft," jettisons epistemology: it replaces the 
establishment of epistemological ideals (e.g. , the search for objective truth), and of 
methods and criteria for proper justification (such as defining exactly what is meant by 
the term "evidence") with the study of a natural process, namely scientific reasoning. 
Epistemological naturalism in its various guises (e.g. , psychologism, anthropologism) 
aims to account for proper epistemological justification by discovering objective 
empirical facts about how humans understand the world. However, in so doing, these 
extreme empiricist positions presuppose the ir own nom1s and methods of justification. 
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Husserl argues that radical empmc1sm commits a VlClous circle of reasoning; 
epistemological naturalism collapses into "a most radical countersense" when 
examined in its principles and how they are justified (Ideen 1, 37; Husserl 1982, 38). 
For Husserl, the norms and canons of proper justification of scientific epistemology are 
not simply facts to be discovered by objective naturalistic methods. They must be 
established on a rigorous basis by a sound philosophical method of epistemological 
inquiry, as we shall see. Husserl thus rejected epistemological naturalism on the 
grounds that its justification of scientific knowledge, and of its own principles, was 
circular and self-contradictory. 
Husserl also rejects epistemological naturalism because it fails to recogmze the 
epistemological status of what Husserl called "material essences" and "laws of 
essence," as well as the correlative "eidetic" or "essential" universality and necessity. 
What is an essence? 12 The essence of a given thing consists in the essential traits that 
make that individual thing what it is; or, as Husserl put it, an essence is "the What (sein 
Was) of an individuum" (Ideen 1, 10; Husserl 1982, 8). It was central to his 
transcendental project that one could provide an a priori analysis of the essences or 
essential properties that pertain to a given domain of objects in experience. Now, in 
perception, what is given to intuition are factual individual objects, which are always 
posited as existing in the world as a matter of fact, "as something factually existing 
spatiotemporally" (Ideen 1, 8; Husser11982, 7). Husserl argued, however, that in lived 
experience, more is given than simply matters of fact. We also apprehend things 
perceived as being of this and that kind. And, he notes, nothing necessary to being that 
12 Space constraints forbid me to unfold ali the implications of Husserl ' s theory of essences . 1 restrict 
my discussion of essences to the. minimum required to show that Husserl rejected epistemological 
naturalism on the basis of the validity of material eidetic investigations. For Husserl ' s account of 
essential laws and how they relate to his doctrine of dependence and foundation, see Ill. Logische 
Untersuchung, esp. §§ 10- 17. For the distinction between analytic (or formai) and synthetic (or material) 
a priori laws, see §§ 11- 12 of that work. For essences and essential laws generally, and the ir relation to 
Husserl ' s doctrine ofregional ontology, see the first chapter of Jdeen 1 (§§1- 17). For formalizations of 
eidetic necessity, as weil as dependence and foundation relations among essences, and also between 
essences and individual things, see, e.g., Correia 2004; Fine 1995. 
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particular kind of object is bound up with the posited existence of a thing in perception. 
Any object perceived as being in a given place at a given time could have existed in 
another place or at another time and remain essentially an object of the same kind. It 
might even be fictional or imagined, yet stiJl is what it is; a fictive sunset is stiJl a sunset, 
and an imagined person is still a person. In other words, the factual existence of any 
object is contingent to its being that object. 
To this contingency or "factualness" ofthe spatiotemporal existence of a thing, argued 
Husserl, there pertains a correlative necessity. This is eidetic necessity, which 
characterizes the essentially necessary properties of a thing in virtue of its being that 
kind ofthing. 13 Husserl argued that contingent matters offact are always bound up with 
essences, and these essences prescribe necessary conditions on the matters of fact 
subsumed under them (Ideen 1, §2). These necessary conditions are "eidetic laws" or 
"laws of essence." Eidetic laws are su ch that if an entity falls un der this or that essence, 
then such and such properties, prescribed by the essence ofthat entity, will necessarily 
be predicable ofthat entity as a matter of eidetic law. Any individual object, beyond its 
being an individual object (as a "This here"), can be qualified, as Husserl puts it, as 
being '"in itself th us and so," that is, as having "its own specifie character, its stock 
of essential predicables which must belong to it (as ' an existent such as it is in itself) 
if other, secondary determinations can belong toit' ' (Ideen !, 9; Husserl 1982, 7). There 
are two main uses of eidè (Ideen 1, §§5-6). We can take essences as the objects of our 
judgment, and go about relating essences to other essences using eidetic laws-what 
Fine (1995) has called "species foundation"-and we can also use essences to 
formulate judgments about the particulars that are subsumed under those essences, in 
13 Husserl uses the term "necessity" to characterize both specifications of general laws (for example in 
fi!. Logische Untersuchung, §12) and also to characterize the kind ofnecessity attached to these laws 
(for instance in ldeen ! , §2, where eidetic necessity and correlative eidetic universality are opposed to 
the contingency or "factualness" of matters offact). For clarity, I shall use the terms "eidetic necessity" 
or "essential necessity" as a modal qualification (necessari ly true in virtue ofwhat it is to be an A, where 
A is an essence), and reserve the term "eidetic law" both for generalized and specified forms of eidetic 
laws. 
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the mode of universal quantification. 14 Eidetic necessity is thus the kind of necessity 
that pertains to those properties which are necessarily predicable to any possible entity 
subsumed under a given essence in virtue of that subsumption. Eidetic laws and their 
correlative necessity, Husserl insists, are completely independent of the factual 
existence of the thing subsumed, and a fortiori of any natural nomological laws that 
attach to the entity in the course ofnatural experience (Ideen I, §4). 
As indicated, eidetic descriptions can be employed to characterize the relations of 
essential necessity among essences, and also to make predicative judgments about the 
essential properties had by given individual, factually existing things in virtue of their 
subsumption under this or that essence. "Eidetic universality" pertains to the state of 
affairs that we can formulate universally quantified statements applying with eidetic 
necessity to all things subsumed under a given essence. In III Logische Untersuchung, 
Husserl relates the notions of eidetic law and necessity to his theory of parts and 
who les, and specifically to his notion of "foundation" ( defined in § 14 of that work). 
This notion provides him with the template for all eidetic laws. Husserl tells us that, 
given a more comprehensive whole or unity subsumed under a given essence, it is an 
essentiallaw that sorne parts of that unity stand in a relation of dependence with regard 
to other parts, whereas others do not. Those dependent parts or "moments" that 
essentially require the existence of other parts are "founded" on the latter; the essences 
that pertain to those parts stand in a similar foundation relation at the level of essences. 
Founded essences require "supplementation" from the essences on which they are 
founded. Consider, for instance, the unity VISUAL DATUM. Husserl argues that it is 
an eidetic law that, given a unity subsumed under the essence VISUAL DATUM (e.g, 
the experience of this red expanse here in my visual field) , the moment of that unity 
subsumed under the eidos COLOR QUALITY (in this case, RED), which is a 
14 As Husserl puts it, we can "judge in the mode Any [ Uberhaupt] about the individual , though purely 
as a single particular subsumed under essences" (Jdeen ! , 14; Husserl 1982, 12). We can readily equate 
this judging in the "mode Any" to uni versai quantification. 
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dependent part of the comprehensive who le subsumed un der the essence VISU AL 
DA TUM, needs to be "supplemented" by another moment subsumed un der the essence 
EXTENSION. This kind of relation is what is meant by foundation: if an essence A is 
founded on another M, then necessarily in virtue ofwhat it is to be instantiations of the 
essences involved, any instantiation x of A needs to be "supplemented" by an 
instantiation y of Min the context of a more comprehensive unity which contains x and 
y as moments. Eidetic laws such as this one obtain with eidetic necessity for any visual 
datum in virtue if what it is to be subsumed under the essences involved; in the case 
just cited, in virtue of what it is to be a VISUAL DATUM, a COLOR and an 
EXTENSION. 
This is the task of an eidetic science: to determine eidetic laws that apply between 
essences, and between essences and individuals subsumed under those essences. 
Husserl sharply distinguished sciences ofmatters offact (factual sciences) and eidetic 
sciences. Whereas factual sciences, such as the natural sciences, are interested in the 
factual causal connections between things in experience, eidetic sciences deal with the 
necessary traits that always pertain to the experience of this and that kind of object 
(ldeen I, §§7-8 Ideen III, §7). 15 Husserl, moreover, thought that the relation between 
eidetic sciences and sciences of fact was unilateral. Eidetic sciences are independent 
from factual sciences, and only deal with individual factual things insofar as they 
instantiate given eidetic laws (Ideen I, §8; ldeen III, §§7- 8). Mathematics and logic, 
for instance, which Husserl regarded as eidetic sciences, deal purely with formai 
essences and formal eidetic laws. When factually existing things enter into their 
15 The independence of eidetic universality and necessity with regard to matters of fact justifies the 
central role of imagination in eidetic investigations (Jdeen 1, §4). As indicated, 1 can imagine an object 
with no pretensions toits actual existence, but despite this Jack offactual positing, the very same eidetic 
laws still pertain to it as would if it really existed. An object perceived and one imagined, if they are 
subsumed under the same eidos, necessarily share the same essential properties. 1 can, for instance, 
imagine a physical object that does not exist. Although, insofar as it is merely imagined (rather than 
perceived), the imagined object does not exist in fact, spatiotemporally, it still has ali the essential 
qualities that make it the ki nd of object it is . 
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account, as when the geometer draws a triangle on the blackboard, they serve as 
illustrations of eidetic laws that pertain to a given class of objects subsumed under an 
essence. Sciences of fact, on the other hand, al ways presuppose an a priori clarification 
of the eidetic structures that pertain to their domain of objects, or what Husserl called 
a "regional ontology." 16 The natural sciences proceed to discover contingent, empirical 
truths, whose validity requires an a priori investigation into the absolutely necessary 
truths uncovered by the eidetic descriptive clarification of the ontological regions 
explored by the natural sciences (Ideen III, 47-48). Yoshimi (2010, 29) has remarked 
that this role is similar to the division of labor between contemporary philosophy of 
science and the natural sciences. The factual sciences deal with the possibilities left 
opened by transcendental phenomenological eidetic description. 
The epistemological task of eidetic analysis in general is to provide a clarification of 
the eidetic necessary Jaws that pertain to a given domain of objects. The specifie eidetic 
task of transcendental phenomenology with regard to the sciences of matters of fact is 
to provide "material a priori" eidetic laws, laws which pertain a priori to the content 
of the essences involved (rather than laws related to formai essences). Transcendental 
phenomenology is a descriptive eidetic theory that pertains to the essences of pure lived 
experience; and the laws and essences involved in the description of pure lived 
experience are "material" ones (Ideen I, §75). What is the distinction? Formai a priori 
laws, as Husserl writes in III. Logische Untersuchung (§§ 11-12), are those that pertain 
to formai or exact essences. Such laws can have ali their terms replaced by variables 
without changing the law; the essences in such laws are "exact essences" that can be 
formalized. Material a priori laws are those eidetic laws that cannot have their terms 
substituted in this way, because the terms in such laws depend on other essences to 
16 For Husserl' s discussion of regional ontology, see Jdeen 1, §§9- 10. For an illustration ofhow eidetic 
analysis can clarify an ontological region prior to naturalistic investigations, see Husserl 's discussion of 
"rational psychology" in Jdeen lll, §§6-8. Rational psychology elucidates the eidetic laws that pertain 
the domain of mental realities, and thus prescribed the possible configurations ofmeaning in experience. 
The factual sciences then proceed to fill in what possibilities eidetic analysis has left open. 
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which they stand in a relation of dependence or foundation. "A whole cannot exist 
without its parts" is an analytic law; "A color cannot exist without an extension that it 
co vers" is a synthetic or material a priori law (§11). A gain, transcendental 
phenomenology, strictly speaking, is interested in the latter kind of essence, and these 
essences cannot be formalized (see ldeen 1, §§72-74). Against those weak 
epistemological naturalists who would explicate all forms ofvalid knowledge in terms 
of empirical and formai kinds ofknowledge, Husserl is clearly arguing that there exists 
another kind of knowledge, eidetic knowledge of material a priori laws and their 
correlative necessity, which is irreducible to either kind (see Romano 2010 for a 
discussion of eidetic necessity versus the nomological and formai kinds of necessity). 
Essences are a new kind of object, and their study opens onto a new domain of 
knowledge disjoint from empirical knowledge. Contra strong epistemological 
naturalists, who deny the. legitimacy of non-empirical kinds of knowledge claims, 
Husserl claims that there is an entire domain ofvalid laws (universally and necessarily 
valid, at that) that pertain to eidë. The claims of the natural science, and the possibility 
in principle of empirical knowledge, rests on an a priori clarification of the regional 
ontologies in which these sciences operate. Husserl thus rejected the epistemological 
naturalist view according to which all valid forms of knowledge amount to empirical 
kno:vledge. On the contrary, Husserl argued not only that was there another domain of 
legitimate knowledge ofthe material eidetic kind, but also that this kind ofknowledge 
clarified and ultimately grounded the possibility of meaningful empirical claims. 
Husserl also rejects the weak epistemological naturalist claim that knowledge reduces 
either to empirical or formai knowledge. Material a priori laws and essences are 
different in kind from formai or analytic ones. Such considerations show that the 
project to epistemologically naturalize phenomenology (e.g. , the project of a 
morphological eidetics) are, at least from the transcendental point of view, are bound 
to fail. In summary, then, the issues Husserl raises against epistemological naturalist 
positions is that they conflate the role of epistemology and that of natural science, and 
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do not recognize the non-natural status of essences. Having shown why Husserl 
rejected epistemological naturalism, 1 now turn to his critique of methodological 
naturalism. 
3 .2. A method with attitude, and the problem of constitution 
Husserl ' s epistemological commitments had methodological implications, and he 
argued against what 1 have defined above as strong methodological naturalism. Recall 
that strong methodological naturalism is the meta-philosophical view that philosophy 
should employ only those methods found in the natural sciences. Husserl rejected this 
view, and defended the autonomy of philosophy. He argued that any claim to 
knowledge, if it is to be justified and meaningful, must first be grounded m 
epistemological evidence and eidetically clarified. As indicated, it was his view that 
this a priori grounding and clarification cannot be provided by the natural sciences 
themselves without vicious circularity. For this reason, transcendental phenomenology 
required a method specifie to it, a principled way of approaching things and states of 
affairs, in order to justify our making knowledge cl ai ms about them in a way that allows 
for systematic evidence, and to clarify the eidetic structures necessarily implied in such 
claims. It could not dispense with a philosophical method that preserved its autonomy 
relative to the natural sciences. This method consists in different kinds of "reductions," 
or variations in our rapport to our lived experience, which open onto the specifie 
attitudes of transcendental phenomenology. 
As is weil known to all phenomenologists, for Husserl, everyday life is of course played 
out within the "natural attitude." This is the attitude of our everyday commerce with 
the world and with other people. It is characterized by a "general positing" (Ideen I, 
§30) of the things that surround us, that is, a taking for granted of the existence of 
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objects. These objects are immediately taken to exist objectively, as "out there" in the 
world, independently of subjects. The "correlate" of the natural attitude (i .e. , the entity 
that corresponds in experience to the activity of the subject in this attitude) is the 
"natural world" given tous in everyday experience. 
The natural sciences proceed in continuity with the natural attitude of everyday life. 
Scientific activities and investigations take already given objects as their starting point. 
However, natural scientific activity goes further in this direction than our everyday 
natural attitude. The specifie attitude of the natural sciences hypostatizes the natural 
world, making it into an entity existing in itself in complete autonomy from any subject: 
"nature." In scientific activity, Husserl argued, the natural attitude becomes a self-
contained theoretical stance: the "naturalistic attitude." The latter attitude is that in 
which things that appear in intuition are treated as objects of nature, as part of the causal 
nexus of natural things. To adopt such an attitude entails that one correlatively adopt 
the methods of the natural sciences in order to account for the objects of our 
investigations. In the naturalistic attitude, conscious subjects are treated as 
psychological objects that can be studied using the methods ofnatural science (see e.g., 
Jdeen II, §49). Methodological naturalism, then, stems directly from the adoption of 
the naturalistic attitude. 
As indicated, Husserl opposes strong methodological naturalism, argumg that 
philosophy ought to have its own rigorous method: the phenomenological reductions. 
The first, and perhaps the most central, of the reductions is the "transcendental 
reduction" or "epochë," which opens onto the specifie "transcendental attitude." The 
second of the reductions, which allows for the direct intuition of essences, is the 
"eidetic reduction" and correlative "eidetic attitude." Both reductions consist in a 
change in attitude toward lived experience, and represent the specifie methodological 
contribution of transcendental phenomenology. 
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The first reduction, the epochë, is a.methodological suspension ofbeliefwith regard to 
the existence of whatever phenomena are being considered in our phenomenological 
investigations. 17 The . point of using the epochë is to show how knowledge about 
"transcendent" entities (that exist "out there" in the world) is possible in principle. 
Transcendental phenomenologists argue that knowledge claims must be grounded in 
what Husserl called "evidence." 18 Evidence is arrived at, following the "principle of 
principles," by the use of intuition (Jdeen 1, §24). Intuition of an entity is the 
apprehension of the bodily presence (Leibhaftigkeit) of that entity "in the flesh" or 
again "in person" (leibhaft), as directly experienced in consciousness. The epochë is 
the method that allows for this systematic intuition of evidence, of the givenness in the 
flesh (leibhaftige Gegebenheit) ofthings in experience. 
The epochë is what allows Husserl to respond methodologically to the first 
shortcoming of epistemological naturalism, its circular justification. In order to show 
how immanent mental states can be about something in the world, the transcendental 
phenomenologist "brackets" the existence of the things in his lived experience. By 
employing the epochë, phenomenologists start their description of lived experience 
from its immediacy, moving from there to the "transcendent" things that appear in its 
flux. The existence of transcendent abjects, about which we claim to know this or that, 
is thus no longer taken for granted, but becomes that which must be accounted for. 
Transcendent abjects, however, are not lost in the reduction. Rather, they reappear with 
a "change of sign," now grounded in the immediacy of lived experience and made 
17 A more fine-grained analysis of the epochë would reveal that this reduction is actually a family of 
related reductions, which reduce to different levels of pure lived experience. Space constraints forbid 
me from unfolding these distinctions in a systematic way. For a recent and in-depth analysis of the 
development ofthe epochë in Husserl 's thought, see Smith (2010), chapters 2 and 3. 
18 
"Evidence" for Husserl is not equivalent to observational evidence in contemporary philosophy of 
science, i.e. as methodologically justified data corroborating various claims and theories (as in, e.g. , 
Bechtel forthcoming). By "epistemological evidence," 1 mean specifically Husserl 's notion of evidence 
as being given "in person" or "in the flesh" to consciousness. For the phenomenological conception of 
evidence, see Heffernan (1998); also see Sokolowski (1964), 153ff. 
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evident thereby. Speaking of the bracketing of reality in the epochë, Husserl writes: 
"Strictly speaking, we have not lost anything but rather have gained the whole of 
absolute being which, rightly understood, contains within itself, 'constitutes' within 
itself, ali worldly transcendencies" (Ideen ! , 94; Husserl 1982, 113). Using the epochë, 
the transcendental phenomenologist reduces his lived experience to its immediacy. 
Transcendent objects reappear, in the immanent flux of lived experience, but with a 
"change of sign," now apprehended as "constituted." 
What does Husserl mean by "constitution"?19 The constitution of objects in lived 
experience refers to the way objects in their meaningfulness (Seinsinn) are disclosed in 
the ongoing endogenous flow of consciousness. Thus, objects are no longer taken as 
existing independently of consciousness, but are apprehended precise! y as they exist in 
their meaningfulness to consciousness, as a meaningful unfolding of experience. 
Constitution, understood transcendentally, is thus the disclosure of meaningful objects 
in the life ofthe mind (Seele). The expression "in," of course, must not be taken literally 
in the spatial sense. The mind, Husserl argued, is not spatial! y extended, and a fortiori 
what "unfolds in" the mind is not a spatial event (although it is temporal ; Ideen II, §32). 
Constitution, considered transcendentally, is not an empirically real process (although, 
as I argue later in this chapter, it is related to empirically real processes). Rather, it is 
the coming into lived experience ofthings for the subject. A theory of constitution, the 
likes of which Husserl elaborated throughout his career (see Sokolwoski 1964), is a 
19 This question is perhaps the most fundamental of Husserl 's transcendental phenomenology, and 1 can 
only hope to sketch an answer here. As Sokolowski , whose work on constitution remains of interest 
today, remarks, "There is no other concept that reflects in itselfthe totality of his thought so completely 
and so weil. The philosophical value of his theory of constitution is the philosophical value of 
phenomenology as a whole, and the weakness and difficulty attached to this concept are the weakness 
and difficulty inherent in phenomenology as a philosophical method" (1964, 223). lt is generally 
recognized that Husserl ' s theory of constitution moves from the "static" conception of constitution in 
his earlier works (i .e . the schema of intentions animating content in Logis che Untersuchungen and Jdeen 
!) to the "genetic" conception in his later works (especially Formale und transzendentale Logik, the 
Cartesianische Meditationen, and Erfahrung und Urteil). For a contemporary study of the notion of 
constitution in Husserl 's overall philosophical project, see Sandmeyer (2009). 
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material eidetic theory (as defined above) that shows how it is possible in principle that 
meaningful abjects come to disclosure in conscious experience, and become present 
"in the flesh." 
Constitution and its elucidation by the method of transcendental reduction are what 
allow Husserl to justify the epistemological scope of transcendental phenomenology. 
Studying the epistemic function of consciousness, as that in virtue of which things are 
constituted or disclosed in experience as meaningful, provides Husserl with an 
epistemological ground for all predicative knowledge. This is because, in disclosing 
the region of immediate pure lived experience, the epoche allows the phenomenologist 
to trace the genesis of constituted predicative meaning to the pre-predicative encounter, 
itself already meaningful , from which it originates. For Husserl , especially in his later 
"genetic phenomenological" period, meaning has a history; as he writes in Formale 
und transzendentale Logik, any meaningful predicative claim of the form "S is p" 
ultimately results from the dialectical relation between the agent' s history of 
"sedimented" predicative judgments and her pre-predicative meaningful encounter 
with things in the world. Phenomenology is thus a transcendental epistemological 
inquiry and can function as a foundational epistemology because it can show how 
' 
"transcendence in immanence," that is, the constitution of transcendent meaningful 
objects within the dynamics of immanent lived experience, is possible. This is precisely 
what the methodological naturalist is incapable of doing: her method always 
presupposes that her ability to make claims about the world has been already 
established and justified. 
The second reduction employed by Husserl is the "eidetic reduction," and correlative 
mode of seeing, the "seeing of essences" ( Wesensschau ). The seeing of essences allows 
one to directly see the essential structures at work in experience. Similarly to the 
transcendental reduction, the eidetic reduction brackets the existence of the 
transcendent objects that are intuited in experience. Rather than examining the 
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constitution ofmeaningful objects in the flux oflived experience, as in the epochë, the 
phenomenologist whose experience has undergone the eidetic reduction apprehends 
the essences of the objects that he experiences. The eidetic reduction is what aliows 
Husserl to justify methodologicaliy the fact that one can access the essential structures 
present in pure lived experience. Husserl writes: "The essence (Eidos) is a new so11 of 
object. Just as the datum of individual or experiencing intuition is an individual object, 
so the datum of eidetic intuition is a pure essence" (Ideen ! , 10-11 ; Husserl 1982, 9). 
The eidetic way of seeing and the eidetic attitude aliow Husserl to support his claim 
that there exists a valid domain of knowledge disjoint from empirical knowledge, 
because it provides a rigorous method by which to grasp the eidë present in any lived 
experience. The transcendental significance of phenomenology, the possibility of its 
playing the role of a "first philosophy," apt to ultimately ground ali others, rests on the 
eidetic status of its investigations (see Cartesianische Meditationen, §34). Husserl 
defined transcendental phenomenology as an eidetic science aiming to describe "pure" 
(reduced) mental processes (Ideen ! , §75). The method of eidetic seeing aliows the 
transcendental phenomenologist to attain eidetic universality and necessity, a truly 
apodictic fundamentum inconcussum. 
Like the epochë, the Wesensschau consists in a change in attitude with regard to our 
immediate lived experience. One can always go from the experience of a factual 
encounter with an object to a direct intuition of the essences involved in that experience 
through the eidetic reduction. In fact, it is an eidetic possibility inherent in ali lived 
experience that one can adopt the eidetic attitude with regard to it. Husserl writes, 
"Experiencing, or intuition of something individual can become transmuted into eidetic 
seeing (ideation)-a possibility which is itself to be understood not as empirical, but 
as eidetic. What is seen when that occurs is the corresponding pure essence, or Eidos, 
whether it be the highest category or a particularization thereof--down to full 
concretion" (Ideen !, 10; Husserl 1982, 8). Thus, just as the epochë elucidates the 
constituted character of ali things experienced, latent in the natural attitude of ordinary 
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everyday experience, the eidetic reduction elucidates the essential structures present in 
all things experienced, also latent in the natural attitude. 
"Naturalized phenomenologies" can be seen as combining epistemological and 
methodological naturalism; they attempt to use the descriptions provided by 
phenomenology in the framework of ordinary natural scientific explanation. The 
reductions are not employed because of the ir philosophical significance (as pro vi ding 
a methodological justification for the autonomy of philosophical epistemological 
inquiry), but rather as one tool among others available to the naturalist in his attempt 
to explain the natural phenomenon of consciousness. Phenomenological description is 
used, in such approaches, to the extent that it can be recuperated as a rigorous 
description of an actually existing thing, consciousness, without regard for the 
epistemological justificatory value of these analyses, nor for the specifie kind of 
necessity uncovered by eidetic analysis. Husserl would clearly object to the claim that 
m so instrumentalizing eidetic analysis, one has effectively naturalized 
phenomenology. 
Bayne (2004) has argued that neurophenomenology, notably as exemplified by the 
accounts of Lutz (2002) and Lutz & Thompson (2003), really amounts to a disciplined 
use of first-person data in cognitive scientific modeling, albeit in a new form that 
involves interesting new elements, such as, e.g. , the elaboration of categories with the 
participants themselves, and the training of the latter through increased ex po sure time 
to the kinds of stimuli tested. However, he argues, nothing particularly 
phenomenological distinguishes this methodology from, say, the kind of first-person 
data use already in vogue in, e.g., qualitative analysis. And indeed, it is far from clear 
that the use of "eidetics" in neurophenomenology is much more than a 
phenomenological gloss for a sophisticated type of introspection, albeit inspired by 
phenomenological insights. This perspective is echoed by Overgaard (2004, 377-378), 
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who argues that it is difficult to distinguish the practice of neurophenomenology from 
traditional forms of introspectiçm and first-person data use. 
In summary, that Husserl rejected strong methodological naturalism is evident from his 
proposing distinct philosophical methods, the reductions, irreducible to the methods of 
the natural sciences. The specifie methodology of transcendental phenomenology th us 
consists in different changes in attitude with regard to lived experience. The purpose 
of these reductions is, one the one hand, to justify the possibility of knowledge claims 
about transcendent abjects and to show their presence in consciousness as constituted 
and meaningful and, on the other hand, to elucidate the eidetic necessary conditions on 
the experience of any possible object. Husserl ' s epistemological and methodological 
commitments have important ontological ramifications, and I now turn to these. 
3.3. Ontological naturalism and consciousness 
Husserl also rejected ontological naturalism. This was a later development of his 
thought. 20 To clarify his reasoning, I propose to consider a phenomenological 
distinction between two ways of understanding consciousness. This will allow me to 
clearly frame Husserl's critique of ontological naturalism (which is, recall , the view 
that all things and properties are natural things and properties). On the one hand, 
consciousness can be understood as a natural process or object, as a factual individually 
existing thing that can be studied with naturalistic methodologies. I shall henceforth 
call this view of consciousness 'Cn', for short. Consciousness is approached by the 
20 As Moran (2008) notes, Husserl ' s position on naturalism has a complex historical deve lopment. 
Husserl ' s critique of naturalism moves from a more methodological orientation in his early career, 
focusing especially on the naturalization of ideality and normativity, to a more ontological direction in 
his later career. This shift to ontological arguments is especially marked in in Husserl 's Formale und 
transzendentale Logik, ldeen Il, and Die Krisis der europaischen Wissenschaften und die 
transzendentale Phanomenologie (hereafter Krisis) . 
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natural scientist, argued Husserl, as an empirical phenomenon, such as plate tectonics, 
the solar system, E. coli, ecosystems, etc., but of perhaps greater complexity. The 
attempt to naturalize consciousness thus amounts to giving a scientific naturalistic 
account of consciousness, conceptualized as a natural process (that is, as Cn). 
For the transcendental phenomenologist, however, consciousness is not merely an 
object or process to be explained using the methods of natural science. Husserl argued 
that consciousness cannot be understood merely as an object ofknowledge, but also as 
the knowing subject for whom there can be any object. The core ontological objection 
raised by Husserl against naturalism is that it "objectifies" (that is, treats as factual , 
spatiotemporal objects) certain things that he argued simply cannot be accounted for in 
real, objective terms. Against ontological naturalism, Husserl proposed that we think 
of consciousness "transcendentally"; that is, in its epistemic dimension, as the 
condition of possibility of there being knowledge of anything. I shall denote this second 
understanding of consciousness, · as transcendental condition of possibility of 
knowledge, by 'Ce' . What is at stake here, as Zahavi poirits out, is nothing less than 
the difference between "being aware of oneself as a causally determined known object, 
as a part of the empirical world, and being aware of oneself as a knowing subject, as-
to paraphrase Wittgenstein-the limit of the world" (2004b, 335). Rather than 
understanding consciousness as merely a psychological phenomenon, Husserl is 
proposing to understand it as an epistemic precondition of, and constant presupposition 
of, the appearance of phenomena in general. 
If Ce is not an object, what is it? It is certainly not a factually existing entity, because 
it is the absolute condition of possibility of the constitution of any thing in lived 
experience. So what, then, is it? Consciousness and its ego, when viewed 
transcendentally, are eidë. They are the invariant, necessary structures of the unfolding 
of any possible lived experience (Ideen 1, §§81-83, esp. §83; Cartesianische 
Meditationen, §§34-37). Thus, for instance, inner time consciousness is not merely that 
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fact that this or that empirical consciousness flows temporally; it is an essential 
structure or eidetic concretum, whose unity provides a lawfulness that pertains with 
eidetic necessity to all lived experiences. Phenomenological time consciousness, as 
Husserl describes it, "not only designates something universally belonging to every 
single mental process, but also a necessary form combining mental processes with 
mental processes" (Ide en I, 163; Husserl 1982, 194 ). It is th us a material eidetic law 
that any lived experience, any concrete mental process, requires supplementation from 
the flux which ti es each together with the who le stream of lived experiences. As such, 
Ce simply cannot be accounted for in the natural scientific register; recall that matters 
of fact and matters essential are disjoint. Insofar as it is an eidetic universal structure 
with its own eidetic necessary laws, Ce can only be described in the material eidetic 
register, by employing the eidetic reduction and the phenomenological description of 
the eidë seen thereupon. When Husserl is analyzing the structure of conscious 
experience, as he does in Zur Phanomenologie des inneren Zeitbewusstseins,21 he is 
not describing a natural spatiotemporal process. He is rather describing necessary 
essential structures of any possible lived experience, the ultimate a priori laws of time 
and its essential traits. Husserl writes: 
The epistemological question about the possibility of experience is the 
question about the essence of experience; and the clarification of its 
phenomenological possibility requires going back to the phenomenological 
data, for what is experienced consists, phenomenologically, of such data. 
[ ... ] We seek to bring the a priori of time to clarity by exploring the 
consciousness oftime, by bringing its essential constitution to light, and by 
exhibiting the apprehension-contents and act-characters that pertain-
perhaps specifically-to time and to which the a priori temporal laws 
essentially belong. (Zeitbewusstseins, 8-9, 1 0; Husserl 1991 b, 9, 1 0). 
2 1 Hereafter, cited as Zeitbewusstseins. 
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lt thus follows that any attempt to model consciousness as a factual event in the world 
will miss its crucial transcendental signification. This remark also clarifies the meaning 
of constitution. Transcendental phenomenology must study the constitution of objects 
and their disclosure in the flux of pure experience using the eidetic method that reveals 
the material a priori essentiallaws pertaining to constitution. The invariant eidë of the 
flux of inner time are such invariant essential structures. 
On Husserl 's argument, naturalistic accounts of consciousness will remain incomplete 
so long as they neglect its epistemic dimension and eidetic clarification. For the 
transcendental phenomenologist, a full account of consciousness is only possible if it 
is understood both in its factual existence, as Cn, and in its fundamental essential 
structures, as Ce. Transcendental phenomenologists are not rejecting the idea that 
consciousness is, in part, a phenomenon of nature (they accept that Cn is a valid object 
of investigation); they are rather emphasizing that it is not only such an object, and 
especially not when examined in its epistemological function, as the essential invariant 
structure of any possible experience. Such an empirical dimension certainly is a valid 
domain of experience, but does not interest transcendental phenomenology per se . 
Husserl writes: 
The psychological apperception that takes. experiences to be psychic states 
of empirical persans, of psychophysical subjects; that establishes 
connections, whether purely psychic or psychophysical, . among these 
experiences; and that follows the becoming, the taking shape, and the 
being-reshaped of psychic experiences according to natural laws-this 
psychological apperception is entirely different from the 
phenomenological apperception. (Zeitbewusstseins, 9; Husserl 1991 b, 9) 
Hence, beyond its dimension as a psychological phenomenon to be studied by 
employing the empirical methods of naturalistic psychology, transcendental 
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phenomenology studies consciousness as the universal eidetic structure that acts as the 
true foundation of all epistemological claims. 
Husserl ' s non-psychological treatment of consciousness 1s clearly at odds with 
naturalism as he understood it. The great methodological naivety of naturalism is, he 
argued, that it presupposes the objectivity of the objects it investigates (i.e., their 
constitution, as they "give themselves" in lived experience). The danger in the 
objectivist presupposition is that those who endorse it might argue that consciousness 
is exhaustively accounted for with a set of facts about natural processes. Husserl 
wholeheartedly disagreed with this approach as missing the most important dimension 
of consciousness, whose investigation as transcendental condition of possibility for 
knowledge is (for principled reasons) prior to, and separate from, the study of any thing 
or state of affairs that can be made evident in conscious experience. lt is prior to any 
natural science because it is only in virtue of Ce that any claim to knowledge can 
ultimately be justified, and it is separate from the study of any natural process because 
it is not interested in matters offact, focused as it is instead on eidetic laws and eidetic 
necessity. 
For Husserl, ifnaturalizing consciousness an1ounts to giving a naturalistic explanatory 
account of it as an empirical object of study, then consciousness can never be fully 
naturalized, because Ce is not a natural object; it is rather the necessary eidetic structure 
of the experience of a subject for whom natural objects are at all. Husserl thus clearly 
rejects ontological naturalism because there are sorne things which are not natural 
objects with natural properties. Ce, as a pure eidos, is such a thing. To propose, as do 
those who would naturalize time consciousness, that Ce could be accounted for with 
natural nomologicallaws seems to miss Husserl ' s ontological distinction between the 
consciousness of a psycho-physical subject, as a natural event, and pure consciousness 
as an eidos. Moreover, to endorse ontological naturalism eo ipso collapses the 
distinction between weak and strong methodological naturalism; if all things and 
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properties, even time consciousness, are natural things and properties, th en no leg room 
remains for the weaker position. Those who endorse ontological naturalism are thus, 
by that very fact, committed to strong methodological naturalism, which Husserl 
rejected. 
Many commentators (e.g., Zahavi 2004b; 2010; 2013; Moran 2013 ; Brown 2008; 
Clegg 2006; Overgaard 2004) have invited us to heed the claim that phenomenology 
could be naturalized with caution. They have pointed out that Husserl ' s overarching 
philosophical project and its transcendental philosophical commitments are what 
motivate-and ultimately justify-the specifie remarks he made about the natural 
sciences and mathematics. To address on! y the latter while neglecting the former would 
deform his philosophical enterprise. I am sympathetic to these arguments. I take the 
project to integrate phenomenology into the natural sciences to be an indispensable and 
theoretically interesting extension of the latter ' s methodologies, and for reasons that 
those who would naturalize phenomenology make abundantly clear: if cognitive 
science is to be a science of the mind, then one needs to account for the first-person 
phenomenal perspective. Cognitive science cannot just describe what is happening in 
the 'black box'; it must describe what it is like ''for the black box" (Petitot et al. 1999a, 
12). However, accounting for what it is like for the black box is not the same as 
accounting for what it is like for the black box to know about the world, nor is it the 
same as describing the eidetic invariants of its experience. 
In trying to deal with the epistemological and foundationalist ambitions of 
phenomenology, current naturalistic approaches jettison the transcendental, epistemic 
dimension of consciousness outright. In so doing, however, mu ch of the philosophical 
import of phenomenology is bracketed, and may even be impossible to recover. This 
casting aside of Ce and its epistemological ramifications throws doubt on these projects 
achieving their desideratum, i.e. to naturalize phenomenology as an eidetic discipline 
of transcendental in quiry. They do not leave the natural attitude and view 
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conscwusness as a psychological thing in need of cognitive scientific explanation. 
They are Jess concemed with the epistemological, methodological, and Ôntological 
implications of transcendental phenomenology than they are with integrating, in 
different ways (through DST, operationalization or direct formalization) , the sundry 
insights of phenomenological analysis (such as dynamical coping, dynamics of time 
consciousness, embodiment, etc.) with various kinds of data sets and formai 
explanatory models in cognitive neuroscience. Although their emphasis on, e.g., the 
endogenous dynamics of consciousness, first-person data, etc. , draws from 
phenomenological thought, consciousness is not considered transcendentally, from an 
epistemic vantage point, and is never described in eidetic terms for reasons other than 
using this description to further naturalistic explanatory projects. 22 
22 lt has been argued by Gallagher (20 12), Zahavi (2004b; 201 0; 2013 ), and others th at the se 
naturalization projects are not naturalizations of transcendental phenomenology, but are better 
understood (in the best of cases) precisely as fonns of what Husserl called "phenomenological 
psychology." 1 agree with this assessment. lndeed, as discussed above, transcendental phenomenology 
engages consciousness not only as an empirical psychological phenomena (Cn) , but as the eidetic 
necessary structure that acts as the epistemic condition of possibility of the knowledge of anything (as 
Ce). The reis th us a significant disconnect between the natural istic approaches to phenomenology, which 
endorse forms of naturalism Husserl rejected, and the transcendental philosophical aims of 
phenomenology. This is not to say, however, that phenomenology and psychology are completely 
unrelated . Husserl himself had glimpsed the usefulness of such naturalistic uses of phenomenological 
description. He had seen that phenomenology and psychology were intimately linked, and had allowed 
for the possibility of a natural scientific "counterpart" to phenomenology, a naturalistic or mathematized 
use of the results of phenomenological description in the natural sciences. Alongside transcendental 
phenomenology, a "phenomenological psychology" could thus be envisioned. The main difference 
between the two is that wh ile the former is an epistemological investigation carried out in the eidetic and 
transcendental attitudes, the latter is an natural science carried out in the natural attitude, albeit one 
informed by phenomenological eidetic analyses. In short, phenomenological psychology is not interested 
in the epistemic dimension of consciousness (Ce), but rather in consciousness as a natural process ( Cn ). 
It employs phenomenological eidetic analysis to determine with precision the object to be analyzed 
naturalistically thereafter, but it does so within the natural attitude. See volume IX of Husserliana, 
entitled Phiinomenologische Psychologie. Vorlesungen Sommersemester 1925. 
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4. Weak methodological naturalism and transcendental phenomenology 
It would seem that transcendental phenomenology is incompatible with naturalism in 
the three senses examined above. The attempts to naturalize phenomenology seem to 
be committed to varieties of naturalism fundamentally at odds with the main 
cornmitments of transcendentalism. At this point, it may be interesting to recall that a 
weaker form ofmethodological naturalism is conceptually viable: the conditional form. 
As indicated, such a weaker reading would take the form of a conditional constraint: if 
X is a natural entity or property, then the most adequate method for its study is one 
coherent or continuous with tho se of the natural sciences. We should recall that this 
conditional reading of methodological naturalism is only available to the naturalist as 
a theoretical position to the extent that she reject ontological naturalism, lest the 
antecedent always trivially obtain. Indeed, if ontological naturalism is accepted as 
premise, then it follows that all things and properties simply are natural things and 
properties, and in that case no room would remain for the weaker statement of the 
position. 
I argue that Husserl's transcendental project is fully compatible with this softer form 
of methodological naturalism. Husserl can even be said to endorse weak 
methodological naturalism about the lived body and the mind, because he regarded 
them as natural things with natural properties, as part of the onto1ogica1 region "nature," 
and argued that at !east sorne natural sciences were suited to the ir study. He even 
proposed a specifie science, called "somatology," that was apt to study the lived body 
and its crucial role in constitution. 
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4.1. The mind and the lived body as objects of nature 
In Ideen II and III, Husserl arguably endorsed weak methodological naturalism with 
respect to the lived body (Leib) and the mind (Seele). 23 He argued that insofar as the 
lived body and the mind were legitimately considered as natural entities, they could be 
studied using the methods of the natural sciences. Husserl argued that the ontological 
correlate of naturalistic attitude was the ontological region called "nature." What we 
caU nature, th en, is the domain of possible objects correlated to that attitude, and objects 
given in this attitude are ipso facto natural objects (Ideen II, §§1- 2, §12; Ideen III, §§1-
2) Natural objects, insofar as they are part of the ontological region nature, are 
essentially part of the nexus of causal interactions. 
Both the mind and the lived body are given in the naturalistic attitude. The lived body 
is apprehended in that attitude as one of the main regions of reality (Ide en III, §§ 1-2). 
Although not equivalent to material physical nature, and not given in the same way, 
the lived body is part of nature "in a second, broadened sense," that of "animal nature" 
(Ideen II, 28; Husserl 1989, 30). The mind is also, as Husserl puts it, "in its connection 
with the material [lived body] , an Object of natural-scientific research" (Ideen II, 90; 
Husserl 1989, 96). Both mind and lived body are thus legitimately understood as 
natural objects. Although Husserl was not endorsing a metaphysical thesis about these 
entities (i.e., the lived body and the mind are not characterized by the metaphysical 
status "natural," as in ontological naturalism), to treat them as natural things with 
23 I preserve for the most part the terminology proposed in the translation of ldeen If by Rojcewicz and 
Schuwer (Husserl 1989). However, 1 opt to translate "Seele" as "mind" (rather than as "sou!") and 
"seelische" as "mental." Husserl, when discussing the Seele, had in mind that which is studied by 
psychologists; I employ the more contemporary terminology to stay cl oser to recent sciences of the mi nd 
and a void the pitfalls associated to doctrines of the sou!. 1 also use " lived body" to translate " Leib," 
rather than the uppercase "Body," to avoid possible ambiguities. English citations of fdeen JI employ 
the translation by Rojcewicz and Schuwer; the first page reference refers to the German edition of 
Husserliana, and is followed by the reference to the English translation. 
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natural properties was permissible to the extent that the status ofthese objects as natural 
is correlative to the attitude adopted towards them (i.e., the naturalistic one). 24 Th us, 
although Husserl did not endorse ontological -naturalism, he did view it as legitimate to 
speak of the mind and the lived body as natural entities. The antecedent of the 
conditional version of methodological naturalism th us obtains with regard to the lived 
body and the mind in Husserl' s account. 
Now, for the consequent. Husserl argued that, insofar as they were natural objects, the 
mind and the lived body could be (at least partially)25 accounted for by employing 
24 To be sure, the mind and the lived body are not exclusively abjects pertaining to the ontological region 
nature. The mind, wh en considered in its relation to wh at Husserl ca lied the spirit ( Geist) is a "spirit-
mind." Although the term Geist may seem odd to the contemporary reader, Husserl is using it as was 
commonplace in his time, to refer to the cultural existence of human beings. Hegel had also used the 
term Geist in this sense, and moreover, the sciences interested in culture and history were referred to as 
Geisteswissenschaften, or sciences of spirit. When viewed as a spirit-mind, the mind " is not defined as 
a real unity in relation to circumstances of Objective nature, thus psychophysically," but Husserl 
immediately adds, "or at !east does not have to be defined that way" (ldeen Il, 280 ; Husserl 1989, 293 , 
emphasis added). Thus, there are ways of apprehending the mind such that it is not understood as a 
natural object, but rather as a cultural or historical phenomenon . But this does not preclude an 
understanding of the mi nd, even as a spiritual or cultural mi nd , as being related to nature. The regularities 
of the mi nd as spiritual, its " immanent lawfulness," can in princip le a Iso be "apprehended as natural" 
insofar as they are tied to psycho-physical regularities. The lived body, when considered in relation to 
Geist, also acquires a spiritual status, as a "lived body for the will , the freely moving body," distinct 
from the body as physical-aesthesiological unity (!deen Il, 284; Husserl 1989, 297). This is why Husserl 
can be said to definitively reject ontological naturalism: the mind and the lived body are more than mere 
natural abjects. However, he does endorse the view that the mind and the lived body can legitimately be 
considered as natural abjects, as part of the regional ontological domain of natural entities, so long as 
we do not contlate this with a metaphysical thesis. 
25 A discussion of the "science ofthe mind" proposed by Husserl would vastly overshoot my aims here, 
and so 1 shall focus on the science of the lived body. However, a few remarks can be made. In ldeen Il, 
Husserl argues that there could be a science apt to study the motivational structure of the mi nd . He writes 
that, just as we learn to know abjects following their kinds and the lawful behaviors pertaining to those 
kinds, we can "capture the development of a pers on if we reconstruct the course of his li fe and make it 
intuitive in such a way that the entirety of his development as a man becomes comprehensible in an 
experiential way, especially with regard to his manner of !etting himself be motivated as a subject, 
together with ali the definite actions and passions proper to him" (!deen Il, 272; Husserl 1989, 285). 
Such a science would be a " science of the mind," a "psycho-logy." Husserl argues, however, that such 
a science could not be carried out in the naturalistic attitude. This is because such a science of the mind 
is interested in the person or persona] ego, only apprehensible in the personalistic attitude; as such, it 
would investigate motivational relations, invisible to naturalistic apprehension, rather than causal ones. 
Husserl's proposai of a science of the mind is not, under this description, a natural science. However, in 
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natural scientific methodologies. This, 1 argue, shows that Husserl endorsed a form of 
weak methodological naturalism that included the mind and the lived body as natural 
things and properties as part of its antecedent. 1 shall focus on his argument for the 
possibility of developing a sciehce of the lived body and its relation to the mind, which 
he called "somatology." But before tuming to somatology, 1 quickly review Husserl ' s 
account of the lived body and its relation to the mind. 
The lived body, for Husserl, is botha physical thing and an animated living thing, and 
is in its animation intrinsically tied to mentallife. This dual nature of the lived body is 
reflected in its having both an "inn er" and an "outer" dimension ( summarized in Ide en 
II, §42). Viewed from the "outer attitude," the body exists in the substantial sense as a 
physical thing (Leibkorper) , participating in the manifold of causal interactions with 
other physical things. For Husserl, to know physical reality is to know the causal 
relations that underlie the noematic appearance of that reality (Jdeen.III, 3--4). Like 
other actually existing, real (real, not simply reel!) objects, the Leibkorper gives itself 
as a "substance", as the stable something which underlies and determines the causal 
changes in the noematic configurations of the sensory contents of lived experience. 26 
Jdeen III, Husserl suggests that psychology, as a natural science interested in the mind, would investigate 
relations of "psychological causality," which suggests that the naturali stic attitude might be appropriate 
to study the mind on his account (see Ideen III, 16). 1s Husserl ' s science of the mind, his psycho-logy, a 
natural science? To decide this is weil beyond the scope of this chapter. 1 shall thus focus on Husserl's 
proposai of a science of the lived body in its relation to the mi nd that can be unambiguously understood 
as a natural science. 
26 In a useful footnote, Husserl gives a definition of "substance." He writes: "Substance signifies here 
nothing more than the material thing as such, considered to the extent that it is the identical something 
of real properties, that which actualizes itself temporally in regulated manifolds of states in regulated 
dependency on concomitant circumstances" (Ide en If, 44, footnote ; Husserl 1989, 4 7) . For the relation 
between materiality and substance, see Jdeen If, §§ 12- 15. We should note a debate in contemporary 
Husserl scholarship over the representational status of the noema, and its relation to the real object. For 
"West Coast" thinkers (such as F01lesdal , Dreyfus, and Mclntyre), the noema is akin to the Fregean 
sense. lt is a kind of mediator entity between the object and the world. This commits West coast 
interpretations to the idea that Husserl was a representationalist. "East Coast" interpretations (like 
Sokolowski ' s or Drummond ' s), on the contrary, claim that the object is a moment in the noema, and 
understand the relation between object and noema as one of identity to manifold. For East Coast 
interpretations, the noema is the object seen under a phenomenological lens in its meaningfulness 
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Objectivities such as these can only be fully determined in intersubjective scientific 
experience (Ideen Il, §18, esp. f, g, and h, §§43-47, and §§51-53; ldeen Ill, §1). The 
object is what it is only relatively to a set of causal circumstances; its individuation is 
relative to these circumstances (Ide en Il, 41 ff, 298ff), and it can only be known if one 
uses a methodology specifie to its encounter as a substantial object. This is where the 
natural sciences enter into our account. The object and its real properties, that is, the 
"determinable X" (Ide en 1, §§97-99, § 131) or experiential correlate of any possible 
rational subject (ldeen Il, 131), can only be apprehended as such in intersubjective 
natural scientific investigations. Empirical experimental methods, which recreate 
specifie conditions experimentally in controlled contexts, need to be employed to study 
the stable identity of real obj ects in the face of changing circumstances. The lived body, 
being in part a constituted Korper like any other natural object, is thus best investigated 
in its factual existence with natural scientific methodology (e.g., neurophysiology, 
physics, etc.). 
On the other band, viewed from the "inner attitude," the body is a living, sensing body, 
the "bearer of sensations" (Ide en Il, 161 ). Insofar as it is animate flesh, over and above 
its physical "layer," the Leib includes for Husserl a layer of inherently localized 
sensations or "sensings" (Empjindnisse) that are constitutive of it as a lived body in the 
strict sense. This intrinsically localized stratum of the lived body is precisely its 
"aesthesiological" dimension (ldeen Il, §36, esp. 145-146). Empfindnisse differ from 
ordinary presentative sensations (Empfindungen) because they have a dual function in 
the life ofthe mind (ldeen II, 144ff). Such sensations are "double-sensations" (Doppel-
Empjindungen, see Ide en II, 14 7). On the one band, they allow us to sense determinate 
properties of things, like ordinary sensations; they th us have a presentative function, in 
that they present a thing leibhaft. On the other band, sensings are perceived as 
(Seinsinn) . See, e.g., F0llesdal (1969; 1974); Mclntyre (1982); Sokolowski (1 987); Drummond (1990); 
Drummond & Embree (1 992), Zahavi (2004a). 
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pertaining directly to the lived body. The same tactile sensation thus supports two 
possible apprehensions: e.g., when I touch an abject, the sensation of touch can be 
interpreted as either a sensation of the lived body, indicative of it as a sensory field 
(e.g. , "my hand is touched here"), or as a sensation of touching something, which 
reveals the material nature of the abject apprehended ("I am touching something here"). 
The aesthesiological lived body is the original source of spatial localization; it is the 
medium through which all determined spatial properties of real abjects are 
apprehended (ldeen II, §§36--40). I feel the real properties of abjects in the world "on" 
and "in" the lived body. 
The lived body as a whole is both Leib and Leibkdrper simultaneously, and 
encompasses both si des at once. When discussing the disclosure in lived experience of 
my hands touching each other, Husserl refers to the hand as a "physical-
aesthesiological unity," an enmeshment of aesthesiological Leib and Leibkorper (ldeen 
II, 155). It is only in the abstract, Husserl continues, that one can separate the layer of 
localized sensations from the physical body. We can characterize the lived body in this 
way as weil, as a unity of Leib and Korper. While sensings are not properties of the 
body as a mere physical thing, they are properties of the lived body as a whole, as a 
physical-aesthesiological unity of Leibkorper and Leib.27 As indicated, the lived body 
as physical~aesthesiological unity is apprehended in the naturalistic attitude, and such 
can legitimately be considered as a natural abject (ldeen III, §2). The lived body, then, 
even when considered as aesthesiological, can thus legitimately be apprehended as a 
natural thing and, by implication, can be studied with methods adequate to such a thing 
27 Husserl writes: "The localized sensations are not properties of the [lived body] as a physical thing," 
immediately adding, "but op the other hand, they are properties of the thing, [lived body] , and indeed 
they are effect-properties. They arise when the [lived body] is touched, pressed, stung, etc., and they 
arise there where it is touched and at the ti me when it is touched [ ... ]. Touching refers here to a physica\ 
event." (!deen Il, 146; Husserl 1989, 153- 154). Leib and Leibkorper thus form a unity that can only be 
dissociated in the abstract. · 
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(i.e. natural scientific methods). Such a peculiar object, however, requires a special 
science, namely somatology. 
How does the mind relate to the lived body? Now, as indicated, the mind is also 
something given in the naturalistic attitude, and can thus also be apprehended with 
legitimacy as a natural thing. Apprehended as a natural thing, the mind and its states 
are intimately related to the lived body. When considering its relation of dependence 
to different kinds of circumstances, Husserl argues that the mind admits a kind of 
stratification into three "sides" : a psycho-physical side, an "idiopsychic" side, and an 
intersubjective side (Ideen II, 135ft). The psycho-physical side of the mind is the mind 
considered in its relation of dependence to physical circumstances (physischen 
Umstdnden ), and notably to the causal pro cesses and circumstances of the lived body. 
The idiopsychic side of the mind refers to the way in which the mind is a circumstance 
for itself, that is, how its own internai circumstances ( e.g. its history and idiosyncratic 
set of motivations) in part determine the course of its mentallife. The intersubjective 
side ofthe mind refers to the way in which the mind and its (real) ego are constituted 
as an objectively existing object (albeit of a special kind; see Ideen II, §§31-33) in its 
relation to other knowing subjects (see, e.g. , Ideen III, 109- 115). I shall focus in what 
follows on the psycho-physical side of the mind and its relation to the constituting 
factor that is the lived body. lndeed, the connection of the lived body to the mind and 
its sensory states is the main theoretical object of interest in somatology. 
4.2. Somatology and psycho-physical dependence 
As indicated, Husserl proposed a specifie science to address the lived body in its 
specificity. He called this science "somatology" (Ideen III, §§2-3). Somatology is a 
natural science interested in the corporeity (Leiblichkeit) ofthe lived body, that is, the 
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"sensitiveness" (Empjindsamkeit) that makes it a lived body perse, and on Husserl's 
definition, it includes the various empirical theories of sensation in empirical 
psychology (Ideen III, 9). Specifically, somatology studies the sensitiveness of the 
lived body, in particular the layer of real properties of the lived body that have an 
intrinsic localization, and studies more generally the various sense fields insofar as they 
are states of the lived body. Husserl divides this science into two different kinds of 
investigation (Ideen III, 18-19). On the one hand, "physical somatology" elucidates 
what 1 shall call the physical-somatological dimension of conditionality, that is, the 
relations of psycho-physical dependence and conditionality that obtain between 
physical states of the body and sensory states of the mind. "Aesthesiological 
somatology," on the other hand, deals directly with the various sensory fields 
comprising the aesthesiological dimension of the lived body and the dependence 
relations among these fields, and it studies what 1 shaii caii the aesthesiological-
somatological dimension of the dependency between mind and lived body. Although 
not a material science, it is nonetheless a natural science, because its object of study is 
a natural one, a natural reality that is part of the causal nexus of the ontological region 
nature and that is given in the naturalistic attitude. For my purposes here, 1 shall most! y 
be concerned with the first, physical kind of somatology. 
How do the physical states of the body affect the mind and its sensory states? Mind and 
lived body form a "concrete unity" on Husserl ' s account (Ide en II, 161 ). When 
discussing the con crete unity of mi nd and lived body, and how states of the lived body 
affect states of the mind, Husserl speaks of "psycho-physical conditionality" 
(psychophysischen Konditionalitat; see Ideen II, § 18, esp. 64ff). Conditionality is a 
relation of functional correlation between various changes in the unfolding of 
experience, or "phenomenal 'if-then"' relations, as he puts it (Ideen II, 155). For 
example, if my body moves or is affected in such and such ways, then my experience 
will change in functional correlation with these changes. The mind's being affected by 
the lived body is regulated by relations of psycho-physical dependence and 
64 
conditionality. In being so related to the lived body, the mind acquires "psycho-
physical properties"; although it is not substantial in the same sense as the lived body, 
and not itselflocated in objective space and time directly, it becomes indirectly located 
in the world through its embodiment (Ideen Il, §§31-33, §46). The lived body, in 
forming with the mind a con crete unity, is a "turning point" ( Umschlagstelle, see Ide en 
II, §§41-42) where ordinary causal relations are transformed into relations of 
conditionality. Changes in sorne states of the lived body produce changes in states of 
mind: the various causal circumstances that stimulate the lived body affect the mind in 
correlative ways, given its psycho-physical side. The mind in this way becomes 
permeable to the causal interactions of things in the world through the lived body, 
which in acting like a turning point, allows the mind itselfto be in the world. The mind 
is in, and open to, the world because it is connected to the body. 
Husserl explicitly acknowledges the dependence of the lived experience of the mind 
on specifie "bodily states" (leiblicher Zustéinde), especially those of the brain or 
"central organ" (Zentralorgan) and its brain-states ( Gehirnzustéinde; see Ide en II, 
290ff). He suggests that the lived body, considered in its relation to the psycho-physical 
side of the mind, acts as the source of changes in the sensuous content that reaches 
consciousness (see, e.g., Ideen II, 135, 164- 165, 289ff, 295 ; Ideen III, 17). The relation 
of physical stimulation to sensation is one of psycho-physical conditionality and 
dependence: changes in states of the mind are functionally correlated to, and depend 
on, changes in the states of the body (Ideen Il, 154ff). 
How do these correlations operate? Husserl states that the various sensory fields 
(visual, auditory, tactile) are always saturated with sensation, and these sensations are 
subject to change in the flux of experience. Now, the lived body is a sensitive thing. 
Intrinsic to the lived body is the very important psycho-physical property of sensory 
sensitiveness (Empjindsamkeit) to the world. This sensory sensitiveness functions as 
an opening of the mind to the physical world. Certain changes in states of the physical 
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lived body (notably state changes in sensory surfaces, nerve endings, and so forth) are, 
Husserl argues, functionally correlated to the manifold changes in the contents oflived 
experience, su ch that changes in sensory states of mi nd depend on changes in the state 
of the lived body (Ideen Il, 155). This is psycho-physical dependence or conditionality. 
He writes: 
What can be apprehended as localized stratum of the [lived body] as well 
as what can be apprehended as dependent on the [lived body] (in the full 
sense of [lived body], including this stratum already) and on the "sense 
organs," all this forms, under the heading of the matter of consciousness, 
an underlying basis of consciousness and undergoes its realizing 
apprehension in unity with this consciousness as [mind] and [mental] ego. 
(Ideen II, 157; Husserl 1989, 164, trans. mod., emphasis added) 
Husserl is here arguing that the matter that at all times fills the various sensory fields 
of lived experience stands in a relation of functional dependence to, and arises from 
changes in states of, the lived body. The relation ofpsycho-physical dependence is such 
that a kind of bodil y state has, "as its uni vocal and Objective consequence, a certain 
sensation in a determinate stream of consciousness bound to its respective body" (Ideen 
II, 290; Husserl 1989, 304). Sensory states of the mind th us depend on physical states 
ofthe body.28 
28 Yoshimi (20 10, 30- 33) has proposed a formalization of the dependence relation between physical 
states of the body and sensory states of the mind as presented in Husserl ' s account. ln arder to capture 
the relation in Husserl ' s account, he proposes to define a supervenience function that relates two state 
sets, which are sets such that the system modelled can only be in one unique state in the set at a given 
time. Supervenience, in this context, is a relation between state sets, such that a state set A supervenes 
on another state set B iff objects that are B-indiscernible are also A-indiscernible. A supervenience 
functionf B->A is a function that relates two state sets, such that when the system is in state b in state 
set B, it is in a unique supervenient statefib). (Note that Yoshimi formulates "partial" and "total" versions 
of the supervenience function , which I cannot go into here, given space constraints). With Pas the state 
set of ali possible physical states of a system (say, an organism), and Sas the state set of ali possible 
sensory states of that system, Yoshimi captures the dependence relation with a (total) supervenience 
function f P->S, such that when the organism is in physica1 state p (in state set P), it is in a unique 
sensory state j{p ). He further argues th at Hus seri rejects total supervenience (20 1 0, 33- 36), and th at 
Husserl ' s argument against total supervenience fa ils (20 10, 36-38). 
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Somatological science would employ the methodologies of the natural sciences in order 
to elucidate the contribution of the lived body (and its being embedded in the nexus of 
causal relations) to the constitution of things in lived experience. Thus, to psycho-
physical conditionality "appertains somatological causality, which immediately 
always concems the relations of the irreal , of an event in the subjective sphere, with 
something real, the [lived body]: then mediately the relations with an extemal thing 
which is in a real , hence causal, connection with the [lived body]" (Ide en II, 65 ; Husserl 
1989, 70, emphasis in original). The science of somatology is thus one that investigates 
the participation of real, constituted structures such as the sense organs and the nervous 
system (what he metaphorically calls "underlying basis") in the process of constitution. 
The causal status of psycho-physical dependence and conditionality is difficult to 
appraise in Husserl. The language he uses is ambiguous. Attimes, Husserl speaks of 
dependence and conditionality as if they were causal relations, as in the remark cited 
above on "somatological causality." In other places, Husserl makes claims that are 
incompatible with a causal interpretation of the dependence relation, as we he remarks 
that "the relation between sensation and Corporeality must be thought of as 
simultaneous" (ldeen II, 295; Husserl 1989, 309).29 He also sharply distinguishes 
between the ordinary causal dependence that regulates changes in physical objects and 
the special kind of dependence that characterizes the relation of sensation to the lived 
body; conditionality is not to be conflated with physical causality (ldeen II, 295 ; also 
see Ide en II, supplement XII, part 1, §2). As Welton (1999, 49ff) notes, Husserl 
acknowledged that psycho-physical dependence relations, which tie localized 
sensations and physicallocalizations of the lived body, are of a different nature than 
29 ln this passage, Husserl argues that the effect of the body on sensation is synchronie. It is generally 
accepted that causal relations cannot obtain between two simultaneous events; to the contemporary 
reader, if Husserl's account of the dependence relation is correct, that relation cannot be a causal one. 
This provide support for Yoshimi's account ofpsycho-physical dependence as a supervenience relation 
(discussed in the previous note). 
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the relations of foundation and dependence that obtain between dependent moments in 
ordinary relations of eidetic foundation. 30 The relation here is not one between 
dependent moments essentially supplementing others, but rather between a real, 
constituted unity, part of the region nature, and sensations; Welton suggests to 
understand this relation as a causal one "in a special sense of the term [causal]" (1999, 
49). This special sense is as a conditional relation, a phenomenal if-then. The lived 
body, as a unity of sensory fields and specifically as aesthesiological, stands in a 
relation of conditional functional correlation and depend en ce to the physical body, su ch 
that changes in the state of the physical body "cause," as their effects, changes in states 
of the lived body and its sensory fields (Ideen III, 18). Physical somatology is the 
science that can study the psycho-physical dependences and conditionality relations 
that obtain between constitution ofmeaningful objects in the mind and the states of the 
lived body. 
But how does this relate to constitution? Husserl acknowledged that the lived body had 
a crucial role to play in constitution, and it is this role that is studied by the science of 
somatology. In Husserl ' s theory, the basic stratum from which ali things are constituted 
is the sensuous matter that upwells in the different sensory fields. Sensations or "sense-
things," i.e. the sensory concrescences in lived experience, are the "primai constitutive 
objects" (Ideen Il, §8). Husserl argued, then, that sensation is the foundation of ali 
constituted unities. The body, in providing lived experience with the requisite 
foundation for the constitution of any kind of thing, acts as an "underlying basis" for 
consciousness and its constituting activity. The expression "underlying basis" might be 
interpreted as a variant of the foundation relation, denoting a psycho-physical 
dependence relation. The lived body, then, acts as a condition of possibility for 
30 Husserl argues that states of sensation and the lived body are connected "certainly not in the way in 
which the sensation-content, tone quality, and the sensation-content, intensity, have an essential unity, 
nor is it the way in which the sensation-content, col or, is uni fied with the moment of spread [ ... ]"(Ide en 
JI, !54; Husserll989, 161). 
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constitution, despite itself being a product of constitution. First, the lived body is the 
source of all changes in sensory data, which form the basis from which all objective 
unities are constituted in conscious experience. This is what we might call the 
"physical-somatological" dimension of psycho-physical conditionality (in accordance 
with Husserl ' s divisions of somatology, indicated above). Second, it is the "bearer of 
sensations" and, given its status as "aesthesiological," it has, as the original source of 
localization, a role in constituting spatial things; this is the "aesthesiological-
somatological" dimension of conditionality. Both these kinds of conditionality 
relations entai1 that the lived body, although constituted, is itself, in its dual nature as 
physical Leibkorper and aesthesio1ogical Leib, a transcendental constituting factor in 
the unfolding of 1iv.ed experience. Indeed, although the intentional functions 
(remembering, perceiving, valuing) are not unilaterally determined by the lived body, 
they are nevertheless "bound to this stratum" or sensory content; and in this way, "a 
human being' s total consciousness is in a certain sense, by means of its hyletic 
substrate, bound to the [lived body]" (Jdeen Il, 153; Husserl 1989, 160, emphasis 
removed). 
Somatology would differ from psychology in its treatment of sensations; that is, while 
somatology would apprehend sensations as providing access to a living flesh, 
psychology apprehends sensations insofar as they are part of the life of the mind, 
contributing to the constitution of transcendent objects in that life by "figuring for" 
them (Darstellung). Somatological science would provide a natural scientific and 
explanatory account of the "underlying basis" of mental life. In somatology, then, 
Husserl is proposing a specifie natural science to study the relations of dependence 
between the lived body and the mind. This science would be apt to study the 
contribution of the lived body to constitution by elucidating the dependence of the mind 
on psycho-physicallived-bodily factors. 
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Although Husserl rejects strong methodological naturalism, he demonstrably endorses 
a conditional, weak form ofmethodological naturalism: ifthe lived body and the mind 
can legitimately be apprehended as natural entities with natural properties, then the 
most adequate method for their study is one coherent with those of the natural sciences, 
e.g. somatology and psychology. Even on Husserl 's transcendental account, then, the 
real factors that partake in the process of constitution can be studied by the natural 
sciences, if approached correctly. For the transcendental phenomenologist, such an 
investigation need only be grounded by an a priori eidetic clarification of the 
ontological region or domain of objects. Husserl did not reject the restricted, 
conditional form of methodological naturalism, and even went sorne ways towards 
pro vi ding a framework in which the relation of the lived body and the mind could be 
experimentally established. 
Contemporary research projects in cognitive science ( e.g., the attempts to naturalize 
phenomenology discussed above) might arguably be seen as forms of somatology, 
proposing naturalistic accounts of the "underlying basis" of constitution. 31 If this 
appraisal is correct, these research projects already provide a scientific framework in 
which to ascertain and explain precisely what dependencies exist between the lived 
body and mind, and how they operate. The "naturalized phenomenologies" could thus 
be rightly held as relevant to transcendental investigations, insofar as they address 
constitution and are viewed as, or as participating in the elaboration of, naturalistic 
theories dealing with the contribution of the lived body to constitution. Such a position, 
however, at !east as seen from the transcendental perspective, rests on these approaches 
31 Given space constraints, 1 cannot provide an exhaustive account of the similarities between Husserl 's 
somatology and contemporary research projects. Research projects such as the enactive or embodied 
approach, first proposed by V are la, Thompson, & Rosch (1991 ), and developed sin ce its inception by 
thinkers like Gallagher (2005), Noë (2005 ; 2009; 2012), and Thompson (2007), illustrates both kinds of 
somatological approaches. The more biologically-oriented approach espoused by Thompson and his 
collaborators and its close relation to neurophenomenology make it weil suited to study the physical-
somatological conditionality relations. The more sensorimotor orientation of Gallagher and Noë seems 
especially weil suited to exploring the aesthesiological dimension of conditionality. 
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rejecting the forms of naturalism that Husserl believed were untenable (as indicated: 
strong and weak variants of epistemological naturalism, strong methodological 
naturalism, and ontological naturalism). Crucially, even if we decide that current 
research projects do not fit Husserl ' s description of somatology, we have still 
established, within Husserl ' s transcendental phenomenological framework, the 
possibility in principle of natural sciences apt to address the underlying basis of 
constitution. 
To summarize, with his exploration ofpsycho-physical dependence and conditionality, 
Husserl recognized that the lived body, despite its being a constituted object, plays a 
crucial role in the constitution of ali objects, as a transcendental condition of possibility 
of their disclosure to consciousness. Moreover, he proposes a distinct natural science 
closely related to psychology, which he calls somatology, apt to study the lived body 
in its Leiblichkeit. Such a science would employ the methodologies of the natural 
sciences to study the participation of lived bodily structures in constitution, and are 
legitimate to the extent that the lived body and the mind can be apprehended as natural 
things correlated to the naturalistic attitude. This shows that Husserl endorsed a weak, 
conditional form of methodological naturalism. Thus, far from contradicting his 
approach, the natural sciences actually fit into the overall transcendental framework. 
5. Transcendentalism, eidetics, and naturalized theories of constitution 
We have thus established that Husserl endorsed a restricted form of methodological 
naturalism. There is room in Husserl ' s transcendental edifice for a contribution from 
the natural sciences to answering the many issues raised by constitution. A question 
arises at this point, however, which is that of determining the extension and mutual 
--- - --- - --------- - ------------------------------------------------------. 
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limits of such naturalistic explanations with regard to the investigations of 
transcendental phenomenology and its methods of investigation. I now tum to this. 
After reviewing the foundational role of transcendental phenomenology with respect 
to the natural sciences, I argue in this section that the natural sciences can readily be 
viewed as contributing to the transcendental project, if they are reinterpreted as 
naturalistic theories dealing with how various real (and as such already constituted) 
factors, entities such as structures of the body, are also constituting factors, which play 
a direct role in the constitution of other meaningful objects. These sciences might be 
elliptically described as "sciences of constitution." In addressing the real factors that 
participate in constitution, such sciences make a bona jide contribution to the edifice 
of transcendental phenomenology. 
Husserl, as we have seen, acknowledged that the lived body is a transcendental factor 
in the constitution ofmeaningful objects. We might ask, to what extent can the natural 
sciences be called upon to study constitution? Is it not the case that a naturalistic 
explanation of the real factors that participate in constitution might exhaust ali there is 
to say about constitution? I would answer in the negative. Why not? Recall that 
transcendental phenomenology is a descriptive epistemological and eidetic discipline. 
With regard to the natural sciences, as indicated in section 3, its role is twofold. First, 
its specifie epistemological task is to justify transcendence in immanence, in other 
words, how it is that the immanent states of lived experience can be about something 
transcendent, out there in the world. Second, its descriptive eidetic task with regard to 
the natural sciences is to clarify the ontological regions where these sciences operate 
by providing a phenomenological description of the material eidë and material a priori 
eidetic laws pertaining to those regions (Ideen III, §§7-8). 
When applied to the naturalistic study of mental realities, transcendental 
phenomenology is tasked with elucidating the essentially necessary and essentially 
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possible relations between the mental on the physical. The specifie function of 
transcendental phenomenological eidetic analysis with regard to the study of mind-
body dependencies is that of determining the possible extension that these 
dependencies can have in theory. This determination proceeds according to the eidetic 
laws that pertain to the realities in question. For instance, eidetic analysis reveals that 
to apprehend an animal nature, I must perceive the physical reality to which it is 
attached (Ideen III, §2). The task of experimental psycho-physiological research, on 
the other band, is to examine the actual extension of the dependence relations by 
employing their natural scientific methodological framework. Speaking of the 
dependence of states of consciousness (sensory states, sensuous feelings, instincts, and 
even individual habitus) on physical states, such as those of the brain, Husserl writes: 
Obviously, how far [psycho-physical dependence] extends can only be 
decided empirically, and if possible by means of experimental psycho/ogy. 
In particular, whether and to what extent the proper character, the rhythm, 
of the higher consciousness is determined by means of its own empirical-
psychological rules as well as according to what is universally human, 
though not by essentiallaws, i.e. , according to what unfolds in the human 
type (the type of the human species) and within the individual type, or 
whether these regularities in the type and in the individual are sufficiently 
grounded in the physical organization by the mere introduction of essential 
laws: this can by no means be established apriori. (Ideen II, 295; Husserl 
1989, 309, emphasis added) 
Neither the transcendental not the eidetic reductions can be used to investigate the 
domain of natural causality, psycho-physical conditionality and dependence relations 
between the mind and the lived body, precisely because they bracket factual matters 
entirely. We can see that eidetic description provides a priori necessary conditions on 
the extension of psycho-physical conditionality and dependence without for all that 
providing sufficient conditions thereof. Thus, while transcendental phenomenology has 
epistemological priority given its a priori status, Husserl seems to suggest that it is not 
in a position to assess with its own methods the actual extension of the mind-body 
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dependence, because it is interested in eidetic truths, rather than matters of fact and 
contingent empiricallaws. 
As Sokolowski pointed out, the fact that phenomenology cannot provide an exhaustive 
or adequate account of the constitution of objects (i.e. the necessary and sufficient 
conditions of constitution) was no cause of concem for Husserl. He argued that the 
father of phenomenology, at !east by the Cartesianische Meditationen , had given up on 
founding a phenomenological science that was both adequate and apodictic, and only 
held on to apodicticity in his final works (1964, 185ff). In its description of the essential 
structures of conscious experience, transcendental phenomenology need only give 
necessary, and not sufficient, conditions ofpossibility for meaningful encounters with 
things in the world (1964, 137-139, 159, 201). To the later Husserl , it had to suffice 
transcendental phenomenology that it describe with apodictic certainty the kinds of 
essential structures found in lived experience, as phenomenology could not 
singlehandedly attempt to provide an exhaustive and adequate account of the genesis 
of every meaningful structure, and ought therefore to be supplemented by natural 
sciences. This was already presaged by Husserl' s proposa! of a somatology in Ide en III 
and his acknowledgment of the limits of his own approach. If phenomenology was to 
remain closed upon itself, what purpose could such statements have? 
Empirical sciences and transcendental phenomenology are thus not competing 
approaches. Their domains of truth and necessity are disjoint. As indicated in section 
3, eidetic sciences are not interested in factual matters. Eidetic sciences only employ 
individual beings in their investigations insofar as the latter can serve to illustrate a 
given eidetic law. It simply cannot be the case that the accounts they provide are in 
competition with one another. Rather, transcendental phenomenology provides an 
epistemological foundation of the natural sciences, and clarifies their ontologies by 
uncovering a priori eidetic laws that govem the ontological regions in which they 
operate, which in tum ground the contingent truths they evince (Ideen III, 48-49). 
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What role, then, do natural scientific investigations play in the transcendental edifice? 
I argue that what we can cali "sciences of constitution," the natural sciences that 
investigate the real factors participating in constitution, can provide a set of conditions 
relative to the occurrence of a given kind of comprehensive unity in the experience of 
an individual embodied psycho-physical subject or class of embodied subjects. In other 
words, the function of what I have called sciences of constitution is to elucidate the 
conditions in which occur this or that kind of comprehensive unity (say, a visual datum) 
in lived experience, relative to a given class of embodied subjects. When the issue at 
hand is the relation between sensation and the lived body, the specifie form taken by 
constitutional-scientific investigations would be somatology; however, we can imagine 
that other aspects of lived experience might also be conditioned by other kinds of real 
factors , such as belonging to a culture or society.32 The usefulness of the more general 
expression "sciences of constitution" is that it leaves this possibility open. 
In his discussion of psycho-physical dependence and conditionality, Husserl suggests 
that the embodied disposition of psycho-physical subjects determines whether or not 
certain kinds of comprehensive unities will be experienced by those embodied subject. 
Consider the case of blindness with regard to the material eidetic laws that pertain to 
visual experience. A person blind from birth does not experience visual data, and 
therefore experiences neither color nor extension in the visual field. Does this mean 
that eidetic laws pertaining to color experience (e.g., the supplementation of COLOR 
by EXTENSION for any comprehensive unity COLOR DATUM) do not apply to the 
blind person? Certainly not. Recall that Husserl argued that it was a material a priori 
32 The cultural variability ofthe perception of illusions, such as the Müller-Lyer illusion (see, e.g., Segall 
et al. 1966), suggests that real factors other than the lived body, such as the cultural and historical 
situation of the perceiving subject, might also be relevant to study with regard to their effects on 
constitution. Husserl ' s proposai of a "science of the mind," elucidating the person ' s history of 
sedimented motivations, actions, and passions, could be counted as another example of a "science of 
constitution"-although adm ittedly, the status of such an investigation as a natural science remains 
debatable. See p. 23, note 25. 
75 
law that all occurrences in experience of comprehensive unities subsumed under the 
eidos VISUAL DATUM must necessarily (in virtue of what it is to be a VISUAL 
DATUM) have co-dependent moments subsumed under the eidë COLOR and 
EXTENSION. We can express this in conditional form, as follows: if an organism X 
has the experience E of the type CO LOR DA TUM, then that co lor datum must 
(essentially necessarily) be experienced as having co-dependent and co-supplementing 
moments of the type COLOR and EXTENSION. 
Now, it is demonstrable that the occurrence of a given kind of comprehensive unity in 
experience is made possible by the activity of certain reale bodily structures. That is, 
there are specifie empirical conditions und er which the antecedent of the conditional 
statement of an eidetic law (in the case being examined: "if an organism X has the 
experience E of the type COLOR DATUM") can indeed obtain. In cases of visual 
experience, these conditions include the normal ones under which a particular class of 
organism can have visual experiences ( e.g., having functional retinae, an intact brain 
area Vl) . Even though a blind person cannot have experiences of the type VISUAL 
DATUM (and as such, cannot have an experience of the type COLOR, nor of the type 
EXTENSION), it is not that the eidetic law does not apply in that case. It is only that 
certain real structures, which are sufficient for visual experience in normal individuals, 
are not present or dysfunctional in the case of the blind individual; and so, in such 
cases, the antecedent does not obtain. The implication, however, can be true even if the 
antecedent is false; the experience of a moment ofCOLOR wouldbe supplemented by 
a moment of EXTENSION in the experience of the embodied subjectX, if X could see, 
or have her sight resto red. In other words, if the conditions un der which X can have the 
experience E of a visual datum did obtain, then there could be occurrences of the type 
VISUAL DATUM in the experience of X, and then the eidetic laws that pertain to 
visual data would in tum apply to E. 
----------------------------------------------- - --- - -- - ------ - ---
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I suggest that sciences of constitution, which elucidate the reallived bodil y structures 
that participate in constitution, should be understood, within Husserl ' s transcendental 
phenomenological framework, as pro vi ding conditions on the antecedent of conditional 
statements of the relevant eidetic laws. Physical somatology, for instance, is tasked 
with elucidating physical-somatological, lived bodily conditions on the occurrence of 
changes in visual data in lived experience. This, however, does not mean that the 
natural sciences thereby explain or "explain away" material eidetic laws and eidetic 
necessity. The natural nomological regularities uncovered by sciences of constitution 
only show how certain kinds of reale structures participate in constitution by making 
possible the occurrence of this or that kind of comprehensive unity in the experience 
of an embodied subject. If these comprehensive unities occur in experience, then the 
relevant eidetic laws obtain (with eidetic necessity). Thus, it is not the case that the 
natural sciences, on this account, "explain" eidetic laws, nor is it that the natural 
nomological laws they uncover are in any sense equivalent to eidetic necessity. It is 
only that for certain kinds of content to occur in the lived experience of embodied 
subjects (such as we humans), certain real bodily structures must be present and must 
function in the normal way. The specifie task of what I have called sciences of 
constitution would be to investigate those sets of empirical conditions on normal 
experience that make possible the occurrence of this or that kind of comprehensive 
unity in embodied lived experience. In cases where there obtain relations of psycho-
physical dependence, sciences of constitution could probe into the nature of that 
dependence relation, and provide empirical laws that account for the regulation and 
functional depend en ce of certain kinds of mental states ( e.g. sensory states) and states 
of the lived body. As Husserl himself argued, to determine the specifie empirical 
conditions leading to various kinds of modification in sensory experience is not a task 
for transcendental eidetics. It is a task for the natural sciences. The natural sciences 
simply operate within the possibilities left open by transcendental investigation. As 
long as the domain of the eidetic remains neatly separated from the domain of the 
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factual, there is no contradiction between natural science and transcendental 
phenomenological eidetic investigations. 
The epistemological vocation of phenomenology is its most central aspect. 
Transcendental phenomenology, as Husserl understood it, justifies the daims of the 
natural sciences by clarifying what it is we are doing when we go about our scientific 
activities. lt is, on its own account, the point ofview adequate to appraising the various 
attitudes we as knowing subjects can have towards the world. It shows, for instance, 
how the naturalistic attitude, which yields natural objectively existing objects and 
predicative knowledge, is itself grounded on a more fundamental , "personalistic" 
attitude, in which we are together as peers, as persons (ldeen II, §51 , and 288 n.l). 
Transcendental phenomenology can play this foundational role because it elucidates 
the genesis of meaningful structures in its study of the genetic dialectic between 
predicative apprehension and pre-predicative encounter, and investigates the a priori 
eidetic laws of consciousness. Ali this entails that, even if it was the case that 
naturalized theories of constitution were to provide an exhaustive account of the real 
factors that participate in constitution (which is no small feat) , transcendental 
phenomenology could still retain its fundan1ental epistemological role. 
So much for naturalized sciences of constitution within Husserl ' s transcendental 
framework. These sciences, which, like somatology, provide conditions on the 
occurrence of this or that kind of comprehensive unity in experience, only require that 
the transcendentalist endorse weak methodological naturalism, and are coherent with 
Husserl's overall transcendental phenomenological approach. If eidetic necessity is 
neatly separated from natural nomological necessity, and ifwe distinguish the function 
proper to each in the overall frarnework, then the natural sciences do not conflict with 
transcendental phenomenology. Of course, sorne may want to question the validity of 
such a separation between material eidetic laws and necessity, and natural nomological 
ones. This is clearly the view held by those who would naturalize material eidë, such 
- - - - - - -
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as the foundation of COLOR on EXTENSION given the unity COLOR DATUM, or 
again the temporal structure of Ce. Those thinkers might want to provide empirical 
conditions not only on the occurrence of certain kinds of comprehensive unities in lived 
experience, but also on eidetic material a priori laws themselves. In this case, what I 
have called sciences of constitution might extend their explanatory efforts beyond the 
antecedent of the conditional formulation of mate rial a priori laws, into the eidetic law 
itself. This is arguably what the "naturalized phenomenologies," especially the 
formalized approaches, have attempted to do. Although the constitutional-scientific 
framework 1 have proposed arguably applies to such cases, my aim in this chapter has 
been to provide an account of naturalism that is compatible with, and remains within 
the limits of, Husserlian transcendental phenomenology. The projects to naturalize 
phenomenology, insofar as they adopt variants of epistemological naturalism, clearly 
step outside of the transcendental framework as Husserl understood it. But is such a 
move legitimate? This is still an open question. 
Conclusion 
My aim was to clarify the relevance of the natural sciences, and especially cognitive 
science, for transcendental phenomenology. I hope to have shown how transcendental 
phenomenology and the natural science are both important parts of the overarching 
transcendental project, each having its specifie function and domain of inquiry. When 
seen as "sciences of constitution," as natural sciences investigating the real structures 
that participate in constitution by functioning as empirical conditions for the possibility 
of this or that kind of comprehensive unity in the experience of embodied subjects, the 
naturalistic theories of cognitive science (and other disciplines) can complement and 
even supplement the descriptive epistemological endeavors of transcendental 
phenomenology. In this way, constitution is partially naturalized (insofar as its reale 
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conditions of possibility are elucidated) without usurping the epistemological, 
foundational role of phenomenology, and without conflating the material eidetic and 
natural nomological or formai registers. This kind of relationship, I argue, is what we 
ought to be after, if our goal is a rapprochement of cognitive science and 
phenomenology that remains true to Husserl 's transcendental framework . The natural 
sciences can thus be seen as figuring in the transcendental edifice, not as its foundation, 
but as an essen ti al part of the building. 
This discussion opens onto questions I cannot address here, such as the value of the 
phenomenological conception of epistemology, ideality, and normativity for 
contemporary epistemology. We might inquire whether, and to what extent, the 
specificaily epistemological and normative aspects of transcendentalism m 
phenomenology ought to matter to contemporary epistemology, which is no longer 
foundationalist. Our goal, after ail, may very weil be a rapprochement of cognitive 
science and phenomenology that steps outside of transcendentalism as Husserl 
understood it. Epistemological justification and normativity are perhaps what 
constitute the distinctive philosophical contribution of transcendental phenomenology 
to the history of ideas, but they are seldom addressed in relevance to current research 
projects and their epistemological frameworks. I would suggest in closing that further 
research is required to clarify how the epistemologically normative dimension of 
transcendental phenomenology can interact with contemporary naturalistic approaches 
to normativity and justification in epistemology. Can we have foundations and 
normativity without foundationalism? 
CHAPTER II 
BURIED ALIVE? A STUDY OF PSYCHOLOGISM AND THE EPISTEMIC 
CAP ACITIES OF CON CRETE AGENTS 
Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to evaluate the relevance of "psychologism," or psycho-
epistemological arguments, in contemporary epistemology. The chapter is divided into 
four sections, which are grouped into two parts. The first part is thematic and addresses 
psychologism. The first section discusses the history of psychologism: its rise after the 
death of Hegel, its faU at the tum of the century, as well as its recent return in the 
philosophicallandscape under the penmanship of Quine and others. The second section 
proceeds to situating psychologism with respect to the varieties of naturalism that I 
identified in the previous chapter. I argue that psychologism, in the sense relevant to 
naturalistic approaches to epistemology toda y, is a form of epistemological and 
methodological naturalism, and admits of two variants: a strong (or replacement) 
version and a weak ( collaborative) one. With this typology of psychologism in place, 
in the third section, I discuss a central transformation in contemporary epistemology, 
which complements its investigations into the nature and justification of knowledge 
with a consideration for the epistemic capacities of concrete epistemic agents, leaving 
behind discussions of abstract, "pure" or "transcendental" subjects of epistemic 
faculties. I conclude the first part of the chapter with a short review and critique of 
Husserl's now canonical arguments against psychologism. 
The second part of the chapter examines an argument for weak psychologism, or as 1 
prefer to put it, a psycho-epistemological argument. This argument moves from 
premises concerning epistemology and epistemic capacities, to considerations about 
the functional and mechanistic explanation ofthose capacities by cognitive science, as 
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well as about the relevance ofthese explanations for projects in epistemology in terms 
of rational epistemic action, to the conclusion that epistemology ought to be informed 
by, and employ sorne of the methods of, cognitive science. The fourth section presents 
the argument directly. I proceed to a stepwise justification of the premises of the 
argument. I first address the issue of normativity, its place in the argument, and the 
naturalistic fallacy. I then examine the epistemic capacities of concrete agents and the 
explanation of such capacities by psychology. Finally, I discuss the conclusion of the 
argument and sorne of its implications for epistemology. If successful, this psycho-
epistemological argument shows why psychology is relevant to contemporary projects 
in epistemology. 
1. A short history of psychologism 
"Psychologism" is a resurgent position today, and has become so popular and so 
mainstream that many simply take its justification for granted. Since Quine 's 
controversial (and now famous) 1969 paper "Epistemology naturalized," many 
scholars have rallied behind the idea that the natural sciences, and psychology33 in 
particular, ought to matter to those involved in epistemological projects, and this, to 
33 Note that 1 shall mostly use "psychology" as a blanket term to refer to the cluster of experimental 
disciplines working on cognition, including cognitive psychology, cognitive linguistics, neuroscience, 
etc. Th us, my use of the term "psychology" refers spec ifically to the experimental science, and not to 
the many philosophical or descriptive psychologies that were popular in the 19 111 century. 1 shall use the 
term more or Jess interchangeably with the "cognitive science" when discussing psychologism today. 
This use should not obscure the fact that the empirical science called psychology in the 19111 century is 
different from the investigations carried out toda y under the same title. (One of the central differences 
between these two kinds of psychology is the epistemic status of introspective methodology: 
contemporary cognitive science is much more skeptical about introspection, comparatively speaking; 
although increasingly, there is renewed interest in first-person , qualitative methods in cognitive science.) 
However, despite such differences, the arguments for and against psychologism arguably apply to both 
kinds ofpsychology, because they are arguments about the empirical, experimental sciences of the mind 
and their relation to traditional topics in epistemology. 
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various degrees.34 Psychologism was thought to have been slain nearly a century ago. 
For the historically inclined thinker, however, its resurgence should not come as a 
surprise. 20111 century attitudes in philosophy with regard to psychologism, attitudes of 
virulent rejection, were more of an exception than the rule in the history of the 
discipline.35 Although psychologism was thought to be dead and buried for most of the 
20111 century in philosophy, contemporary debates over the naturalization of 
epistemology suggest otherwise. Has psychologism been buried alive? 
Before discussing the return of psychologism, we ought to discuss its origin in the 
contemporary context. The end of the 19111 century was witness to a great struggle in 
institutional philosophy, known as the Psychologismus-Streit, or psychologism 
dispute. The intellectual and social context of this dispute was the fall of German 
ldealism and its repercussions in philosophy. The "same old story," as Kusch puts it in 
his 1995 sociological analysis of psychologism, is that university philosophy 
underwent an institutional crisis around the turn of the 20111 century. As the story goes, 
Hegel's death led to the fall of German ldealism in academie philosophical circles after 
nearly a century of dominance, especially in Germany itself. The effects of this 
intellectual (and, in effect, political) vacuum were manifold. One of the most important 
consequences of the fall ofldealism was that many professional academie philosophers 
34 The advocates ofnaturalistic approaches to epistemology are now legion. Consider the work of P. M. 
Churchland (1989; 2007), P. S. Church land ( 1986), Giere (1 990; 1999; 20 1 0), Giere et al. (2005), 
Dennett ( 1983), Millikan. (1989), or Dretske ( 1995), ali of whom espouse a version of naturali stic 
epistemology. 
35 During most of the 201" century, it was very near common sense in philosophy that psychologism was 
wrong and had already been decisively refuted. McCarthy (1990), for instance, held that the refutation 
ofpsychologism was the most decisive event in 20111 century. Musgrave (1972) argued that it was a sign 
that there is progress in philosophy. See Kusch (1995), 2ff. for discussion. However, this attitude is 
something of an oddity in the history of philosophy, as traditionally, epistemology and philosophical 
psychology went hand in hand: think of Aristotle, Locke, Hume, or James. It is the new, experimental 
form of psychology and the reaction of institutional philosophers to it that motivated the brief 75 year 
hiatus in psychologism around the turn of the century. 
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tumed elsewhere to justify the relevance of their inquiries and practices. This, in tum, 
led to the ri se of many naturalistic views in philosophy, most controversially in logic 
and epistemology. As Kusch remarks, 
After Hegel's death in 1831, idealistic philosophy in Germany quickly fell 
into disrepute, and philosophy lost its dominant position in the intellectual 
field to the natural sciences. Philosophy had to adjust to the change 
conditions by remodelling itself [in the image of natural science]. This 
meant that many philosophers adopted a 'naturalistic' or 'positivistic ' 
attitude, i.e. the viewpoint that the ideal of knowledge and the justification 
ofthe empirical sciences holds for philosophy as well. f ... ] This naturalistic 
stance implied that philosophers sought to solve philosophical problems, 
e.g. epistemological, logical and ethical questions, by means of empirical 
research. (Kusch 1997, 2) 
Thus, around the end ofthe 19th century, more and more philosophers were turning to 
the natural sciences, above all to the burgeoning experimental psychology, in order to 
legitimate their philosophical practices. Increasingly, around the turn of the century, 
philosophy chairs in university departments were being filled by experimental 
psychologists, rather than by (perhaps even at the expense of) what we might call "pure 
philosophers."36 Few new philosopher-psychologists had formal philosophical 
training, which displeased many "pure" philosophers. A crisis in institutional 
philosophy became inevitable. 
36 Kusch (1995 , 126) provides a numerical appraisal of this ri se of experimental psychologists that held 
positons in philosophy departments: 
For the moment, note that the practitioners of the new (experimental) psychology worked 
in philosophy departments, and that between 1873 and 1913 the number of full 
professorships held by these ' psychologists ' increased from one (i.e. Stumpt) to ten . 
According to the statistics of one contemporary witness, of the thirty-nine full 
professorships in philosophy in 1892, practitioners of experimental psychology held three; 
of the forty-two full professorships in 1900 they occupied six; wh ile of the forty-four in 
1913 they had already gained ten. 
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The number of proponents of psychologism exploded mid-century, but after its 
impressive ri se, it feU out of prominence around the tum of the century; and this, for a 
number of reasons, sorne theoretical, and sorne sociological or poli ti cal in nature. The 
institutional crisis in philosophy was ultimately averted, so the story goes, by the 
intervention ofFrege, but especially of Husserl, whose arguments cemented the repute 
psychologism as an untenable position. 37 The canonical arguments that lead to the 
eventual downfall ofpsychologism were provided by Husserl in the 1900 Prolegomena 
to his Logische Untersuchungen, and in his 1911 Logos article "Philosophie als strenge 
Wissenschaft." As we have seen in the previous chapter, the father of the 
phenomenological movement rejected nearly every variety of naturalism, and he 
argued with particular vehemence against psychologism. By the 191 Os, the arguments 
of Husserl 's Prolegomena had become the battle cry of institutional philosophers. 
Proponents of psychologism were compromised theoretically and politically: through 
a series of (arguably political) events, Husserl 's arguments against psychologism 
eventually won general favor. 38 
Psychologism was all but dead and buried, until its recent resurgence. Interestingly, the 
motivation of this resurgence parallels the initial motivations for psychologism: the 
decline and eventual fall of the foundationalism proposed by the defend ers of logical 
empiricism. Quine's initial statement of naturalized epistemology and return to 
psychologism was mainly motivated by the palpable failure ofthe foundational projects 
37 Frege's attacks (1884; 1893) centered on the refutation ofpsychologism as a position arising in logic, 
i.e., that logic is reducible in some sense to psychology. Note that this is not the ki nd of psychologism 
at issue in debates over naturalistic epistemology today. As such, in what follows , 1 shall focus on 
Husserl's arguments against psychologism as a position arising in epistemology. 
38 These events are recounted in detail in Kusch (1 995). Kusch argues, e.g., that the anti-scientist spirit 
of the Weimar Republic made it politically advantageous to adopt anti-psychologism, and lead to the 
rise of Lebensphilosophie over scientific philosophy. Kusch discusses a number of political events th at 
had an incidence on the debate, notably the 1913 petition by "pure" philosophers against the appointment 
ofpsycho1ogists in phi1osophy chairs. 
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in epistemology, such as the one proposed by Carnap in his Der Logische Aujbau der 
Welt (1928), to provide a philosophical justification of the doctrinal (truth- and 
justification-related) aspects of scientific investigation, which would could act as a 
foundation for all knowledge daims. For Quine, the failure offoundationalism entailed 
that, should philosophy still engage in epistemology at all, it ought to "settle for 
psychology" (Quine 1969, 75). 
2. Naturalism and psychologism 
We are thus confronted with a "new psychologism" today. This renewal of 
psychologism leads to a number of questions. Given the contemporary resurgence of 
psychologism, ought we to re-evaluate the validity of this position? Is psychologism 
worth pursuing today? But what did the specter of psychologism consist in? As we 
have seen, in the most general sense, what was called "psychologism" was the view 
that philosophy, and in particular logic and epistemology, in sorne sense, and to sorne 
degree, were either part of psychology or could be usefully complemented by 
psychology. But the term was used ambiguously: many heterogeneous positions were 
labelled psychologist, and the charge was nearly impossible to avoid, with accusers 
often being accused of the same. 39 
Discussing psychologism in general is a nearly intractable problem, so it might be 
worth our while to untangle sorne of the senses of the expression to allow for tractable 
discussion. This will allow me to focus my discussion to psychologism on a specifie 
(if narrow) sense of the term, one directly relevant to the question of naturalistic 
39 As Kusch (1995, 4ff.; 95ff. ; 1 08ff.) re marks, the accusation of psychologism arose in many fields: 
· fields as diverse as metaphysics, ontology, epistemology, Jogic, ethics, but also aesthetics, sociology, 
religion, mathematics, pedagogy, and linguistics. This makes a discussion of psychologism in general 
an intractable problem, which motivates an analysis ofspecific components ofthe concept. 
86 
approaches to epistemology. As indicated, generally speaking, psychologism is defined 
as the view that traditional philosophical investigations ought to be replaced, or 
complemented, by empirical psychology. Psychologism, as I shall discuss it here in 
relation to naturalistic approaches to epistemology, is a species of naturalism. Now, 
naturalism is itselfpolysemous as weil. In the previous chapter, I argued that naturalism 
can be read in three different ways: as a position arising in ontological, methodological, 
and epistemological domains.40 
In the relevant sense, psychologism in philosophy is a form of naturalism, one whose 
source and target have been specified. · That is, psychologism is a form of naturalism 
that specifies a source natural science of interest (i.e., psychology), from which it draws 
methodological insight, as well as a target discipline (i.e., epistemology), which is to 
benefit from the resources and methods of that science.41 Psychologism, then, is the 
claim that a specifie natural science, psychology, is relevant to epistemology, given a 
set of naturalistic ontological, methodological, and/or epistemological 
considerations. 42 
40 The following typology of naturalism was first presented in the first section of the previous chapter. 
Note that 1 have modified the position label led "epistemological naturalism" for the purposes of the 
present discussion. As indicated, this typology of naturalism is indebted to Ayala's typology of 
reductionism (see Ayala 1974). The typology benefited from Zahavi ' s (20 1 0) di scussion ofmetaphysical 
and methodological naturalism in the context of naturaliz ing phenomenology as weil. Note that the 
varieties of naturali sm discussed here are not mutually exc lusive. 
41 Although the primary focus of this chapter is epistemology, 1 think a similar case can be made for the 
rel evan ce of psychology to philosophy of science. 1 shall at times draw on au thors in the philosophy of 
science to argue for naturalistic epistemology. See Giere (20 1 0; 1999; 1990). 
42 I am aware that this presentation of psychologism , to wit, as a species of naturalism whose target is 
epistemology (rather than, say, to logic), is partial. Husserl 's anti -psychologism in epistemological 
matters was very intimately intertwined with his logical anti -psychologism, and both were rooted in his 
Platonist view on meaning. lt might be argued that full exposition ofpsychologism would indeed require 
a joint account ofits logical and epistemological aspects. One of my evaluators cogently remarked that 
Quine's project for naturalistic epistemology is, in effect, an endorsement of logical as weil as 
epistemological psychologism. His notion of "stimulus-meaning" (Quine 1995) is an attempt to 
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In principle, I would argue, psychologism can be read as ali ofthese ways (as a form 
of ontological, methodological, or epistemological naturalism). But not every reading 
of psychologism is equally relevant to the context of naturalistic approaches to 
epistemology toda y. Let us un pack a typology of naturalism and see how psychologism 
relates to each element in the typology. 
First, ontological naturalism is a form of monism. Simply put, ontological naturalists 
hold that there exists one (and only one) kind of "stuff," which makes up ail the sundry 
things in nature. This stuff is "natural" stuff-the kind of stuff assumed to exist by the 
natural sciences. We might state this as: 
Ontological naturalism: the position that ail things and their properties are 
natural things and properties, or supervene on natural things and properties. 
Ontological naturalists typically refer to the ontologies of the physical sciences ( e.g. , 
electric charge, mass, energy, etc.), but this is not always the case. Although many 
naturalists also endorse physicalism, the view that the fundamental ontology is 
provided by physics (i.e., that ail things and properties are, or supervene on, physical 
things and properties), not ail naturalists would endorse such a reductionist view, and 
might hold psychological things and properties as being equally fundamental (e.g., 
Fodor 1968; 1974). However, the ontological debate about ontological naturalism, 
while interesting in itself, is not reaily what is at issue in recent debates over naturalistic 
naturalize philosophy ali the way down to meaning. In a sense, Quine bites the bullet: his psychologism 
is precisely what Husserl was criticizing. Y et Quine embraces the position and ali that it entails. While 
these considerations are worthwhile to explore, 1 shall restrict my discussion to epistemological 
psychologism, given space constraints. However, we should keep in mi nd that this presentation is partial. 
- - - - - - - ----·----
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epistemology and psychologism.43 Most protagonists in this debate are ontological 
naturalists, and differ with respect to their stance on physicalism (i.e., can ali natural 
things and properties be reduced to physical things and properties), rather than on 
ontological naturalism perse. Their interests and worries lie elsewhere; ours will as 
well. 
A variety of naturalism more relevant to our considerations here is naturalism as 
methodological. We might state this position as follows: 
Methodological naturalism: the meta-philosophical view that philosophical 
fields of inquiry (e.g. epistemology, ethics, metaphysics) should employ, 
or at !east be coherent with, the methods of the natural sciences (such as 
the use of empirical experiments, the operationalizing of concepts, and so 
forth) and the ir criteria for justification ( e.g., parsimony, simplicity, 
predictive power, reproducibility of results, etc.) 
Methodological naturalists are not necessarily committed to any specifie ontological 
views about the kinds of things that exist, but simply insist that philosophy ought to 
43 Moreover, a discussion of ontological naturalism would make the argument on offer intractable, given 
the extensive literature that exists on the question . The literature centers mostly on the debate between 
the advocates ofreductionist physicalism and the partisans ofnon-reductionism. Non-reductionists argue 
that "higher-order" (i.e., biological or psychological) things and properties emerge from, and are 
ontologically distinct and autonomous from , physical things and prope1ties. The many debates over the 
multiple realization of biological and psychological functions are also pmt of this constellation of 
considerations. See, e.g., Mitchell (20 12); Kim (2006; 1999); Boogerd et al. (2005); Fodor ( 1997); Sober 
(1999); Stephan (1999); Schaffuer (1967); Nagel (1961) . The fact that ontological questions are not 
central to the debates over naturalistic epistemology contrasts strongly with the state of affairs in other 
debates, notably the one on the nature of consciousness and the "hard problem"; see, e.g., Chalmers 
(1995) . 
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adopt, or at least minimally cohere with, the various methodologies adopted by the 
natural sciences. 44 
Another relevant form of naturalism for our purposes arises in the epistemological 
domain. We might label as epistemological naturalism the following view: 
Epistemological naturalism: the position that the only valid and justified 
form of knowledge is empirical knowledge, knowledge pertaining to 
natural things and properties, and natural nomological regularities 
The epistemological naturalist holds the view that knowledge is only justified in as 
much as it results from empirical investigations. When applied to epistemology (as 
target field) , the claim is that epistemological statements themselves are only valid and 
justified insofar as they pertain to na:tural things and properties.45 We might nuance the 
view, and introduce two variant positions. A strong reading of epistemological 
naturalism might be stated as follows: 
Strong epistemological naturalism: the position that for any field of study 
to qualify as a bona fide scientific enterprise providing a legitimate form of 
knowledge, that field must provide empirical knowledge about natural 
nomological regularities and particulars. 
44 ln the previous chapter, l argued that one of the most prominent opponents of psychologism, Husserl 
himself, did not outright reject the naturalistic methodologies, but allowed for their use in a limited 
setting, provided they did not overstep their role and stay far from epistemological questions. 
45 We can imagine a theorist who would endorse epistemological naturalism for empirical scientific 
claims, but not for epistemology itself. This is possible if one rejects the claim that epistemology is in 
the business of producing knowledge and endorses, e.g., the view that it is a kind of therapy, as 
Wittgenstein suggested. 
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Strong epistemological naturalists want to reduce all forms of knowledge to empirical 
knowledge. When applied to epistemology, this would mean that all our knowledge 
about our knowledge ought to pertain to natural nomological regularities and 
particulars, lest it be meaningless or vacuous. Such extreme positions are today few 
and far between. With a few exceptions, most would be inclined to endorse a weaker, 
more moderate form of epistemological naturalism, whjch we might put as follows: 
Weak epistemological naturalism: the position that for any field of study to 
qualify as a bona fide scientific enterprise providing a legitimate form of 
knowledge, that . field must provide empirical knowledge about natural 
nomological regularities and particulars at sorne point in its argument; 
however, that field might employ other forms of knowledge as well , such 
as formai knowledge about logical and mathematical entities, structures, 
and relations. 
Applied to epistemology, weak epistemological naturalism is the claim that 
epistemology ought to, at sorne point in its reasoning, appeal to natural things, 
properties, and regularities, given certain of its questions or interests. This is a much 
weaker form of epistemological naturalism, because it does not reduce the field at issue 
(in our case, epistemology) to a province of the natural sciences. But it is still a fonn 
of naturalism: it is still consistent with the idea that fields in philosophy ought to 
produce knowledge that, at sorne point in the argument, refers to natural things, 
properties, and regularities. 
Psychologism as a species of naturalism 
So much for naturalism. How does this relate to the issue at hand? As discussed, , 
psychologism is a form of naturalism whose source and target have been specified. 
First, psychologism is a species of naturalism appealing to a specifie science, namely 
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psychology, for clarification in philosophy. Second, psychologism is a form of 
naturalism whose target discipline is epistemology. As we discuss it, psychologism is 
not a general meta-philosophical view that naturalistic psychological considerations 
ought to apply to ali of philosophy (i.e., logic, metaphysics, ethics, etc.), but strie tl y to 
epistemology. So the general claim of psychologism is that epistemology ought to be 
informed by psychology, or simply replaced by scientific psychology, by a psychology 
that uses the descriptive framework of the experimental sciences. 
How does this tie into our typology of naturalism? Psychologism, I would argue, is 
necessarily a form of methodological naturalism, because it claims that epistemology 
ought to employ, or at least be coherent with, the methods of empirical psychology to 
answer its specifie set of questions . A proponent of psychologism will minimally want 
to claim that the methods specifie to psychology are of epistemic relevance to questions 
raised in epistemology. But she may not want to claim that ali kinds of knowledge 
necessarily relates to natural/formal things, properties, and regularities. We can provide 
two varieties of psychologism, which index the two variants of epistemological 
naturalism introduced above, and which might allow finer, more relevant distinctions 
to be made. A first, maximal version of psychologism, might be defined as follows: 46 
Strong (or replacement) psychologism: the position that epistemology is a 
part of psychology; it does not have any legitimate claims to autonomy 
from psychology. 
This strong form of psychologism is the view initially defended by Quine in his 1969 
paper (and later by thinkers such as Churchland): it is a statement of his (in)famous 
"replacement thesis" about epistemology. On this reading, epistemology best be 
46 The qualifiers of psychologism that 1 employ, "replacement" and "collaborative," are those usefully 
proposed by Feldman (2001) to describe naturalism. Feldman also discusses "substantive" naturalism, 
which 1 do not address. 
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replaced by psychology. Methodologically, the maximal claim is that epistemology 
would be better off simply to use the empirical, experimental methods of psychology 
and limit armchair theorizing to the heuristic role it serves in science. 
Epistemologically, the maximal claim is that epistemology is nothing more than a part 
of psychology: its claims are only legitimate insofar as it makes reference to 
psychological laws, processes, concepts, and regularities. A partisan of strong 
psychologism can justify his methodological commitments by painting to his 
epistemological commitments: if all knowledge is essentially empirical knowledge, 
then to employ the methods of the natural sciences, especially psychology, in 
epistemological investigations is almost common sense. 
However, for many, the maximal position is too strong. We might then define a weaker 
version of psychologism, which combines methodological naturalism with the weak 
version of epistemological naturalism, as follows: 
Weak (or collaborative) psychologism: the view that epistemology would 
greatly benefit from a rapprochement with psychology, where a 
rapprochement means: to draw on psychology for its concepts, laws, 
methods, and theories, orto make sure that epistemology is coherent with 
its concepts, laws, methods, and theories. 
On this weaker reading, epistemology is not best replaced by psychology, but rather, 
can be complemented by psychology given certain of its interests. This variety of 
psychologism is also a form ofmethodological naturalism, as it claims that sorne of the 
questions relevant to epistemology are best approached by the methods ofpsychology. 
But it is not committed to the strong version of epistemological naturalism, as it 
acknowledges that, although the methods of psychology can provide illumining 
answers to epistemological questions, there are sorne questions in epistemology that 
might not be best addressed by psychology. Such a thinker can justify her 
methodological commitments pragmatically, as Giere (1999, 69ff.) has suggested, 
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following the great American naturalists Dewey and James. In short, on the weak, 
collaborative reading, the claim that psychology is methodologically and epistemically 
relevant to the field of epistemology does not entail the claim that that epistemology 
can be reduced to a province ofpsychology. 
Having defined psychologism, we can contrast both variants with anti -psychologism, 
a maximal claim that can be phrased as follows: 
Anti-psychologism: the position that epistemology is independent of any 
claims made by psychology 
Husserl is perhaps the best known advocate of anti-psychologism. Given that we have 
seen his arguments against naturalism and psychologism in sorne detail in the previous 
chapter, I only will briefly summarize these arguments here, insofar as they concern 
methodological and epistemological naturalismY Husserl rejected naturalistic 
methodologies in philosophy because he held that philosophy had (and indeed, ought 
to have) its own irreducible, independent set of methods. For Husserl, these 
autonomous methods were the "transcendental reduction" and the "eidetic reduction," 
which allowed the phenomenological philosopher to change her attitude towards her 
own direct lived experience, and describe it as it welled up in the flux of conscious 
experience. Husserl also rejected the epistemological implications of naturalism. He 
held that there was an irreducible domain of knowledge, that is, "material a priori" 
knowledge, which was neither reducible to empirical knowledge about states of affairs, 
nor to formai a priori knowledge such as mathematics and logic. Indeed, epistemology 
need not make any reference to the natural sciences at all, on his account. The domain 
47 A much fuller exposition of Husserl's arguments against psychologism in the Prolegomena can be 
found in Kusch (1995). Also see Moran (2008) for a discussion of the evolution of Husserl's arguments 
with respect to psychologism and naturalism . 
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of the material a priori was an independent domain, disjoint from the factual domain, 
and accessible only to the gaze of the phenomenologist who practiced the reductions. 
Psychologism, argued Husserl, necessarily lead to relativism, and was a viciously 
circular attempt to provide the sciences with a foundation. Psychologism led to 
relativism, he argued, because it entailed that truth was relative to the constitution of 
the organism experiencing it. For Husserl, this was nonsense, because tru th is 
necessarily absolute: something is either true or it is not. Worse stiJl, psychologism was 
a fundamentally flawed doctrine, as it necessarily led to a vicious circle of reasoning 
with regard to the foundation of science. It would be nonsense, he believed, for the 
sciences to propose their own normative principles. Norms, after ail , on his view, are 
not facts to be discovered by sorne naturalistic investigations, but rather must be 
established on the basis of sound philosophical argument.48 The sciences presuppose 
proper epistemological work, which allows them to justify their knowledge claims. 
Now, as we have seen, the foundational considerations that motivated Husserl's own 
brand of anti-psychologism have ail but disappeared from the contemporary 
philosophical landscape. But critics were plentiful even at the time he penned his 
arguments.49 Sigwart (1904), Schlick (1910), and Maier (1914), for instance, claimed 
that Husserl conflated truth with reality. With these distinguished, it became possible 
to argue that although truth, insofar as it is correlative to a judgment, is relative to the 
individualjudging and her psychological constitution, matters offact are not. This view 
allowed them to resist to accusation of relativism: truth may be relative, but the matter 
48 For Husserl , the norms of scientific practice were to be delivered by a "pure logic," that is, a general 
theory of scientific theories. The laws of pure logic could th en be transposed as normative laws for the 
individual sciences. See Husserl (1900), chapter Xl. 
49 Again, see Kusch 's excellent 1995 for an extensive report ofthese criticisms, especially pp. 63ff. 1 
base the discussion in this and the next paragraph on Kusch 's study, and 1 am greatly indebted to his fine 
work. 
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of fact is independent of epistemic agents, and provides us with a firm grounding to 
our knowledge claims. Jerusalem (1905) and Palagyi (1902) argued similarly against 
Husserl's absolutist theory of truth, contesting the idea that psychologism lead to 
relativism in a negative sense. 
Conceming vicious circularity, a significant number ofHusserl 's contemporaries (e.g., 
Jerusalem 1905; Cornelius 1906; Stumpf 1907; Rickert 1909; Meinong 1913) actually 
retumed the accusation of psychologism against him. In his Prolegomena, Husserl had 
argued that his phenomenological method was a form of descriptive psychology. In a 
sense, according to his critics, Husserl was proposing to ground all sciences in a form 
of psychology, despite his own vocal rejection of psychologism. 50 This criticism might 
have defused Husserl ' s accusations of relativism, were it not for the political and social 
contexts, which fostered anti-psychologism. But the point holds: Husserl 's arguments 
against psychologism met with probative resistance from his contemporaries, and this 
resistance might incite us to look into psychologism today and re-evaluate its relevance. 
50 Stumpf (1939-1940, § 13) argued that Husserl unjustifiably lumped together the three "neutra) 
sciences" in his phenomenological project, and in so doing, made the nuanced consideration of the 
relations between them and the natural sciences imposs ible. See Fisette (20 15) for an ilium inating 
discussion . lt is probably this line of criticism, which turned the accusation of psychologism back on 
him, that motivated Husserl 's famous "transcendental turn" of phenomenology. As Romano (20 10, 
508ff.) recounts, in a letter to Hans Cornelius from 1906, Husserl writes that one of the chief motivations 
behind his turn to a pure epistemological subject was the realization that psychology, even descriptive 
and immanent, was not in a position to provide a foundation for the sciences, because it was, itself, a 
science. Husserl's arguments against naturali sm and psychologism are based on his specifie conception 
of evidence, which differs significantly from the contemporary conception. See Heffernan (1998; 1999) 
for a thorough discussion . 
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3. The new psychologism and epistemology 
As indicated above, the "new psychologism" rose in response to the failure of 
foundational projects in epistemology, much like the old psychologism rose from the 
ashes of German ldealism. The caUs for a "naturalized epistemology," however, rest 
on a transformation of how we think of epistemology today. 1 argue that the major 
changes in the epistemologicallandscape today can be seen as the index of changes in 
how we think about epistemic agents. Increasingly, today, epistemological projects are 
interested in the epistemic capacities of what we might caU the "concrete epistemic 
agent." This is far removed from the study of knowledge in the abstract, which 
dominated logical empiricism, or again from the investigations into the epistemic 
faculties of a "pure" or "transcendental" subject. As Bechtel and Richardson ( 1993 , 
3ff.) have remarked, contemporary epistemology has blurred the line between the 
contexts of discovery and justification, such that epistemologists and historians of 
philosophy today are increasing concemed with factors that were once considered 
"extemal" to the practice of epistemology. One of the central factors is arguably the 
epistemic capacities of the actual, concrete agents of knowledge and scientific 
discovery. 
Consider Kuhn's famous 1962 study on the structure of scientific revolutions. Kuhn' s 
pioneering work brought sociological and historical considerations to the fore, situating 
the epistemic agent, and indeed the progress of science itself, in a network of concrete 
historical factors: he was looking to establish "a role for history" in philosophical 
accounts ofknowledge. Kuhn considered many capacities of epistemic agents that had 
been neglected (or exorcized) up to that point, such as the capacity to make up one ' s 
mind between two competing theories, and he went on to analyze how factors like peer 
affiliation, or persona! commitment to an idea, figure important! y in how the scientific 
landscape evolves over time. Kuhn thus displaced the interests of epistemology in two 
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ways: he historicised its subject matter, and situated his reasoning at the level of the 
capacities of historical agents and communities of such agents. 51 
Think also of the neuro-philosophical project, pioneered by P. M. Churchland (1989; 
2007) and P. S. Churchland (1986; 1987). 52 Neuro-philosophers adopt a "biological 
perspective" on epistemology (Churchland 1987, 546), and similarly to Kuhn, they 
situate the concrete epistemic agent and her scientific practices in the concrete context 
of finite biological existence, that is, in evolutionary time. Churchland argued that 
epistemic capacities such as learning, had by epistemic subjects, are not indifferent to 
our philosophical accounts ·of knowledge, and ought to be considered by 
epistemologists. Thus, the question "How is it possible for us to represent reality ," 
which was arguably the central philosophical question since Plato, becomes, in the 
context of the new epistemology, "How, situated within its bodily configuration, with 
its surrounding physical environment, and within the social context it finds itself, does 
the brain work" (Churchland 1987, 546). Epistemology has a new face-and a body, 
and a history. 53 
51 Although, technically, Kuhn's project is one in the philosophy of science rather than epistemology in 
the strict sense, 1 be lieve his arguments have implications for the theory of knowledge in general. 
52 The point of referring to Churchland here is not to directly claim that epistemology ought to be 
interested in cognitive science. That would obviously be begging the question . 1 am on ly illustrating the 
idea that contemporary epistemology is interested in the capacities of concrete epistemic agents . Of 
course, my argument will conclude something similar to the thesis espoused by Churchland, but at this 
stage, 1 am not directly making the argument for the relevance of cognitive science. 
53 This shi ft in interest towards con crete capacities of subjects is also related to the shi ft in thinking in 
ethics inaugurated by Nussbaum (2000; 1988) and the capabilities approach she proposes. Rather than 
focusing on abstract human rights, Nussbaum and her collaborators propose to focus ethical debate on 
the concrete capacities had by ethical agents. This is in line with the recent change in thought over the 
focus of epistemology we have just discussed . What is central to contemporary discussions is arguably 
the capacities or capabil ities of the concrete agents that concem us, be it in epistemology or in ethics. 
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These new conceptions of epistemology, focused as they are on the concrete epistemic 
agent and her capacities, rather than on the abstract subjects of epistemic faculties, are 
so common today that they are often presented without argument. So epistemology 
today is at least interested, among other things, in the epistemic capacities had by 
concrete epistemic subjects, which have a history, a culture, and a body. This is the 
new understanding of epistemology, and although it is still not the standard, traditional 
view, if correct, it entails a change of focus in the type of question asked in 
epistemology. It entails, minimally, the deliberate, if occasional, consideration of the 
concrete capacities had by epistemic agents when studying knowledge and justification 
in epistemology. 
Historically, this focus on concrete epistemic subjects has gone band in band with the 
rejection of a priori foundationalism. 54 In its maximal expression, the claim is that if 
there is no ultimate foundation for scientific knowledge claims, the best we can do is 
study how actually existing epistemic agents acquire knowledge ( e.g. , in strong or 
replacement psychologism). We might instead suggest, on a weaker reading of the 
claim, that epistemology ought to be interested in epistemic capacities among other 
things (e.g., in weak or collaborative psychologism). In either case, the guiding 
metaphor for the epistemic process of acquiring knowledge about the world is 
Neurath's boat, constantly rebuilt at sea along its voyage: our epistemology enables our 
scientific investigations and also changes in tandem with it, as we leam more about 
who we are as epistemic agents. 
54 The rejection of foundational ism and the tu rn to the capacities of con crete epistemic subjects are not 
logically entai led by one another, but rather emerge together in a complex tapestry oftheoretical options. 
Both might reflect underlying commitments of contemporary epistemology, but it is logically possible 
to end orse one without the other. We can imagine, for instance, a kind of foundationalism th at ai ms to 
ground ali knowledge claims on the capacities of concrete epistemic subjects. 
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4. The psycho-epistemological argument: an outline and stepwise justification 
In the previous section, we examined psychologism in light of the recent debates over 
naturalistic approaches to epistemology, and we identified two varieties of the position. 
The strong or "replacement" version of psychologism is a combination of 
methodological and strong epistemological naturalism, and is the view according to 
which epistemology reduces to part of psychology. The weak, "collaborative" version 
advocates methodological naturalism as well, but is committed only to weak (rather 
than strong) epistemological naturalism, calling for collaboration epistemology with 
r 
the sciences of the mind, rather than replacement. We contrasted both positions with 
anti-psychologism, the view that epistemology has nothing to learn from empirical 
psychology, and discussed Husserl ' s arguments. Husserl emphatically rejected 
psychologism in epistemology because he believed that it led necessarily to relativism, 
and that it was a viciously circular attempt to pro vide a firm foundation for the sciences. 
We reviewed sorne of the responses ofhis contemporaries and drew the conclusion that 
Husserl ' s arguments were not impervious to critique. Having made these distinctions, 
we have seen that rather important changes in the conception of epistemology have 
altered the philosophical landscape, in at least two ways. First, the failure of logical 
empiricism marked the end of attempts to provide apodictic, absolute, a priori 
foundations for the sc1ences: the project of foundationali sm seem to be dead 
(necromancy aside ). Second, epistemology is increasingly concerned with the 
capacities of concrete epistemic agents, that is, with the capacities of fini te, historical, 
encultured, and embodied epistemic agents, rather than with the abstract, "pure," or 
"transcendental" subject of epistemic faculties. 
With this backdrop secured, 1 proceed to making a general argument in favor ofwhat I 
have called weak psychologism in this section of the chapter. This psychologistic (or 
again, as 1 prefer to put it, psycho-epistemological) argument is an attempt to justify 
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the claim that sorne of the investigations carried out in cognitive science are directly 
relevant to the questions raised in epistemology. 
The psycho-epistemological argument has five steps. (1) The first is to claim that 
epistemology is interested in, or at least concerned with, a specifie world-disclosing 
capacity, labelled C*, had by concrete epistemic agents. 1 support the claim by referring 
to projects in contemporary epistemology, and discuss the central terms in the claim. 
(2) Next, 1 consider whether an explanation can be provided for this capacity by a given 
branch of cognitive science. 1 argue that such an explanation can be provided in at least 
two different ways: (i) by functional analysis and decomposition, and (ii) by 
mechanistic analysis. The second step considers the idea that epistemic capacities can 
be analyzed by specifying a "terminal parameter," which allows us to approach the 
capacity from a design or engineering perspective. This opens onto at least two kinds 
of analysis, functional and mechanistic, for the relevant capacity. (3) The next claim is 
a relatively uncontentious one about explanation and the epistemic relevance of 
capacities in general, to the effect that if a given discipline explains a capacity C that 
is epistemically relevant to another discipline, then the latter discipline ought to be 
inforrned by the former. This step is crucial, because it provides the link between the 
first two daims, which are factual , and the conclusion, which is normative. (4) Finally, 
the argument moves to a conditional conclusion, contingent on accepting the first 
premise: that if an epistemic world-disclosing capacity C* is epistemically relevant to 
epistemology, then epistemology ought to be informed by those sciences that study the 
functional organization and neural implementation of C*. 
The psycho-epistemological argument itself is as follows: 
(1) An epistemic world-disclosing capacity C*, which is characteristic of 
concrete epistemic agents, is epistemically relevant to epistemology 
(among other things) 
(2) There exists sorne cognitive science N, such that N can provide an 
explanation of the relevant epistemic world-disclosing capacity C*, by 
functional analysis/decomposition of C* into organized operations fE: F c•, 
and/or by mechanistic analysis of C* into cognitive mechanisms m E: Mc• 
( among other things ), or both 
(3) For any two disciplines D1 and D2 (e.g. , epistemology and cognitive 
science) and a given capacity C (e.g., C*): if C is epistemically relevant to 
D1 and C is explained by D2, then D1 ought to be informed by D2 
( 4) If C* is epistemically relevant to epistemology, th en epistemology 
ought to be informed by N. 
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At the outset, I ought to address a potential failing in the above argument. It might be 
argued that I am committing the naturalistic fallacy, by moving from factual premises 
to a normative conclusion. Indeed, I am moving from claims about the interests of 
epistemology, as well about the possible explanation of epistemic capacities by 
cognitive science and their epistemic relevance to epistemology, ali of which are 
arguably factual claims, to what seems like a distinctly normative claim about what 
ought to inform or interest epistemology. How does this not commit the naturalistic 
fallacy, that is, the fallacy of deriving an "ought" from an "is"? Given this preliminary 
problem, it is probably best to discuss claim (3) first, and then examine in the other 
claims in order. Now, the claim that allows us to move from the factual to the normative 
is the following: 
102 
4.1. (3) For any two disciplines D1 and D2 (e.g., epistemology and cognitive science) 
and a given capacity C ( e.g. , C*): if C is epistemically relevant to D1 and C is explained 
by D2, then D1 ought to be informed by D2 
This claim is the one that links the factual claims in the psycho-epistemological 
argument with the normative import of the cognitive sciences to epistemology, and 
allows us to avoid committing the naturalistic fallacy. One way to avoid charges of 
committing the naturalistic fallacy is by approaching epistemic normativity as a 
question of rational epistemic action conceming to the best way to reach a given end 
given the me ans that are available. The normative status of claim ( 4) pertains to the 
achievement of a specifie kind of goal, an epistemic goal, given a set of conditions and 
possibilities for epistemic actions to realize the goal, and this passage from the factual 
to the normative modality happens in claim (3). 
In terms of action theory, we can argue that this claim is an application of a more 
general principle of rational action to epistemological matters, which could be stated 
as follows: if, in conditions X, an agent S aims to achieve an objective 0 , and if, in 
conditions X, action A allows S to achieve 0 , th enS ought to do A. In our specifie case, 
the claim is about rational epistemic action: that if, in conditions X, an epistemic agent 
S aims to account for sorne capacity C*, and if, in conditions X, to be informed by a 
cognitive science N allows the agent to pro vide an explanatory account of this capacity, 
then S ought to be informed by N. To address the question of normativity in this way 
makes it a special case of rational action in general. Normativity, present in the 
modality "ought to be informed by ... ," here appears as a link between what an agent 
aims to do and the means through which she can accomplish what she aims. 
From this, claim (3) follows naturally, as it generalizes the aforementioned principle of 
rational epistemic action from epistemic agents to disciplines. The claim is simply that 
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for any two disciplines D, and D2, say, epistemology and cognitive science, and a given 
generic capacity C, the following must hold. If it is the case that C is epistemically 
relevant to D1 , and it is also the case that C is explained by D2, then given what we 
have just discussed in terms of epistèmic rational action, it follows that D, ought to be 
informed by D2. More directly, if cognitive science explains a generic capacity that is 
of epistemic relevance to epistemology, then epistemology ought to be informed by 
cognitive science. 
Outside of action theory, there are other ways to cash out the idea that factual premises 
can lead to normative daims given a set of goals, this time as goals implicit in the 
struggle for survival. We might consider naturalistic approaches to normativity, and 
specifically viewing epistemological prescriptions as cases of functional normativity. 55 
What does this mean? Since the advent of Darwin, biological thinking has attempted 
to naturalize normativity, and has done so quite productively. For instance, natural 
selection, as is now commonplace, largely explains the (apparent) teleology and 
normativity of biological systems. Normativity in this sense is a recurrent feature of 
many approaches in philosophy of mind and biology, and is well illustrated with 
Millikan's (1984, 1989) notion of a "proper function." As she puts it, 
for an item A to have a function Fas a [non-derived] "proper function," it 
is necessary (and close to sufficient) that... . A originated as a 
"reproduction" (to give one example, as a copy, or a copy of a copy) of 
sorne prior item or items that, due in part to possession of the properties 
reproduced, have actually performed Fin the past, and A exists because 
( causally historically because) of this or these performances. (Millikan 
1989, 288) 
55 Note that the two accounts of normativity on offer are not mutually exclusive. 8oth of these 
explanatory accounts ofnormativity are of the design or engineering kind. In the first case, the designer 
is the human epistemic agent seeking to better the practices that allow her to acquire knowledge; in the 
second, the "designer" is simply natural selection "attempting" to "make" organisms better able to 
survive and reproduce in their environment. Arguably, both accounts might usefully contribute to 
understanding·epistemological normativity . 
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This is where normativity cornes m. First, items can fail to achieve their proper 
function; the latter have an apparent teleological aspect and, and that basis, a kind of 
normativity that relates to aims. Human vision, for example, can fail to adequately 
represent an object in certain conditions. This possibility of failure implies a kind of 
normativity: proper functions can be carried out successfully or unsuccessfully, and 
this provides them a kind of normativity . . We might consider the successful operation 
of a proper function as a kind of "normative" aim for the system: the system "ought" 
to do this or that if the "goal" of vision (that is, adequately representing the visual 
scene) is to be realized. 
Second, the successful performance of a function depends on "normal conditions," 
conditions in which the function can be realized, to obtain the result it was selected for 
(e.g. Darwinian reproductive success). Human eyes, for instance, can act as proper 
transducers of visual information, that is, can con vert physicallight energy into neural 
impulses, only given certain specifie constraints or norms. In this case, the normal 
conditions include adequate (not too intense) ambient luminosity, healthy retina 
function, absence of pathology (such as cataracts), and so forth. There are thus very 
specifie conditions in which a function can be carried out, and these conditions can be 
seen as normative. They are the conditions that the system "ought" to be in for the 
function to be carried out. Similar considerations apply to most other biological 
systems. 56 Thus, we have a kind of "engineering" or "design" conception of 
56 The "enactive" approaches to biological and cognitive systems make a central point of normativity in 
this design sense. They make a case for considering the " intrinsic purposiveness" of biological systems 
in cognitive science (see, e.g. , Thompson 2007, 133ff.). On the enactive reading, organisms dynamically 
make sense of their environments in a continuous process of co-constitution of self and world . This 
"sense-making" activity stems from specifie, bodily dispositions that are characteristic of the perspective 
of the organism, and this perspective is a ki nd of normative ground for cognition Organisms thrive in 
precarious conditions. The struggle for continuous existence in a far-from-equilibrium state entails that 
the conditions allowing for the continuous steady-state existence the organisms act as a kind of 
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normativity, where design considerations pertaining to the carrying out of a specifie 
function fumish the motivation for this or that norm. These statements straddle the 
middle line between the factual and the normative: they are factual because they are 
grounded in how the system is in fact constituted, but they are normative insofar as 
they provide conditions for the system' s achieving this or that design goal. 
We might argue that naturalistic approaches to epistemology need only appeal to 
"engineering" accounts of normativity: this is a claim about the rationality of epistemic 
action or about biological normative constraints. So claim ( 4) do es not commit the 
naturalistic fallacy, because it states little more than that epistemology ought to heed to 
the results ofpsychology insofar as they have a specifie goal, to account (among other 
things) for epistemic capacities of concrete agents. This is a claim about the aims of 
epistemology, and about how best to achieve those specifie aims. Quine goes in this 
direction when he says that his naturalistic approach to epistemology does not merely 
reduce norn1ativity to brute fact: 
Naturalization of epistemology does not jettison the normative and settle 
for the indiscriminate description of ongoing processes. For me normative 
epistemology is a branch of engineering. lt is the technology of truth-
seeking, or, in a more cautiously epistemological term, prediction. Like any 
technology, it makes free use of whatever scientific findings may suit its 
purpose.. . The normative here, as elsewhere in engineering, becomes 
descriptive when the terminal parameter is expressed. (Quine 1997, 665, 
emphasis added) 
Contemporary naturalistic projects in epistemology provide a kind of engineering 
accounts of the aims ofthat discipline. Quine' s and Millikan' s proposais tQ naturalize 
normative constraint on the organism. One of the merits of the enactive approach to cognition is to have 
reintroduced the idea ofnormativity, and a kind ofnaturalized teleology, in cognitive science. For a clear 
introduction to the se ideas, see ( e.g.) V are la, Thompson, & Rosch ( 1991 ); Weber & V are la (2002); 
Thompson (2007); Di Paolo (2009); Froese & Di Paolo (20 JI) ; Di Paolo & Thompson (20 14 ). 
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normativity are operative only insofar as a "terminal parameter" has been established, 
either by the engineer or by natural selection. What is meant by a terminal parameter 
in this sense is just the end result of a function that can be maximized or minimized 
given certain constraints. In summary, the approach outlined by Quine allows us to take 
a given normative capacity and then to treat it from a design or engineering perspective 
by specifying the terminal parameter that this capacity is supposed to real ize. 57 The 
design perspective can be thought of either in terms of action theory and rational 
epistemic action, or again in terms of naturalized normativity, given the constraints on 
living systems in evolutionary time. Now that the major caveat has been dealt with, we 
can move to the justification of the other main premises in the argument. 
4.2. (1) An epistemic world-disclosing capacity C*, which is characteristic of concrete 
epistemic agents, is epistemically relevant to epistemology (among other things) 
The first step of the psycho-epistemological argument is to identify one specifie 
epistemic capacity bad by concrete human agents that is of epistemic relevance to 
epistemology, that is, a capacity the carrying out of which matters to epistemological 
57 To illustrate this design sense of normativity further , consider the emerging "predictive process ing" 
or "free-energy principle" approach to cognitive systems (see, e.g. , Clark 20 13 ; Hohwy 20 13 , Friston 
201 0). Su ch approaches view cognitive processes as bidirectional cascades of information process ing, 
where top-down connections between neurons relay predictions coming from generative model s. These 
predictions actively try to cancel out or "explain away" the prediction errors picked up by dedicated 
"error units," either by changing the generative mode! that made the predictions, or through action. ln 
such models, the cognitive system has access to a mathematically specifiable quantity, nam ely prediction 
error (which is a mathematical upper bound on the system-inaccessible information theoretic quantity 
"surprisal"), which the system minimizes in order to gain a firm perceptual and motor grasp on its 
surrounding. ln such models, the minimization of prediction error can be seen as a terminal parameter 
for the activity ofprocessing information. We can move from an abstract capacity perspective to a design 
or engineering perspective by specifying such a parameter, and find the ways the system actually does 
minimize prediction error to real ize its perceptual and motor feats. Thus, minimizing prediction error is 
design-normative in predictive processing approaches. 
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accounts of knowledge and scientific reasoning. A few remarks ought to be made with 
regard to the abject and scope of this claim. The first clarification, discussed above, is 
that we are working with a new, perhaps nonstandard conception of epistemology. In 
the account we adopted, epistemology is interested in knowledge, rationality, 
justification, and the capacity to construct scientific theories, but not only in the 
abstract: it is interested more specifically (and among other things) in the knowledge, 
rationality, andjustificatory practices of concrete epistemic agents, that is, ofhistorical, 
embodied, and encultured epistemic agents. 
This claim will make or break the argument for many. 1 suspect it will be the claim that 
generates the most resistance from "traditional" epistemologists. 58 Nonetheless, it still 
seems correct to claim that contemporary epistemological projects are no longer 
exclusive! y interested in studying the faculties of formai or disembodied subjects. 59 "A 
58 Kim ( 1988), for instance, argues th at Quine ' s conception of epistemology in effect evacua tes many of 
the questions that are central to epistemology. These questions relate to the relation of ep istemic support 
or justification between our beliefs about the world and the ev idence to which we are privy. On Kim ' s 
account, Quine's proposai replaces these questions of justification with questions surrounding the causal 
relation between the way we acquire sensory information and the way beliefs are formed. Kim and Quine 
are, then, in a sense, talking past each other, because they do not seem to be tai king about the same set 
of problems and questions. We might respond to Kim 's critique as Quine has, by arguing that the 
distinction between relations of epistemic support and relations of causal inference can be mitigated by 
the engineering or design stance. It might be argued that in so changing the question, the issues of 
justification become amenable to explanation, given a terminal parameter. 1 might fwther argue that the 
aim here is not to outright replace traditional epistemological questions, but only to examine other 
relevant questions concerning the makeup of epistemic agents (that is, to advocate collaborative 
psychologism rather than replacement psychologism). 
59 Of course, those who espouse the more idealistic aspects of Husserl ' s transcendental-
phenomenological project, centered as it is on uncovering the invariant structures of "pure" 
consciousness, would be rather disinclined to accept this precision on the first premise. 1 would reply to 
the Husserlian that it is utterly unclear to me how one can adequately move from the study of "pure" 
consciousness to the study of how beings such as ourselves acquire knowledge about our worlds. The 
problem with "bracketing" the natural world, as it were, in the transcendental and eidetic attitudes is that 
it seems to relegate our epistemological investigations to the rarified lev el of pure consciousness, without 
any possible way back to our concrete living practice of science. 
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priori foundationalism is dead," we might say dramatically (knowing full well, of 
course, that necromancy is common philosophical practice ), as are the myriad 
epistemologies grounded in disembodied, abstract epistemic subjects. The minimal 
interpretation of this claim is such that epistemology, as it stands today, is an attempt 
to account (among other things) for how concrete beings such as ourselves, embodied, 
historically and culturally bound epistemic agents, having finite cognitive resources, 
manage to acquire knowledge about the world and conduct scientific activities.60 
A related precision concerns what I mean by an "epistemic world-disclosing capacity." 
By this expression, I mean a capacity had by an epistemic agent that allows her to 
acquire knowledge about her world or about herself. In the new conception of 
epistemology we have adopted, to account for such capacities is necessary ( although, 
given the weak reading of psychologism on offer, not sufficient in itself) to providing 
an exhaustive account of knowledge. We have many such capacities. Consider a 
candidate capacity C*: that ofbeing in a world-disclosing, intentional, and interpretive 
relationship with the world. Intentionality in philosophy of mind is a property of 
experience that we might call also "aboutness." That is, intentionality pertains to the 
fact that our mental experience has content, is about something. 61 1 do not just see, 
rather 1 see things, people, places, and all of the se mental states are about something in 
the world. Put simply, in everyday experience, our experience is such that it is about 
things in the world. It is inherent to organisms such as ourselves that we are capable of 
having such an intentional relation with the world "out there." Intentionality, as a 
60 In any case, the remainder of the argument rests on accepting this premise. Of course, more 
"traditional" epistemologists (e.g., value epistemologists) might reject this claim, in which case the 
argument will fa il for them. But the argument th us formulated , in that case, at least has the advantage of 
pointing out the specifie premise that generates disagreement, which is useful for debate. 
61 Franz Brentano is the first to have introduced the term intentionality, which he borrowed the Medieval 
Scholastic philosopher Thomas Aquinas. For Brentano, intentionality is the mark of the mental : psychic 
phenomena are defined by their being about something. Husserl would later make intentionality into one 
of the central concepts of his transcendental phenomenology. 
1 . 
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central trait of our capacity for having a world-disclosing experience, is relevant to 
epistemology insofar as the possibility of acquiring knowledge about the world 
supposes that organisms such as ourselves can entertain states of mind about the world. 
Interpretation is another capacity that might be relevant to epistemology. Arguably, the 
capacity to interpret or make sense of the world is a central, necessary part of our 
meaningful relation with the world. World-disclosing experience is the result of 
interpretation: our experience is laden with processes of interpretation, which yield not 
mere phenomenal experience per se ( qualia, or whatever ), but also an understanding of 
that which we perceive as being such and such.62 Severallines of argument converge 
on this idea that experience is interpretation-laden. A straightforward argument to this 
effect cornes from Gibson's influential "ecological approach" (1979) in psychology. 
Gibson argues that we apprehend things in the world as laden with what he calls 
"affordances," or possibilities for action. When 1 perceive a chair, for instance, I do not 
perceive it merely as a physical thing with given properties, say, size, shape, mass, etc. 
Rather, I perceive it as "sit-uponable," as something 1 could sit on, that is, 1 interpret it 
as something that affords action. My experience ofthings in the world, as those things, 
is the result of interpreting them as affording this or that possibility for action, and so 
is my knowledge about those very things. Experience and knowledge of things is 
contingent on interpretation: interpretation is part of what it is to have the capacity for 
62 Although there is still debate about whether there can be so called "pure," or "pre-conceptual" states 
of consciousness, that is, whether there is such a thing as a perceptual "given," it is uncontroversial to 
assert that our world-involving states of conscious perceptual experience are laden with understanding. 
Although it may be the case that conscious states of experience may not about anything, it seems 
reasonable to argue that insofar as consciousness is consciousness ofsomething in particular in the world, 
then consciousness proceeds on the basis of interpretation. That is, we do not experience an indistinct 
and diffuse conscious state, but we experience things as things, as these particular things, which requires 
interpretation. 
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a world~disclosing experience. 63 Other capacities bad by con crete epistemic agents 
might also be epistemically relevant to epistemology. We might want to study, say, 
how it is that agents manage to form true beliefs, track truth, orto justify beliefs in light 
of new evidence. All such world-disclosing capacities, insofar as they allow an agent 
to disclose and come to know their world, and as such are relevant to epistemological 
projects, are included under the extension of C*. 
The claim here, then, is that sorne epistemic world-disclosing capacity, which 1 
generically label C*, is of epistemic relevance to epistemology. This follows from our 
proposed reading of epistemology, as that discourse which studies knowledge and how 
we acquire it, and accounts for how it is that we can formulate and test scientific 
theories and hypotheses.64 For instance, we have the capacity for intentional, 
interpretive relations with the world, and this capacity seems epistemically relevant to 
epistemology, insofar as epistemology accounts for how concrete epistemic agents 
acquire knowledge. The intentional component of the capacity is crucial because it 
63 Other !ines of argument converge on this idea. ln his language of thought hypothes is, Fodor (2008), 
for instance, suggests th at perception consists in the tokening of a term in "mentalese," the language of 
thought. Th us, whenever 1 perce ive a particular, I am al ways perceiving it as an instanti ation of a concept, 
lest I not perceive the thing at ali. The argument, then, is that to perceive something is necessarily to 
perce ive something as that thing, as the token of a mentalese term. Dennett (1987; 20 13) has a Iso argued 
something along these li nes in his di scussion of the different stances and their relation to Gibsonian 
affordances. What we apprehend, when we deal with the many phenomena around us, depends in large 
part on our attitude or stance towards these phenomena. When l interact with a person, 1 am obviously 
not in the same stance as when 1 interact with an inanimate object: 1 expect the person to have beliefs 
and intentions, to reply, to agree or disagree, and so forth (which 1 ordinarily do not for inanimate 
objects). My very apprehension of a person as a person is thus, in a sense, coextensive with my capacity 
to interpret my experience in a specifie way. The same could be said for ali things one might encounter 
in the world: my apprehension of an object relates to my attitude and expectations (and indeed, my 
expectations about my expectations) regarding that object in the world. Arguments to this effect could 
be made from hermeneutic and phenomenological philosophy, but space constraints prohibit me from 
unfolding this complex tapestry. 
64 We should note, however, lest we be accused of question begging, that if one di sagrees with such a 
construal of epistemology, one will probably not agree with this claim. As indicated a number of times 
already, the argument on offer is contingent on accepting the first premise. 
-1 
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underlies our ability to come into contact with the world, which is necessary if we are 
to know aboutit, or test our models, theories, and hypotheses aboutit. The interpretive 
component is just as crucial, because it is necessary for going about acquiring 
information about specifie things in the world, for grasping things in the world as such. 
There could be no acquisition of knowledge, and a fortiori no science, if we could not 
interpret our experience, models, and data as being about this and that specifie state of 
affairs. 
Finally, it should be pointed out that the aim here is not to reduce epistemology to the 
study of a set of epistemic, world-disclosing capacities. Of course, it goes almost 
without saying that epistemology is interested in other things: the nature and origin of 
knowledge, the reliability of our claims to knowledge, the nature of rationality and 
justification, and so f011h, which eo ipso make little reference to epistemic agents and 
their capacities. The claim 1 am making is only the limited one that epistemology is 
interested in su ch capacities among other things. Th us, we are defending a kind of weak 
psychologism: we are not advocating the strong replacement thesis, but rather are 
calling for collaboration between fields . 
Now, the epistemic world-disclosing capacities C* just discussed in (1) are a special 
case of the generic capacities C that we examined in (3). This allows us to link together 
(1) and (3), and thereby legitimately move from factual to normative considerations. 
So the claim so far is as follows: certain epistemic capacities are epistemically relevant 
to epistemology (as defined here ); if the se capacities were to be explained by a given 
discipline N, say cognitive science, then the explanation provided by N ought to inform 
epistemology. Can such an explanation be provided? This is what we tum to next. 
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4.3. (2) There exists sorne cognitive science N, such that N can provide an explanation 
of the relevant epistemic world-disclosing capacity C*, by functional 
analysis/decomposition of C* into organized operations/ ( Fe•, and/or by mechanistic 
analysis of C* into cognitive mechanisms rn (MC* (among other things), or both 
Once we have agreed that epistemology is interested in a given epistemic capacity C, 
and that an explanation of this capacity, if it was to be provided, ought to inform 
epistemology, the next step in arguing for the relevance of the cognitive sciences is to 
look for a candidate explanation of that capacity from cognitive science. Before 
proceeding to such an explanation, however, we need to frame the question su ch that 
cognitive science can be of help. Indeed, ali we have considered so far is a given 
capacity, and it is not immediately clear that this capacity can be usefully explained. 
What we propose to do is to account for the epistemic capacity in terms of a terminal 
parameter. This will allow us to think of epistemic capacities from a design perspective. 
Now, as discussed above, a terminal parameter is the upshot of a given activity, which 
can be maximized or minimized given the specifie goals we have set out. Once such a 
parameter is made explicit, we can apply a host of scientific tools for two purposes. 
First, we can attempt to understand the capacity relative to the terminal parameter. This 
will allow us to explain how it is that the capacity in question is carried out. Second, 
this explanation ofhow the capacity is carried out will allow us to adopt an engineering 
or design perspective to see how we can maximize or minimize the terminal parameter. 
In the case of epistemic world-disclosing capacities, the terminal parameter might be 
the function of representing the world, and we can attempt to provide an account of 
adequate representation of the world (i.e., a design-normative account of 
representation) by thinking of representation as a rational epistemic actiori that is 
subject to means-end reasoning, and/or as a proper function with a goal and normal 
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conditions, which provide it with normativity. This analysis, in cognitive science, can 
be conducted in at least one of two ways. 
Functional decomposition and analysis 
One way to analyze a given capacity or regularity is to carry out traditional functional 
analysis (Cummins 1975; 1983; 2000; Black & Segal 1998; Dennett 1978). This 
analysis yields what we might caU a functional decomposition Fe• of the capacity C* 
in question.65 The idea here is to decompose the capacity of interest C* into constituent 
operations fE: F e•. These operations figure in a functionalist explanation of the capacity, 
that is, they are sequenced and organized in such a way as to yield an explanation of 
the target capacity. The set of constituent operations f E: Fe• that figure in our 
reconstruction of what the system does to achieve its given terminal parameter are 
functions, insofar as they figure adequately in the explanation, as partial operations 
which together have an overall functional organization and account for how the 
capacity studied actually operates. 
To clarify, what is called a "function" in functional decomposition and analysis is an 
operation that accounts for part of what a given system considered does. That is, a 
function is an operation that explains how the relevant capacity is carried out by 
figuring as part of the workflow that results in the capacity being carried out by the 
65 This step is reminiscent of moving fi·om the computational leve! to the algorithmic leve! in Marr ' s 
classic (1982) computational mode! of cognitive processing. This step can also be cashed out in terms 
of Bechtel's and Craver's mechanistic approach to the mind (Craver 2007 ; Bechtel 2008). ln this 
framework, what we have identified as the relevant epistemic capacity is the "phenomenon" to be 
explained. A mechanistic explanation decomposes the phenomenon into component operations and 
parts. Coupled or linked together, these parts and operations comprise a mechanism that explains how 
the phenomenon of interest is realized. To identifY only operations, without considering the parts that 
implement them, would consist in functional decomposition. 
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system (see, for instance, Cummins 1975; 1983; 2000; Craver 2007; Bechtel 2008; 
Piccinini & Craver 2011). We thus move from the epistemic capacity C* to the 
functional decomposition of this capacity Fe* by specifying the sequence of steps (i.e. , 
operations or functions) that allow the system to realize its terminal parameter. For 
instance, vision can be defined in the more general sense as a capacity that we have as 
embodied agents (namely, the capacity to see things in the world, and thereby disclose 
and know them). We can consider vision from a functional point ofview by specifying 
the ends realized by vision (the tenninal parameter), and then mapping out the 
operations that allow to system to reach those end s. The terminal parameter of vision, 
for instance, might be the achievement of a representation of the visual scene. An 
operation in the functional decomposition of the capacity might be directing visual 
attention, classifying and identifying the distal causes of visual stimuli , and so forth. 
All these operations unfold in tandem such that the capacity considered is carried out. 
In and ofthemselves, operations need not make explicit reference to the physical parts 
carrying them out (although we might suppose that operations and functions are in fact 
carried out by physical parts). Functional explanations of capacities are, or so the 
received functionalist view goes, independent from accounts of the realization or 
implementation of those capacities (Fodor 1965; 1968, 1974; Cummins 1983; 2000). 
As Fodor points out, one can provide a functional description of a target phenomenon 
without making reference to any of the physical parts that carry out the operations: 
If I speak of a deviee as a "camshaft," I am implicitly identifying it by 
reference to its physical structure, and so I am committed to the view that 
it exhibits a characteristic and specifiable decomposition into physical 
parts. But if I speak of the deviee as a "valve lifter," I am identifying it by 
reference to its function and I therefore undertake no such commitment. 
(Fodor 1968, 113; cited and discussed in Bechtel2008, 136ff.) 
Functional analysis is thus a decomposition of a target capacity, in our case the 
epistemic capacity at issue, to see how it is that the phenomenon can take place the way 
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it does. Typically, one proceeds to such a functional analysis by looking at the 
operations that make up a given capacity, as well as their organization, in terms of 
input, internai state, and output. The idea is to describe the relevant capacity of the 
system in terms of a sequence of operations, which act on an input that interacts with 
the system's internai state to produce an output. Such sequences of operations are often 
represented as flowcharts, which graphically represent the sequence of operations that 
make up the capacity considered. 
Sorne central kinds of functional analysis can be explicated and enriched significantly 
in terms of information and information processing. 66 Now, information is a 
multifarious notion. lt arises notably in thermodynamics, information the ory, and in 
the cognitive sciences. We ought to say a few words about the notion here. To get a 
gist of what the term means, we might say that information is a relational , statistical, 
measurable quantity between two states of affairs, such that when one state of affair 
carries information about another, the occurrence of one is indicative (in sorne sense of 
the word) of the occurrence of the other. Information is thus related to the reduction of 
uncertainty, in that a state of affairs that carries information about another tells us 
something about the probability of the state of affairs that it carries information about.67 
66 Not ali functional analyses will be informational. A "valve-lifter," for instance, is not a deviee 
specified in information-processing terms, but rather, simply, in terms of input, output, and internai state 
of the system. Thus, functional analysis is the more general kind of explanation, which subsumes 
information-processing and computational-information-processing kinds of explanation. 
67 Jnformation has been discussed in both semantic and non-semantic terms in the literature. Given space 
constraints, I cannot unpack the notion extensively, and will make a few general remarks. Non-semantic 
information is an information-theoretic notion that pertains to the statistical properties of signais being 
analyzed. One does not suppose that this information is "about" anything in particular. One can cash out 
this specifie concept of information, as it is used in cognitive science, as "mu tuai information," which is 
a measure famously developed by Shannon that tells us about the statistical dependence between two 
distributions . Semantic kinds of information is information about the meaning of a given signal. This 
sense of information is used in the cognitive sciences, but its use is rather controversial: sorne (e.g., 
Fodor 2008) have argued that semantic views on information are misguided or mistaken. For one 
interesting account of semantic information, see Scarantino & Piccinini (201 0). For a discussion the 
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The concept of information is relevant to psychology, as it explains how the internai 
states of the organism and the external states of the world are linked one to the other. 
To say that the cognitive system has or carries information about the world is to say 
something about the statistical relations that obtain between certain of its inner states 
and certain states of the environment. 
Now, information is not only present in cognitive systems, in the sense that internai 
states of the system are statistically dependent on external states of the world. 
Information, moreover, is processed in cognitive systems, that is, manipulated and 
transformed to various cognitive ends. The system manipulates the information it has 
access to in order to intelligently accomplish tasks, and infer what is going on in the 
world. As indicated, this information processing is typically graphically represented as 
a flowchart that captures the flow and modification of information in the system. For 
instance, in traditional accounts of its functioning, the visual system isolates the many 
statistical correlations discernable in the information it has access to, in order to extract 
specifie features of the stimuli that caused this excitation, and thereby reconstruct its 
distal causes. In other words, then, information processing is the manipulation of the 
flow of information in a system in order to reach a given terminal parameter. So the 
functional decomposition story can be applied to epistemic capacities insofar as 
functional decomposition makes explicit the kinds of information flows contained in a 
system. 
Once the terminal parameter has been specified for a given capacity, and once we have 
decomposed the capacity functionally, we can think ofit from an engineering or design 
perspective: that is, we can study how the terminal parameter is achieved, and how the 
system might better achieve it, by specifying the sequence of operations that explain 
relation between semantic and non-semantic accounts of information, see Piccinini (2004; 2008). For 
more on information and computation, see Piccinini & Bah ar (20 13); Piccinini & Scarantino (20 1 0); 
Piccinini (2008). 
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how that function cornes about, and then considering what design-normative conditions 
make it possible or could improve its functioning. In other words, once we have 
specified how a given capacity is functionally realized, we can then proceed to a design 
perspective and ask the question how that function might be carried out better or more 
efficient! y. The normativity implicit in the term "better" can be read in the sense above, 
as a question of rational epistemic action or naturalized normativity. That is, we can 
examine the conditions in which the system operates, and propose adjustments to its 
operation depending on the chosen terminal parameter. 
How are these considerations relevant to the psycho-epistemological argument? AU the 
second step of the argument is claiming is that a given epistemic capacity, which is 
relevant to epistemology, can be explained in functional terms, and notably in terms of 
information and information processing (in at !east one relevant sense of the term). This 
step of the argument should not be too controversial. After all , it is common practice, 
at !east since the ad vent of psychology and cognitive science in the la te 1950s, but also 
in sociology and biology, to analyze a given capacity in terms of the different 
operations that together yield the capacity under study. So the second step of the 
argument is merely the claim that the relevant epistemic capacity C* admits a certain 
functional decomposition F c* from a given cognitive science, which exp lains that 
capacity. 
Mechanistic analysis 
There is an important trend in contemporary cognitive science that consists in coupling 
the functional analysis of the phenomena at issue with a mechanistic analysis of the 
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working parts that realize or implement the se functions. 68 While functional analysis 
might lend itself to making explicit the kinds of operations that are ongoing in the 
nervous system, w~ might require a description of the mechanisms that enable these 
operations. 69 There is increasing interest in the "implementation" m of cognitive 
functions in recent psychological investigations. An implementation, here, means a 
physical part of a system that realizes the operations described at the functionallevel. 
Although the most obvious implementation of cognitive functions is the brain and its 
parts, the recent literature on "situated cognition" and "embodied cognition" suggests 
that other kinds of parts outside the brain, including the body, but also cognitive 
technologies such as persona! computers and the Internet, might figure in such 
physically applied explanations. 70 
68 Again, this is akin to moving from the algorithmic to the implementational or hardware leve t in Marr ' s 
(1982) theory of cognition. A functional analysis can be considered as a "mechanism sketch" (Piccinini 
& Craver 20 Il), that is, as a functional description of a mechani sm in need of implementational detail s 
to be provided by later, mechanistic investigations. Some authors, however, consider functional-
psychological leve! explanations to be sui generis and irreducible to mechanistic explanation ; see, e.g. , 
Fodor (1974). 
69 A significant debate in the philosophy of cognitive science and in the philosophy of biology persists 
over multiple realization ofbiological and mental functions. That is, debate rages over whether it makes 
sense to speak of functional properties without making explicit reference to the physical parts that 
perform the operations. To thinkers such as Fodor, the autonomy of the special sciences (notably of 
psychology) rests on the explanatory relevance and autonomy of its predicates at its specifie leve!. For 
thinker such as Kim and Bechtel, however, the phys ica l implementation will necessarily constrain the 
functional account of any function whatsoever. See Fodor (1997; 1974; 1968); Kim (2006; 1999); Sober 
(1999). 
70 On "situated" (that is, on "extended" or " embedded") accounts of cognition, non-neural processes may 
participate in the realization of mental operations. Situated cognition in general is the idea that cognition 
spreads out or otherwise in volves parts of the world . As the great study by Hutchins (1995) has shown, 
and as many others in the tradition have shown after him, cognitive processes can be di stributed, such 
that the operations typical of a given function can be realized by, say, computers, the Internet, 
blackboards, and so forth . So the implementation in question need not necessarily be neural. To be 
committed to the view that every operation in Fe• is realized by a brain structure would ipso facto commit 
me to a strong form of neural reductionism . Extended mi nd theorists make an ontological claim to the 
effect that cognitive processes literally extend into the environment. This view has also been called 
"active externalism" (Clark & Chalmers 1998), or again "vehicle externalism" (Rowlands 2003 ; 2006). 
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With this reductionist caveat in mind, we might suggest another way of providing an 
explanation for a target capacity: mechanistic analysis. 71 Mechanistic analysis of a 
capacity generally consists in linking or coupling operations provided by the functional 
description of the relevant epistemic capacity with a description of the working parts 
that carry out the relevant operations. Bechtel and Richardson (1992) have dubbed this 
process "localization," in line with the parlance of psychologists. Localization is the 
identification of a mechanism, where a mechanism is defined as a linked set of 
operations and working parts. 72 A mechanism is an implementation of a function, that 
is, a physical thing that performs a given number of operations that lead to the carryin,g 
out of the relevant capacity. To provide a mechanistic explanation of a target capacity 
is to provide a set Mc• of mechanisms m that account for how that capacity is carried 
out. 
Recent technological developments in the cognitive sciences, notably the refinement 
in software processing data from EEG and MEG, new brain imaging techniques such 
as functional MRI, and the advent of computational science, have allowed 
psychologists to study, empirically and with simulations, the implementations of the 
functions and operations that were once o~ly described in terms offunctional analysis. 
Other theori sts, e.g. , Rupert (20 1 1; 2004), Huebner (20 13), and Adams and Aizawa (200 1; 2009), reject 
this ontological claim, and instead propose an embedded account of cognition. They argue that the 
insights of extended cognition theorists about the dense cou pl ing of external and internai resources could 
be weil accommodated by the more conservative view that the cognitive system is organismically 
bounded. 
71 For accessible introductions, see Machamer et al. (200 1 ); Craver (2007); Bech tel (2008). 
72 In its simplest form, localization is the coupling of an operation to a working part, the result ofwhich 
is a mechanism. This localization itself can be complex or simple: a simple localization couples one 
operation to one part; but more complex localizations, involving many parts to one operation or many 
operations to one part, are also possible. 
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Sorne might argue that the implementationallevel is strictly required to account for a 
capacity, as we need to know how operations are carried out by physical structures, 
typically through forms of computation. 
But what do we mean by "computation," here? One of the great insights of cognitive 
science is that the brain is in the business of computation.73 Computation, however, is 
arguably not a merely functional notion, as it describes the manipulation of "vehicles," 
physical substrates that carry information, according to certain rules or regularities. 
Vehicles are "medium-independent" (Piccini & Scarantino 2010). That is to say, only 
a subset of their properties encodes information. Not every property of a vehicle is 
directly relevant to information processing: this is why a silicon chip and a network of 
neurons can effectively serve the same functional role, in the case, say, of restoring 
sight to a blind person. The physical features of the vehicle that encode information are 
only relevant to the cognitive system insofar as they allow the system to distinguish 
one vehicle state more or less unambiguously distinguished from other vehicle states. 
However, the computations defined over the vehicles depend on the physical 
substratum that realizes them, as there must be sorne physical states that encode 
information if further work is to be done on that information. The vehicle properties 
are thus relevant for the kind of information processing considered. 
73 There exists a debate over what kind of computation is performed by neural networks in the brain. 
The first wave of cognitive scientists, notably McCulluch and Pitts, supposed that neural computation 
was digital. Other schools of thought argued that neural computation is essentially analog. Recent in-
depth studies by Piccinini have tried to show that neural computation is a sui generis kind of 
computation, neither digital nor analog. The brain makes use of certain of its vehicles ' features 
(neurotransmitter levels, spike trains, and so forth) to manipulate the information it has access to, but 
this computation is ofits own specifie kind. The physical features ofthe vehicles thus end up making a 
difference in the kind of operation the system can real ize. It can complement the functional information 
processing to provide an account of the specifie mechanisms that real ize the flow of information in the 
system, as weil as the specifie type of computation that they realize. There are marked differences 
between digital, analog, and neural forms of computation. See Piccinini & Bahar (2013); Piccinini & 
Scarantino (20 1 0). The differences mainly lie in the different kinds of operations th at different kinds of 
vehicles allow. 
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The idea here is that functional decompositions of the relevant epistemic capacity have 
a physical implementation, at least part of which is located in the brain. To provide a 
mechanism that underlies a given capacity is to provide a mechanistic explanation of 
that capacity. So the epistemic capacities we have been considering up to now admit 
functional as weil as mechanistic explanations. Again, 1 am not arguing that every 
operation that is part ofF c* needs to be realized by specifie mechanisms at the neural 
level. Recent studies in situated cognition argue that it is at least plausible that certain 
operations are actually carried out not by neural networks, but rather by parts of the 
environment. The point is simply that an account of the implementation of a given 
capacity (whatever its specifie nature) can provide us with an explanation for that 
capacity. 74 Now that we have seen that there are frameworks in cognitive science for 
pro vi ding explanations of relevant epistemic capacities, every premise of the psycho-
epistemological argument has been justified. We are thus justified to move to its 
conclusion: 
74 Note that 1 could have unfolded another set of considerations to a similar effect to my use of 
functionalist and mechanistic approaches. Sorne theorists choose to explain capacities using the tools of 
dynamic systems theory: this is the suite of dynamicist approaches. See, e.g. , Juarrero (1999); Lewis 
(2005); Thompson (2007); Anderson (2014). Dynamicist approaches (typically, but not always) reject 
the concept of representation. Dynamicists often a·rgue that the computer metaphor is inadequate for 
mentallife, and propose a dynamical system , the Watt governor, as an alternative metaphor. The brain-
mind would on this account be a self-organizing dynamical system, whose properties cannot be 
assimilated to those of (digital) computation. An expansive literature has emerged addressing this 
problem. See Clark (1997); van Gel der (1998); Bech tel (20 12; 2009; 2008; 2007); Bech tel & 
Abrahemsen (2012 ; 2010; 2005). 
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4.4. (4) If C* is epistemically relevant to epistemology, then epistemology ought to be 
informed by N 
We have at this point unfolded the psycho-epistemological argument. If the argument 
holds, we are led to a contingent conclusion. The conclusion is that, insofar as epistemic 
capacities had by concrete epistemic agents are epistemically relevant to epistemology, 
and because there exists some cognitive science that provides an explanation of that 
capacity, then, given the principles of rational epistemic action, epistemology ought to 
be informed by cognitive science and its explanation of that capacity. 75 A few general 
remarks about the conclusion and its consequences are in order. 
The first remark is that this is an argument for weak psychologism. lt does not aim to 
usurp the function and questions that usually belong to epistemology. It merely states 
that epistemology, given some of its desiderata, ought to employ some of the methods 
and findings of cognitive science to answer its own questions. To study these conditions 
does not commit one to the view that the sciences ought to unilaterally justify their own 
practices. It is only to claim that questions in epistemology are not indifferent to the 
functional decomposition and mechanistic implementation of a given capacity. 
The considerations examined above with regard to forms of explanation speak for the 
importance of the findings of psychology for epistemology. Consider the following 
illustration. It is reasonably well established that the vi suai pathway in the brain is split 
into dorsal and ventral streams, which process different visual traits (labelled as "what" 
75 Of course, other sciences might also be relevant to epistemology given its interest in the capacities of 
concrete agents. Kuhn ' s work, for instance, illustrates the ki nd of useful contribution that can be made 
by the historical and sociological sciences to epistemology. 
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and "where" streams). 76 This finding cornes from mechanistic analysis of the brain and 
visual pathway. If the brain cornes to represent what something is and where it is 
differently, then it stands to reason that we do not acquire knowledge about what 
something is and where it is in the same way. Moreover, sorne sense modalities, and 
even sorne operations within a given modality, may be more reliable than others, and 
thus lead more reliably to knowledge (see Hohwy 2013 , 140ff. for discussion in a 
predictive coding framework). If this is the case, then epistemology ought to address 
these issues, insofar as it is concemed with concrete capacities had by epistemic agents . 
More generally still, accounts of knowledge acquisition can explicitly draw on the 
functions and mechanisms of the nervous system. This is the case with Giere's 
cognitive approach to the philosophy of science. Giere (20 1 0; 1999; 1990) draws on 
cognitive scientific accounts of how we represent our world and share those 
representations among each other by employing mathematical models, and links up 
scientific observation and model-building with the cognitive capacities that we are 
endowed with. It tums out that our capacities to build scientific models have a lotto do 
with our limited cognitive abilities and the particular features of our cognitive systems. 
Giere points out, for instance, that scientific work often uses visual , graphical 
representations ofmodels and data to make sense ofthe phenomena studied. This use 
of visual representations is related to the prominence of our ability to process visua1 
information. As such, our scientific capacities to build theories are in line with our 
cognitive makeup, and might be different if, for instance, we primarily relied on other 
sense modalities, such as hearing or smell, to make sense of the world. Having explored 
76 See Goodale & Milner (1992) for the canonicat characterisation of the two-stream hypothesis. We 
should note that recent findings have contested the strict functional segregation of these pathways. 
Although the two pathways are anatomically distinct and functionally specialized, there also seems to 
be significant cross-talk between the streams, such that they are not functionally isolated. See Mclntosh 
& Schen (2009) for a recent review. 
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these general considerations, we can try to respond to Husserl's accusations of circular 
reasoning and relativism. 
Circular reasoning 
One probative way to respond to Husserl's accusation of circular reasoning is to bite 
the bullet and embrace the alleged circularity. As we have seen, many authors since 
Quine (1969) have rejected the claim that the sciences are in need of anything like an 
a priori foundation. Our acquisition of knowledge in science and in everyday life are 
like Neurath's boat, constantly being rebuilt at sea. There seems to be no principled 
reason why epistemology today ought to lay out a fundamental groundwork for science 
once and for all. Rather, we might argue that epistemology and the empirical 
investigations it enables grow and change in tandem, especially if we vrew 
epistemology as interested in the epistemic capacities of concrete agents. While this 
may be circular, it may not be a vicious circularity, and may indeed prove 
unproblematic if we abandon a priori foundationalism. 77 
From an engineering standpoint, the conditions in which a capacity can be carried out, 
as weil as the terminal parameter of this capacity, tum out to be relevant to 
understanding how we acquire knowledge. Friston (2014) has suggested that the 
77 Space constraints forbid me to unfold this li ne of reasoning in other philosophical traditions. 1 shall 
brietly mention one. ln philosophical hermeneutics (e.g., Heidegger 1927, 148ff. , 312ff. ; Gadamer 1960, 
270ff.), the circularity is embraced as virtuous rather than vicious, making it a methodological princip le, 
called the "hermeneutic circle." This circle corresponds to the dialectical movement between our 
anticipations (our fore-structures ofunderstanding, Vorstrukture) and our interpretation of the situation. 
Very schematically, on this account, our anticipations of wh at we grasp change as a result of our current 
interpretation, and our current interpretation is al ways the result of our anticipations of wh at we be lieve 
will be the case. There is thus no single absolute foundation to knowledge; rather, there is a process of 
continuous bootstrapping of our anticipations and our current interpretation. 
--- ---- ------------------------------------------------------------------
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mechanisms that allow us to perceptually grasp the world in the first place (i.e. , 
predictive processing mechanisms) are the very same that we employ when using 
scientific reasoning: both our nervous system processes and our scientific 
interdisciplinary endeavors tend, on his account, to minimize the surprise of outcomes 
in experime~t. There is thus a distinct continuity between the neural mechanisms that 
allow us to disclose and know the world, and the structure and purpose of scientific 
practice.78 We produce better theories and models to minimize our surprise and to 
produce better predictions, just as our nervous system refines its internai model of the 
world to the same general effect. Science, knowledge, and mind are continuous. 
Consider the work ofWason on errors in reasoning and inference, which suggests that 
we do not ordinarily perform as ideal epistemic agents. Wason ( 1960) has shown that 
we, as concrete epistemic agents, tend in general to make inferences from confirming 
evidence to reach our conclusions, rather than from both confirrning as weil as 
disconfirming evidence. Wason (1968) has also shown that subjects tend to make errors 
in logical reasoning, and tend to find making contrapositive inferences from 
conditional statements of the form p ---+ q (that is, to infer ~p from p ---+ q and ~q) 
difficult, even unwieldy. Human agents thus have a tendency to attempt to confirm 
their beliefs rather than to attempt to falsify their hypotheses, which is contrary to how 
scientific investigation ought to go about, and tend not to employ more formai kinds of 
logical thinking when confronted with a problem. Or again, consider the work of 
Kahneman and colleagues. They have shown that typically, we use heuristic reasoning 
rather than strict algorithms to solve a variety of everyday cognitive problems. What 
studies like these show is that, given our nature as limited, finite epistemic agents, 
78 This continuity, of course, is couched in rather abstract terms at the functional leve], and is purchased 
at the cost of implementational detail. The world-disclosing neural mechanisms that concrete agents are 
endowed with and the structure of scientific practice may have a common functional architecture, but 
the physical structures that realize them will necessarily be heterogeneous in nature, and in effect, the 
mechanisms that implement the former wi ll be included the implementation of the latter. 
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resulting from a long evolutionary history, we employ sorne strategies that are not 
epistemically optimal. 
To account for such suboptimal reasoning might very well be important for projects 
aiming to study how we, as fini te epistemic agents, acquire knowledge. 79 Given that 
we know that we tend to make such errors in reasoning (this is knowledge of the 
engineering or design kind we discussed above), then we ought to design our scientific 
investigations in such a way as to counteract this tendency. The point, again, is not to 
commit the naturalistic fallacy by arguing that, because humans reason in this or that 
way, they ought to reason in that way. It is only to show that knowing about such flaws 
in our reasoning, and understanding them from a design perspective, might allow us to 
better our scientific investigations and make better inferences on a daily basis. The 
process of scientific investigation and the justification of our claims to knowledge th us 
improve one another, and allow us to bootstrap our knowledge about the world and our 
knowledge about our knowledge. 
79 Husserl might reject the relevance of these cl ai ms for epistemological projects. His diagnosis is th at 
psychologism stems from the conflation of the factual , empiricallaws that underlie acts of judging with 
the normative laws of logic (see for example Husserl 1900, §22). Wh ile acts of judging are real events, 
with causes and effects, and are subject to empirical regularities which can be discovered through 
experimentation (as in the work ofTversky & Kahneman 1 974), the laws of logic are contents of mental 
activity, and as such have a normative rather than a causal role. The latter laws can only determine the 
thought process, says Husserl ~ once they have been taken up explicitly as norms for correct thinking. For 
example, while confirmation bias may be an empirical regularity about how humans reason (Wason 
1960; 1 968), this " law" does not have normative force ; wh ile hu man beings may be prone to error in 
such and such ways, they can also reason according to the laws of logic. Notice the difference in the 
ki nd of law involved in each case: on the one hand we have the laws of a theoretical discipline, and on 
the other, those of a normative discipline (for Husserl ' s distinction between theoretical and normative 
disciplines, see the Husserl 1900, §§ 1 3-16). To conflate both kinds of laws would make it impossible to 
account for errors in judgment. Moreover psychologism, which for Husserl is a kind of relativism 
grounded in traits ofhuman nature, errs on his account in conflating causal processes with idealities. My 
judgment, for instance, that 2 x 2 = 4 may be cau sally determined by, e.g. , the mechanisms of the thought 
process; however, that 2 x 2 = 4 is not a fact, nor is it causally determined by facts about my makeup as 
a human being. 
127 
Relativism 
The accusation of relativism is perhaps more difficult to counter. It might be worth 
recalling what this accusation consisted in. Husserl, notably in his Prolegomena, 
accused the advocates of psychologism of lapsing into an indefensible and absurd form 
of relativism. This was because, on their account, the truth of a given matter of fact 
would depend on the psychological makeup of the epistemic agent. For Husserl , this 
was nonsense, because it conflated the act of judging this or that to be true with the 
content of that judgment. The father of phenomenology was a Platonist: for Husserl , 
although psychological factors could, and of course did in fact, participate in the act of 
judgment, the contents of judgment themselves were objective idealities, whose truth 
value in no way depended on the makeup of the agent judging. To argue that 
psychology could tell us something about the truth value of the contents of a judgment 
was contrary to his Platonism, and therefore absurd. 
I cannot hope to provide a thorough and extensive refutation of Husserl ' s accusation 
here, given space constraints. However, I believe that I can provide the sketch of an 
answer, specifically by painting out that if we rej ect Husserl' s Platonism, th en there is 
way to supplement his framework that allows us to ground truth in our access to the 
matter of fact, which exists independently of any epistemic agent. One can argue, in 
line with Sigwart (1904) and Schlick (191 0), that Husserl ' s conflation of tru th and 
reality obfuscates the situation and leads him to accusations of relativism that are 
unfounded. On this account, what is nonrelative to the epistemic agent is arguably not 
truth, but rather the matter offact. To counter the accusation ofrelativism, we just have 
to show that the epistemic agent has access to the matter of fact. One way show that 
this is the case is to consider the epistemic capacity for an intentional, interpretive 
relation with the world. This capacity is what allows the agent to access states of affairs 
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in the world. I shall now present an outline ofhow we could address the capacity from 
a functionalist point of view. 80 While this functionalist account do es not pro vide a 
complete explanation ofintentionality, it does help us see how a response to Husserl's 
accusation could be attempted. My proposai is in no way meant to be definitive or 
exhaustive. I am only gesturing towards a general kind of response. 
Traditionally, the intentional character of our mental experience has been explained in 
philosophy of mind one of two ways, one of which will retain our attention. 81 The 
causal account of intentionality argues that what grounds our intentionality is the fact 
that we are directly, causally involved with the distal causes of our sensory states. It is 
the fact that distal causes have effects on us (specifically on our sensory surfaces) that 
grounds our ability to perceive them. In information theoretic terms, the claim is that 
mutual information between the environment and the sensory surfaces is ensured 
through causal connections between the environment and the input channel. The 
capacity for an intentional relation to the world is ensured through the operation of 
selectively sampling the environn1ent in order to derive (mutual) information about it. 
The organism must be able to acquire information about its world through the causal 
connections between the world and what we might cali its "input channel." 
This claim does not seem particularly controversial. Nearly ali models of cognitive 
processing suppose that at sorne step in the functional architecture, the cognitive system 
80 One could, of course, complete the picture by suggesting mechanistic implementations of this capacity. 
1 shalllimit my discussion to functional decomposition for lack of space. Note that I am not suggesting 
that Husserl 's theory ofintentionality could simply be replaced by a naturali stic explanation ofthe same. 
I am merely suggesting that a naturalistic explanation of intentionality contains sorne elements that can 
help us respond to Husserl's accusation ofrelativism. 
81 The second is the descriptive reading of intentionality. Hohwy (20 13) has proposed an integration of 
both approaches under the banner of pred ictive coding mechanisms. Now, traditionally, the many issues 
surrounding intentionality have been addressed in the philosophy of mi nd, rather than in epistemology . 
l would argue, however, that these issues indeed have epistemological significance. 
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receives what can generically be called sensory input from the world. This sensory 
input is the basis of the perception of the outside world and the physical body: it is 
necessary (although perhaps not sufficient) to perceive a world as such. The crucial 
point is that the organism only has access to the varying signais present in its input 
channel, and it is through these signais that it manages to have access to the world. This 
information is used to disclose the world, because it is only starting from this 
information that the cognitive system can represent the world at all. It is necessary for 
the disclosure of a world, for we only know the world as such because the hidden causes 
in the world are represented at sorne level in (or on) the sensory surfaces. 
Consider the "Bayesian room" problem discussed by Hohwy. The cognitive system 
only has access to a noisy ~ensory signal, which was encoded in its input channel. The 
system must, solely from this noisy signal , reconstruct the causes in the world, but this 
process of reconstruction is far from trivial. The sensory signais that impinge on the 
sensory states of the system, after ali , overdetermined: there is no simple, neat one-to-
one correspondence between a pattern of sensory activation and the distal causes at its 
source. The exact same sensory impression can be caused by many different quite 
heterogeneous distal causes: for instance, a picture of the moon and the moon itself, 
when seen from the right point ofview, might cause the very same retinal impression. 
Y et we do experience a world of things, we manage to infer the distal causes of our 
sensory input. As such, it seems reasonable to suggest that the nervous system has a 
way to extract the distal causes from the impinging sensory stimulation. After acquiring 
information, the nervous system interprets the signal to extract its distal causes. We 
thus have a functional information processing sequence, whereby information acquired 
is interpreted or processed at a later stage. 82 
82 Of course, to provide ·an actual explanation of this information processing sequence in the form of a 
functionalist or mechanistic model would be necessary if we were to examine the interaction between 
how the capacity is realized and how our epistemic norms change in consequence. This, however, is 
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To (partially and non-exhaustively) explain intentionality in this way can go sorne ways 
toward countering accusation of relativism, because it shows how the system can 
reliably access the state of affairs in the world. We can reject Husserl ' s Platonism 
without for ail that necessarily lapsing into relativism, at !east on this line of reasoning. 
Although the system's access to the world is mediated by its functional constitution, 
the state of affairs itself is not; the system can proceed to infer the causes of its sensory 
states and reliably disclose things in the world. This allows it to know the world. 
Conclusion 
The aim of this chapter was to address the relevance of psychologism for contemporary 
epistemology and provide an argument for what I called weak psychologism. I first 
discussed psychologism in light of the varieties of naturalism that I distinguished in the 
first chapter. I identified two kinds of psychologism, namely strong (or replacement) 
psychologism and weak (or collaborative) psychologism. After reviewing Husserl's 
argument against psychologism, I discussed the new conception of epistemology, 
which has abandoned foundationalism, and is increasingly interested in the capacities 
of concrete epistemic subjects, rather than by the abstract faculties of "pure" epistemic 
subjects. I proceeded !o the psycho-epistemological argument itself. The argument 
concludes that if epistemic capacities of concrete epistemic agents are indeed relevant 
to epistemology, then epistemology ought to heed the explanations ofthese capacities 
provided by the cognitive sciences. In closing, I suggested that sorne of the arguments 
Husserl raised against psychologism could be defused with the argument on offer. In 
beyond the scope of the present chapter. My aim is only to point to such a poss ibility, and to sketch the 
kind of explanation one might invoke of our epistemic capacities. 
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the end, the success of my argument depends crucially on accepting the new view on 
epistemology that I have discussed. 
CONCLUSION 
What have 1 leamed? 
1 have changed a great deal while working on this project. This change, 1 believe, was 
reflected in the writing process itself. I started writing the first chapter of my thesis 
with the naïve triumphalism that is the wont of new, enthusiastic graduate students. My 
tune would change quickly before the challenges that lay ahead. My appreciation of 
the difficulties inherent in the project 1 initially proposed nearly three years ago has 
increased, and with it, my scepticism with regard to that same project. 
I think 1 can break down the writing process itself into two phases. The first started in 
May 2013 and lasted until 1 submitted the first chapter for publication in October of 
that same year. 1 started my research with a naïve conception of transcendental 
phenomenology, and with the equally naïve idea that the projects to naturalize 
phenomenology had for the most part solved the problem ofuniting the transcendental 
phenomenological and the cognitive scientific perspectives into a unitary research 
programme. I did not yet see the difficulties with these positions. 1 had not yet, I now 
see, sufficiently familiarized myself with Husserl ' s transcendental phenomenological 
project to see wh y things were not so simple. 1 knew a good deal about phenomenology, 
but 1 had never been presented with the foundationalism inherent toit, and I was utterly 
unfamiliar with Husserl 's doctrine of essences. 
It was my beliefthat phenomenology was a research programme that sought a definite 
and irreducible role for conscious experience in epistemology, that aimed to define the 
function of conscious disclosure of the world in our account of how we manage to 
acquire knowledge about the world. However, there was much more to the story. Early 
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on, many discussions with sorne dedicated Husserl scholars made me realize that there 
were complexities in the questions 1 raised that 1 had not sufficiently considered, 
complexities conceming the nature and motivations ofHusserl ' s project. 1 spent most 
of my time in this first phase reviewing the primary and secondary literature on 
transcendental phenomenology, with the goal ofunderstanding the project that Husserl 
had laid out, and of examining the limits of the various contemporary attempts to 
naturalize phenomenology with respect to the desiderata of his project. 1 discovered, to 
my amazement, that transcendental phenomenology was a different sort of beast than 
what I had anticipated. 
1 spent the fall writing the chapter itself. Still convinced that Husserl ' s project provided 
an interesting framework for epistemology, 1 sought a form of naturalism that would 
be compatible with it. By then, 1 had realized that the naturalization projects in 
epistemology, and indeed also the proj ect to naturalize phenomenology, were contrary 
to Husserl ' s approach. 1 would rewrite the chapter twice in response to reviewer 
comments, and each rewrite made it clearer to me that it was against the spirit of 
transcendental phenomenology to allow for naturalization, both of epistemology and 
of phenomenology. This first phase of the writing process ended with the publication 
of my first thesis chapter in the journal Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences . 
Writing the first chapter made me more knowledgeable about transcendental 
phenomenology, but also more sceptical about Husserl ' s project. After reading many 
of his published and posthumous works, 1 realized that 1 had not found what 1 was 
looking for. 1 sought in Husserl ' s corpus an epistemological framework apt to articulate 
consciousness and physical embodiment, a project apt to determine how what we call 
consciousness fits into contemporary epistemology. lnstead, 1 found foundationalism 
and idealism. After publishing my first chapter, 1 decided that 1 no longer endorsed 
Husserl ' s project, and wanted to step outside of its boundaries. The second chapter 
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reflects this change in position and takes as its starting point those very positions 
Husserl criticized with so much conviction. 
Have I succeeded in what I set out to do? 
In general, my self-assessment is that while each chapter, considered separately, 
arguably reaches its aim, the thesis itself falls short of its original objective to build a 
bridge between naturalistic epistemology and transcendental phenomenology. Writing 
the thesis made me realize, more and more with each passing hour, and with each 
rewrite, that a rapprochement of the kind I wished for at the outset was impossible. I 
take solace, however, in that I think I have been able to show why the dialogue between 
naturalistic epistemology and transcendental phenomenology is so difficult, notably by 
identifying the premises of contention and the main conceptual tensions between the 
two frameworks. Furthermore, I think my thesis makes a fair attempt at exposing these 
difficulties from both sides of the divide. Although I fall short of my original goal, this 
modest success, in itself, is cause, if not for celebration, then at !east for the satisfaction 
ofhaving shown why my initial project could not be carried out. 
The first chapter, I think, does what it sets out to do. To the best of my capacity, I have 
tried to define a form of naturalism compatible with transcendental phenomenology, 
and 1 think I may have succeeded in this modest respect. This means that naturali sm 
perse is not antithetical to Husserl ' s project, at !east not in every sense of the term. I 
have drawn on some ofHusserl's posthumously published works, especially the second 
and third volumes of the Ideen series, to show that the .father of transcendental 
phenomenology viewed the mind (Seele) and the lived body (Leib) as parts of the 
ontological region called "nature," that is, as natural things with natural properties, 
subject to natural nomological regularities. In as much as this entails that the mind and 
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the lived body can be studied by the natural sciences (especially, as Husserl proposes, 
by the science he called "somatology"), it seems to be the case that a weak form of 
naturalism is compatible with the transcendental phenomenological framework. This 
arguably opens sorne space of dialogue between cognitive science and transcendental 
phenomenology. But, in the end, does this get us any doser to bridging naturalistic 
epistemology with transcendental phenomenology? 
The form of naturalism that I arrived at, the conditional form of methodological 
naturalism, is weak indeed. Many partisans of the project to naturalize epistemology 
and phenomenology might find the position much too weak to be of any use to their 
own projects. The idea, central to these naturalistic thinkers, that epistemology (and/or 
phenomenology in its epistemological function) , might be reduced to psychology or 
any other natural science--or even be informed by drawing on sorne oftheir methods-
is contrary to the fundamental tenets of Husserl ' s transcendental phenomenology. 
Although a form of naturalism is, as I have tried to argue, full y compatible with, even 
complementary to, the project for a transcendental phenomenology, it is unlikely that 
this rapprochement will be seen as a useful accommodation (or even a fair concession, 
really) for those engaged in naturalization projects. 
So, although the first chapter achieves its immediate desideratum, insofar as it defines 
a variety of naturalism that is compatible with transcendental phenomenology, it does 
not really advance us in our attempt to bridge the do mains of naturalistic epistemology 
and transcendental phenomenology. The rapprochement fails : constat d 'échec. 
Nonetheless, I would argue that the first chapter does have the merit of showing how 
and why the rapprochement fails . The bridge collapses because of the irreconcilable 
differences between the premises and commitments of the naturalistic and 
transcendentalist conceptions of epistemology and their respective relation to the 
sciences. Husserl's project is a foundationalism: epistemology must unilaterally 
provide a foundation for the sciences. Naturalistic epistemology is a rejection of this 
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unilateralism, a call for either replacement or collaboration. Dialogue is impossible 
because both parties adopt contrary premises. 
Similarly, I believe that the second chapter achieves its proximal objective, but does 
not really help to bridge the abyss between both registers either. The second chapter 
presents the argument that, insofar as we endorse the recent paradigm shift in 
contemporary epistemology, which is now interested (among other things) in the 
epistemic capacities of concrete agents, then psychologism follows. That is, in as much 
as it is the case that (1) epistemology is interested in how concrete agents, that is, agents 
such as ourselves, agents that are embodied and embedded in historical and cultural 
contexts, manage to acquire knowledge about our worlds; given that (2) there exist 
sciences that provide explanations of those capacities; and given that (3) these 
explanations ought to matter to epistemology if one of its aim is to account for such 
capacities; then it follows that (4) psychology ought to inform epistemology. 
The reason why this argument, even if successful, fails to provide us with a bridge 
between the two fields is that it rests entirely on accepting the first premise, as indicated 
repeatedly throughout the chapter. And ultimately, it is real! y this first pre mise that is 
contentious form the perspective of transcendental phenomenology. What separates 
naturalistic episternology from Husserl ' s transcendental phenomenology is arguably a 
significant and irreconcilable difference in how each party understands the subject of 
knowledge. For the naturalistic thinkers, the subject ofknowledge is the concrete agent. 
However, for transcendental phenomenology, the subject of knowledge is none other 
than transcendental or absolute consciousness. Husserl repeated, again and again, that 
he was not interested in the psycho-physical subject: the transcendental reduction 
precisely brackets that subject, and discloses the "pure" consciousness that constitutes 
or discloses everything else. So, while the argument does not bridge the abyss per se, 
it nevertheless has the merit of showing us exactly where the naturalistic episternologist 
·and the transcendental phenornenologist are bound to disagree. 
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Lirnits and concessions . 
The thesis on offer here has many lirnits. I could have looked for points of contact 
elsewhere. There are certainly many more such points than those I have been able to 
study in this thesis, and they may have helped to shed additional light on the issues 
addressed. For instance, as indicated in the introduction, 1 could weil have exarnined 
sorne of the later works in Husserl ' s corpus, in which his interest in experimental 
psychology, as weil as its relation to the epistemological dimension of transcendental 
phenomenology, is taken as therne and expanded upon. Many other directions would 
have been possible, and earl y drafts of the second chapter reflect these possibilities. 1 
could have focused my attention on the issue of evidence, which made Husserl the 
target of rouch criticisrn, and which in part motivated his la ter turn to a philosophy of 
the transcendental subject. (One of the earlier versions of the second chapter tried to 
examine the limits of evidence in the phenomenological framework, and to suggest that 
the gaps in conscious evidence pointed towards the operation of unconscious cognitive 
processes.) 1 could have followed this path and many others. 
Despite this, I do think that I have found what, in the final analysis, prevents naturalistic 
epistemology and transcendental phenomenology from coming into serious dialogue. I 
wager that these difficulties, inherent in the foundational project itself as weil as in the 
conception of the episternic agent pertaining to each project, would have resurfaced no 
matter the angle of pursuit. The projects are irreconcilable at many different levels. 
My treatmerrt of psychologisrn is also, adrnittedly, rather partial. Psychologism for 
Husserl was not only a position in epistemology, but also in logic and mathematics. 
Husserl ' s anti-psychologisrn was rnotivated in a large rneasure by his cornmitment to 
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the ideality of meaning and to the irreducibility of meaning to psychological processes 
and concrete characteristics of the epistemic agent. Although 1 address the issue in 
passing in the second chapter, it may have been worthwhile to explore the connection 
between epistemological and logical forms of psychologism, as one of my evaluators 
has suggested. 
The thesis also admits of limits as to the scope of the literature reviewed. My review 
ofthe work on naturalistic epistemology could have been expanded upon significantly, 
to include more recent work on the questions by authors such as Kitcher, Komblith, 
Goldman, and Stich. lndeed, 1 essentially stick to the body of work produced from the 
late 1960s to the early 1990s, and the field has admittedly changed since. Doing so . 
might have streamlined the first three sections on naturalism, as the question of weak 
versus strong psychologism seems to be discussed extensively in this more recent 
literature. 
The questions 1 explored during my master' s degree will continue to fuel my reflection, 
but I feel 1 have moved on to a new set of questions. My research, however, has opened 
my eyes to the possibility of using the many things 1 have leamed in phenomenology 
and epistemology in a concrete way. 
1 am grateful to everyone that has helped me along the way. 
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